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INTRODUCTION
"I'm sorry, Dave, but . .. 'When the crew are dead or inca-
pacitated, the onboard computer must assume control' ... I
must, therefore, override your authority now since you are not
in any condition to exercise it intelligently." HALl
Congress has concluded that the voyage of consumer bankruptcy
in the United States is off course and that some of its crew - consumer
bankruptcy attorneys and bankruptcy judges - no longer can be com-
pletely trusted at the helm. Following years of drama reminiscent of
the 1914 silent film serial "Perils of Pauline," we now have a mid-
course correction: the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 ("the Act").2 Save perhaps the 1938 introduc-
1. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (MGM 1968).
2. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCP Act). Prior to the passage of the
BAPCP Act in the 109th Congress, bankruptcy reform legislation containing virtually
all of its essential features failed in each of the four preceding Congresses, notwith-
standing significant and consistent bipartisan support. The journey began in the 105th
Congress. The House of Representatives passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998,
H.R. 3150, 105th Congo (1998), by a vote of 306-118. 144 CONGo REC. H4442 (1998).
After substituting the language of S. 1301, 105th Congo (1998), the Senate passed the
bill by a vote of 97-1. 144 CONGo REC. S10767, 10789 (1998). The House of Representa-
tives agreed to the resulting Conference Report (H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794 (1998»,
by a vote of 300-125. 144 CONGo REC. H10239-40 (1998). Opposition to the Conference
Report by Senate Democrats and a threatened veto by President Clinton killed the bill
in the Senate. Caroline E. Mayer, Negotiators Complete Bankruptcy Reform Bill, WASH.
POST, Oct. 8, 1998, at E01; Monica Borkowski, The JOSth Congress; A Look Back at a
Legislative Term, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, §1, at 22.
In the 106th Congress, the House of Representatives passed the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Congo (1999), by a vote of 313-108. 145 CONGo REC.
H2770-71 (1999). After substituting the language of S. 625, 106th Congo (1999), the
Senate passed H.R. 833 by a vote of 83-14 and requested a conference. 146 CONGo REC.
S255 (2000). The Senate version, which renamed the measure the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 2000, included an amendment offered by Senator Charles Schumer (D.N.Y.)
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 227
("Schumer amendment") restricting the dischargeability of fines and judgments in-
curred by virtue of impermissible obstruction of access to providers of abortion services.
H.R. 833 (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate), 106th Congo § 328 (2000). It
also included an amendment capping the homestead exemption at $100,000. H.R. 833
§ 324. The Schumer amendment, tangential to the bankruptcy reform then desired by
bipartisan majorities of Congress, was a poison pill carefully chosen by opponents ofthe
proposed consumer bankruptcy reform. Anathema to right-to-life legislators, it worked
for a time, killing bankruptcy reform legislation in the 106th, 107th, and 108th Con-
gresses. Near the end ofthe 106th Congress, House and Senate Republicans executed a
controversial legislative maneuver. A conference committee stripped the American Em-
bassy Security Act of 1999, H.R. 2415, 106th Congo (2000), of all but its bill number and
then agreed to the bill after substituting the text of S. 3186, a bankruptcy bill first
introduced the same day in the Senate. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-970 (2000). Because a
conference report is both privileged (motions to proceed to them cannot be debated) and
not amendable, this forced an up or down vote in both houses on a bill that did not even
purport to reconcile earlier conflicting versions of H.R. 833. Senator Wellstone later
described and criticized this maneuver in comments on the Senate floor. 146 CONGo
REC. S11683, S11687-88 (2000) (statement of Senator Wellstone). The bill reported out
of conference included neither the $100,000 cap on the homestead exemption nor the
Schumer amendment that had emanated from the Senate in its engrossed version of
H.R. 833. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-970 (2000). A day later, the House of Representa-
tives passed the bill by voice vote. 146 CONGo REC. H9840 (2000). The Senate, pre-
cluded from either filibuster or amendment, passed the bill in December 2000 by a vote
of 70-28. 146 CONGo REC. S11730 (2000). President Clinton pocket vetoed the bill, em-
phasizing two features ofH.R. 2415 in his message explaining the pocket veto: failure to
include language making non-dischargeable debts incurred for abortion clinic violence,
and failure to cap the homestead exemption. President's Memorandum of Disapproval
regarding the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000," 36 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 3130
(Dec. 25, 2000).
The election of Republican President George Bush in November 2000 buoyed the
prospect for reform in the 107th Congress. On March 1, 2001, the House of Representa-
tives passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001,
H.R. 333, 107th Congo (2001), a bill virtually identical to the bill pocket vetoed by Presi-
dent Clinton, by a vote of 306-108. 147 CONGo REC. H600-01 (2001). On March 15, 2001,
the Senate passed its version, S. 420, 107th Congo (2001), by a vote of 83-15. 147 CONGo
REC. S2379 (2001). The Senate bill included a cap on the homestead exemption and the
Schumer amendment. 147 CONGo REC. S2480, 2496, 2501 (2001).
Differences between the competing versions necessitated a conference. The battle
for power in the Senate, split equally between Democrats and Republicans following the
November 2000 national elections, delayed appointments to a conference committee in
the first months of 2001. The impasse, unrelated to bankruptcy reform, was ultimately
broken by the May 2001 defection of Senator James Jeffords from the Republican Party
and the consequent reallocation of power in the Senate. Katharine Q. Seelye & Adam
Clymer, Balance of Power: The Power Shift; Senate Republicans Step Out and Demo-
crats Jump In, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at AI. In July 2001, the Senate considered
H.R. 333, first offering the language of S. 420 as a substitute and then passing H.R. 333
with the substitute language by a vote of 82-16. 147 CONGo REC. S7553-54 (2001); 147
CONGo REC. S7742 (2001). The substitute language included both a cap on the home-
stead exemption and the Schumer amendment. 147 CONGo REC. S7742, 7758, 7762
(2001). The Senate and House then named members of the conference just prior to the
summer recess. 147 CONGo REC. S7796 (2001); 147 CONGo REC. H4954-55 (2001). The
first meeting of the conference, which was scheduled for September 12, 2001, was post-
poned as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The
terrorist attacks put war, security, and related matters at the top of the legislative
agenda, and the conference did not first meet until November 2001. The attacks, to-
gether with a reported recession in progress, also created a climate of economic instabil-
ity and uncertainty and highlighted the economic suffering of some citizens. In
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228 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
addition, the bankruptcy filing and off-balance-sheet transactions of energy trading gi-
ant Enron commanded attention to the manner in which bankruptcy law treated securi-
tized assets sold to special purpose vehicles and to the unseemly prospect of Enron
executives residing in Texas or Florida preserving expensive homesteads in bankruptcy
even though the retirement accounts of many Enron employees, invested heavily in En-
ron stock, had been devastated. In that climate, legislation to restrict consumer bank-
ruptcy filing was not politically palatable. Riva D. Atlas, How Will Washington Read
the Signs? Review of Bankruptcy Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, §3, at 13.
On April 23, 2002, the conference reached agreement on a provision capping the
homestead exemption at $125,000 for convicted felons and those owing debts under fed-
eral or state securities laws and barring use of an unlimited exemption to anyone who
had not lived in the relevant state for at least 40 months. Philip Shenon, Congress
Panel Agrees to Limit Home Shield in Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,2002, §C, at I.
On July 25, 2002, the conference agreed to compromise language on the issue raised by
the Schumer amendment and issued its report. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-617 (2002);
Philip Shenon, Negotiators Agree on Bill to Rewrite Bankruptcy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 2002, at AI. In a stunning vote on November 14, 2002, fueled by the objections of
right-to-life legislators to the compromise version of the Schumer amendment, the
House ofRepresentatives, by a vote of 172-243, rejected a motion to consider the Confer-
ence Report. 148 CONGo REG. H8742-8757 (2002). It then passed a version of the bill,
stripped of both the cap on the homestead exemption and the Schumer amendment, by
a vote of 244-116, 148 CONGo REG. H8825-8877 (2002), and sent it to the Senate, but
then Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D.S.D) announced that the Senate, which
was scheduled to adjourn shortly, would not pass the bill and therefore would not con-
sider the bill. Philip Shenon, Bankruptcy Bill, Caught in Abortion Dispute, Dies in Con-
gress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2002, at A15. Bankruptcy reform thus died in the 107th
Congress, poisoned by the Schumer amendment.
Sponsors tried again in the 108th Congress. Early in 2003, the House, by a vote of
315-113, passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2003, H.R. 975, 108th Congo (2003), a bill virtually identical to the bill passing the
House in November 2002 (i.e. without an outright cap on the homestead exemption or
the Schumer amendment), but the bill languished in the Senate without a vote for the
balance of the congressional term in part because the Senate's support of the Schumer
amendment had not changed.
The November 2004 elections, in which Republicans gained four Senate seats,
changed the political landscape sufficiently to bring the epic struggle to an end.
Jonathan Yarowsky, advisor to and lobbyist for the National Association of Consumer
Bankruptcy Attorneys ("NACBA") since 1998, explained the end game in his comments
to attendees of the 13th Annual Convention of the NACBA in San Diego, California on
April 29, 2005. Following the elections, bankruptcy reform was viewed in both houses
and in the White House as "low hanging fruit," especially given the absence of any sig-
nificant congressional business in the first months of 2005. Republican leadership in
the Senate, in cooperation with Republican leadership in the House and with the sup-
port of the White House, insisted that Senate Republicans vote as a bloc against all
amendments to a bankruptcy bill save for those pre-cleared by House leadership. As a
result, the Senate passed S.256, carrying the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005 by a vote of 74-25. 151 CONGo REG. S2474 (daily ed. Mar.
10, 2005). Before doing so, the Senate rejected virtually all amendments offered on the
floor of the Senate, including the Schumer amendment and an outright $300,000 cap on
the homestead exemption, and invoked cloture. 151 CONGo REG. S. 2215, 2326, 2216
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005). Passage by the House of Representatives on April 14, 2005
followed swiftly, by a vote of 302-126. 151 CONGo REG. H2076-77 (daily ed. Apr. 14,
2005). President Bush signed the measure on April 20, 2005. Although the Act does not
include an outright cap on the homestead exemption, it restricts homestead exemptions
in some cases involving fraudulent transfers, some cases involving acquisition of a
homestead within 1215 days of filing the petition, and some cases involving certain
debtor misconduct. For discussion of these restrictions, see Margaret Howard, Exemp-
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 229
tion of Chapter XIII, the correction presents the most far reaching
changes in consumer bankruptcy law since the adoption of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898. These changes come little more than a decade af-
ter Congress established a National Bankruptcy Review Commission
(the second such commission in twenty-five years) to review, improve,
and update the Bankruptcy Code "in ways which do not disturb the
fundamental tenets and balance of current law."3 A House Report ac-
companying the legislation that established the second Commission
pronounced Congress "generally satisfied with the basic framework
established in the current Bankruptcy Code."4
The Act ignores most of the Commission's consumer bankruptcy
recommendations.5 Fueled by concern about dramatic increases in
tions Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments: A Tale of Opportunity Lost, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 397, 398-408 (2005).
For an entire article devoted to the legislative history of the Act, see Susan Jensen,
A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005).
3. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 59 (1994). Title VI of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4107, 4147 (1994) established the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission. The commission issued its report on October 20, 1997,
NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT
(Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter COMM'N REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edul
nbrdreporttitlepg.html. Ironically, Senator Grassley (R. Iowa), a prime mover of the
Act and predecessor bills in previous Congresses, said the following of the Commission's
contemplated work:
[Tlo review the code, and ... not ... to overhaul it. The term 'fine-tuning'
might better fit the purpose we see behind the Commission's establishment,
because we on the Judiciary Committee are generally satisfied with the code,
and we are not interested in the proposals that start from scratch.
140 CONGo REC. S4508 (1994).
Congress established the earlier commission in 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468
(1970), and that commission provided its report on July 30, 1973. REPORT OF THE
COMMN ON THE BANKR. LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, PTs. I & II
(1973).
4. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 59 (1994).
5. See George J. Wallace, The National Bankruptcy Review Commission and Con-
sumer Bankruptcy: Proposals in Search ofa Rationale, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 341,
341-42 (1997). Critical of the Commission's consumer bankruptcy reform recommenda-
tions, Mr. Wallace concludes "Its early obscurity deserves to be its final epitaph." [d. at
362. Evaluation of the Commission's consumer bankruptcy reform recommendations
reminds us of Goldilocks and the Three Bears. Mr. Wallace found the recommendations
too favorable to debtors. [d. Gary Klein, StaffAttorney at the National Consumer Law
Center, found the recommendations too favorable to creditors. Gary Klein, Consumer
Bankruptcy in the Balance: The National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Recommen-
dations Tilt Toward Creditors, 5 AMER. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 293 (1997). Not surpris-
ingly, Commission Reporter Elizabeth Warren found the recommendations just right.
Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AMER. BANKR.
L.J. 483 (1997). Professor Warren's article also described the high stakes, intense scru-
tiny, and professional lobbying associated with the Commission's consideration of con-
sumer bankruptcy reform. The text of the Commission's consumer bankruptcy
recommendations may be found in Appendix A to Professor Warren's article. [d. at 509.
The text can also be found in the COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, Vol. I, at 1-9.
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230 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
Chapter 7 filing rates,6 the Act accepts instead the premise, advanced
persistently and forcefully by and on behalf of extenders of consumer
Many of the recommendations were highly controversial within the Commission.
The consumer bankruptcy reform recommendations, referred to collectively by the Com-
mission as a "framework," were adopted by a 5-4 vote. Views of the dissenting commis-
sioners, some strident, are expressed in Chapter 5 ofthe Commission Report. E.g., Hon.
Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, Vol. I, at
1043. The animosity and deep divisions reflected in parts of the dissent have been mir-
rored in the ensuing four years of national debate:
Seen in its best light, the Framework reflects the well-intentioned aspirations
of individuals who live in ivy-covered towers who have no real day-to-day expe-
rience with the law they are seeking to reform. The sum of their knowledge of
consumer bankruptcy is the incomplete raw data from selected judicial dis-
tricts from which they draw "undisputable" conclusions and make recommen-
dations, and the culled and selected portions of the Commission's hearings and
materials ... which reflect and support their preconceived ideas of problems
and need for reform.
[d. at 1115.
The harsh language ran both ways. Professor Warren, one of the "individuals who
livers] in ivy-covered towers," is quoted as saying "Those who want to say [that] the way
to solve rising consumer bankruptcy is by changing the law are the same people who
would have said during a malaria epidemic that the way to cut down on hospital admis-
sions is to lock the door." Peter Pae & Stephanie Stoughton, Personal Bankruptcy Fil·
ings Hit Record; Easy Credit Blamed, Congress May Act, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at
AI.
Some members of Congress were predisposed to ignore recommendations of the
Commission Report prior to its receipt by Congress, as evidenced by considerably differ-
ent consumer bankruptcy reform provisions in both the Responsible Borrower Protec-
tion Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Congo (1997), which was introduced a month
before the Commission issued its report, and the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1997, S. 1301, 105th Congo (1997), introduced one day after the Commission issued its
report.
Professor David Skeel attributed the chilly reception of the Commission's Report to
two factors: a shift to a Republican controlled Congress in 1994 after the appointment of
the Commission and the Commission's apparent slighting ofthe law-and-economics per-
spective on consumer bankruptcy. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION, A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAw IN AMERICA 199-202 (2001).
6. The number of non-business Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings for the calendar


























Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics, available at
http://www.uscourts.govibnkrpctystats/statistics.htm#calendar (last visited July 23,
2005).
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credit, that too many consumer debtors with the ability to repay
meaningful amounts of non-priority unsecured debt have been seeking
Chapter 7 relief.7 Advocates of reform have attributed much of this
7. Several studies attempted to predict the number of consumer debtors that a
means test would screen from Chapter 7 as well as the amount of non-priority un-
secured debt that consumer debtors screened from Chapter 7 by a means test could
repay. GAO reports in 1998 and 1999 reviewed, analyzed, and summarized the key
studies. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Personal Bankruptcy: The Credit Research
Center Report on Debtors' Ability to Pay (1998) [hereinafter 1998 GAO REPORT], availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98047.pdf; UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, Report to Congressional Requestors, Personal Bankruptcy, Analysis of Four
Reports on Chapter 7 Debtors' Ability to Pay (1999) [hereinafter 1999 GAO REPORT),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99103.pdf.
The 1998 GAO REPORT reviewed a study prepared for the Credit Research Center:
JOHN M. BARRON & MICHAEL E. STATEN, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: A REPORT ON PETITION-
ERS' ABILITY-TO-REPAY (1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulnbrc/report/
g2b.pdf. That study concluded the following:
[A)pproximately 25% of Chapter 7 debtors declared income sufficient to repay
at least 30 percent of their non-housing debt over 5 years while still maintain-
ing their mortgage or rental payments on their homes. Ten percent of Chapter
7 debtors declared income sufficient to repay at least 78% of their non-housing
debt over 5 years. Five percent of Chapter 7 debtors could have repaid 100% of
their debts over 5 years.
[d. at 31.
The United States General Accounting Office suggested that additional research
and clarification would be needed to confirm the accuracy of the report's conclusions.
1998 GAO REPORT, at 2.
The 1999 GAO REPORT reviewed four studies. Ernst and Young LLP, sponsored by
Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard International, produced two of the studies: TOM NEUBIG,
FRITZ SCHEUREN, GAUTAM JAGGI, & ROBIN LEE, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, CHAPTER 7 BANK-
RUPTCY PETITIONERS' ABILITY TO REPAY: THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1997 (1998) [here-
inafter 1998 EY STUDY], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/5343.htm; TOM
NEUBIG, FRITZ SCHEUREN, GAUTAM JAGGI, & ROBIN LEE, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, CHAPTER
7 BANKRUPTCY PETITIONERS' REPAYMENT ABILITY UNDER H.R. 833: THE NATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVE (Mar. 1999) [hereinafter 1999 EY STUDY], reprinted at 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 79 (1999), available at http://lobby.la.psu.edul046_Bankruptcy_Reform/Congres-
sionaLStatements/House/H_Gekas_030099.pdf. Law professors at Creighton Univer-
sity School of Law, funded by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, produced
a third study based on data gathered for a study of reaffirmation practices. Marianne
B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a
Test Drive: Means Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999)
[hereinafter Creighton Study)' Researchers at the Executive Office for United States
Trustees produced the fourth study. GORDON BERMANT & ED FLYNN, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
FOR UNITED STATES TRUSTEES, INCOMES, DEBTS, AND REPAYMENT CAPACITIES OF RE-
CENTLY DISCHARGED CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS (1999) [hereinafter EOUST STUDY], http://
www.usdoj.gov/usUeo/public_affairsiarticlesidocslch7trends-Ol.htm.
The four studies differed in a variety of respects, including the sampling method,
the proposed legislation by which repayment ability was measured, and the assump-
tions used to estimate debtors' living expenses and debt repayments. 1999 GAO RE-
PORT, at 8-22. Accordingly, their results are not entirely comparable.
The 1998 EY STUDY concluded that 15% of consumer Chapter 7 debtors annually
would be subject to dismissal and could pay $4 billion in non-priority unsecured debt
over 5 years. [d. at 15. Applying the same legislation, the Creighton Study concluded
that 3.6% of consumer Chapter 7 debtors annually would be subject to dismissal and
could pay $870 million in non-priority unsecured debt over 5 years. [d. Applying differ-
ent legislation, the 1999 EY STUDY concluded that 10% of consumer Chapter 7 debtors
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232 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
alleged abuse to consumer bankruptcy law that they characterize as
lenient, to an alleged decline in the moral shame and social stigma
associated with bankruptcy, and to increased attorney advertising.8
This claim of abuse, together with concomitant suggestions for re-
stricted access to the Chapter 7 discharge, is a familiar refrain, having
been advanced several times during the twentieth century, most nota-
bly in the 1930s, in the 1960s, and soon after the 1979 effective date of
the Bankruptcy Code.9 The claim also has deeper historical roots. As
Professor Bruce Mann has argued, from at least the beginning of the
eighteenth century "inability to pay was [perceived as] a moral failure,
not a business risk."lO
annually would be subject to dismissal and could repay $3 billion in non-priority un-
secured debt over 5 years. Id. Based on varying assumptions, the EOUST STUDY con-
cluded that between 12.2% and 15% of Chapter 7 debtors annually would be subject to
dismissal and could repay between less than $1 billion and a maximum $3.76 billion in
non-priority unsecured debt over 5 years. Id.
Each ofthe studies assumed the accuracy of data reported by debtors in their bank-
ruptcy schedules, assumed that the income and allowable living expenses of debtors
would remain constant for five years following the filing of a petition, and assumed that
all debtors required to file a five-year Chapter 13 plan would complete the plan. 1999
GAO REPORT, at 3. None of the three assumptions had been validated and review of
data on completion rates under Chapter 13 (36% average completion rate from 1980-
1988) led the GAO to conclude that repayment could be less than that predicted by
these studies. Id. The Creighton Study characterized the assumption that there would
be no change in income or expenses during the five years following the petition and the
assumption that 100% of debtors would complete payments in a five-year Chapter 13
plan as "impossible dreams." Creighton Study, at 59-60.
8. The argument is developed at length in Honorable Edith H. Jones & Todd J.
Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177 (1999). See also A. Mechele
Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J.
243 (2001) (arguing advocacy for means testing in bankruptcy is consistent with evolv-
ing public attitudes toward public entitlement programs, such as welfare, which have
been altered to require greater personal responsibility and sacrifice as a condition to the
receipt of benefits).
Jones and Zywicki offer a useful distinction between shame and stigma: "Shame is
the internal, psychological compass that forces one to keep his word; stigma is the exter-
nal, social constraint that reinforces this." Jones & Zywicki, 1999 BYU L. REV. at 215.
Gordon Bermant reviews recent studies attempting to correlate increased individual
bankruptcy filings with decline in shame and stigma, reflects upon the difficulty of mea-
suring shame and stigma, and questions the validity of certain research proxies for
shame and stigma. Gordon Bermant, What's Stigma Got to Do with It?, 22 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 22 (2003). See also Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Empiricism: Lighthouse Still
No Good, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 425, 450-55 (2001) (reviewing TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZA.
BETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, AMERICANS
IN DEBT (2000» (arguing that theories and anecdotes rather than statistically valid
study support claims of decline in stigma).
9. David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise ofConsumer Bankruptcy: Evolu-
tion, Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 314-20 (1999).
10. Bruce H. Mann, Failure in the Land of the Free, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2003)
(adapted from Professor Mann's book, BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANK·
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"Means testing" is a cornerstone of the perceived solution. Means
testing, a formula applied to the imputed income, imputed expenses,
and actual debt of some individuals who file, or might otherwise file, a
Chapter 7 petition, can deny Chapter 7 relief to some consumer debt-
ors presumed able to pay a defined portion of their non-priority un-
secured debt over a five-year period.ll Although means testing will
affect only a small percentage of individual debtors contemplating
Chapter 7, it has nonetheless commanded the lion's share of debate,
overshadowing other significant components of the reform. I discuss
several of these other components of consumer bankruptcy reform in
this Article. Part I considers the purposes, contours, and possible ben-
efits, costs, and consequences of two new conditions to Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 relief for individual debtors: receipt by the debtor of a
briefing and related budget analysis by a nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agency as a condition to the filing of a petition, and comple-
tion of an instructional course in personal financial management as a
condition to discharge. Part II explains means testing and dismissal
of consumer Chapter 7 cases for abuse, in part to suggest both the
transitory and enduring flaws of means testing and in part to provide
important context for the remaining portions of the Article. Part III
considers provisions requiring that consumer Chapter 7 debtors fur-
nish what may often be superfluous additional information and com-
putations in support of a petition. Part IV considers extensive new
rules governing the behavior of consumer bankruptcy attorneys. It in-
cludes discussion of rules restricting the kind of advice that an attor-
ney may give to a client and mandating specific content in advertising,
rules that raise significant First Amendment issues. It also includes
discussion of rules imposing new due diligence obligations upon con-
sumer bankruptcy attorneys and authorizing sanctions for violation of
those obligations, rules that have raised significant concerns about the
viability of consumer bankruptcy practice and access of debtors to le-
gal representation.
Together with significant reform of Chapter 13, which I do not
discuss, this package of reforms - - counseling, instruction, means test-
ing, documentation, and attorney regulation - - constitutes the core of
the Act's consumer bankruptcy design. Its architects have clearly in-
tended through them to constrict the availability, feasibility, and de-
11. The Act also provides for means testing of some Chapter 13 debtors to deter-
mine the amount of disposable income they must devote to payments under a Chapter
13 plan, BAPCP Act, supra note 2, § 102(h) (amending § 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code), and probably also provides for means testing of some Chapter 11 debtors who are
individuals to determine the amount of disposable income they must devote to pay-
ments under a Chapter 11 plan, BAPCP Act, supra note 2, § 321(c) (adding
§ 1129(a)(15) to the Bankruptcy Code). I do not discuss means testing in those contexts.
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234 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
sirability of Chapter 7 relief for individuals. The mid-course
correction occurred on October 17, 2005. 12
I. PRE-PETITION BRIEFING FROM A CREDIT COUNSELING
AGENCY AND POST-PETITION INSTRUCTION IN
PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
The Act introduces two new conditions to bankruptcy relief for an
individual debtor. First, an individual may not file a petition without
the benefit of a ''briefing" and related budget analysis from an ap-
proved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency ("counseling
agency" or "agency") during the ISO-day period preceding the date of
filing a petition.13 To assure compliance, the Act requires the debtor
to file both a certificate from an approved counseling agency stating
that the debtor received the briefing and a copy of any debt repayment
plan developed through the agency.l4 Second, the Act denies an indi-
vidual debtor a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 discharge absent post-peti-
tion completion of an approved instructional course in personal
financial management. 15 The Act does not exempt sole proprietors (or
other individuals whose debts are not primarily consumer debts) from
either of the two new requirements even though experience in operat-
ing a business likely makes either credit counseling or instruction in
personal financial management superfluous for many such debtors.
Likewise, the Act does not exempt others whose education, training,
or experience will make a briefing and budget analysis or instruction
in financial management superfluous, but the bright line rule avoids
12. President Bush signed the Act on April 20, 2005. With exceptions not relevant
to this Article, the Act became effective 180 days following enactment. BAPCP Act,
supra note 2, § 150l.
13. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 § 106(a) (2005) [hereinafter BAPCP Act] (adding § 109(h) to the
Bankruptcy Code).
14. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(d) (adding § 521(b) to the Bankruptcy Code).
A proposed interim amendment to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure requires
the debtor to file the certificate and debt repayment plan, if any, with the petition. FED.
R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(7), (c) (proposed interim amended rule), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/ruleslCPA2005frext_Consumer_Rules.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
15. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(b) (adding § 727(a)(1l) to the Bankruptcy
Code); id. § 106(c) (adding § 1328(g) to the Bankruptcy Code). Note that these sections
would preclude discharge if, after filing a petition, the debtor has failed to complete the
required course of instruction. The sections do not state that the debtor must both start
and complete the course of instruction after filing the petition. If a debtor may start a
course of instruction pre-petition, counseling agencies might attract debtors by offering
and advertising a package that includes both pre-petition credit counseling and pre-
petition instruction in personal financial management and schedule completion of the
instruction (e.g. taking a multiple choice test) for a time after, even on the same day as,
the debtor files a petition.
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both the burden of administering an exemption and its uneven
application.
The Act charges the United States trustee16 with the task of eval-
uating, approving, and annually re-evaluating counseling agencies
and instructional courses, and requires that bankruptcy court clerks
maintain a publicly available list of approved agencies and instruction
providers.17 The United States Trustee Program announced the be-
ginning of the approval process and posted the application forms and
related materials on June 30, 2005.18 It began accepting applications
on July 5, 2005.19 The Act exempts from the briefing or education
requirements those debtors filing in districts in which the United
States trustee determines that the approved counseling agencies or
instructional courses, as the case may be, cannot adequately serve all
who would otherwise be required to obtain a briefing or financial man-
agement instruction.2o The Act also exempts debtors from a pre-peti-
tion briefing and budget analysis upon submission to the court of a
satisfactory certification ofboth exigent circumstances and inability to
16. I follow the convention used in the Act of using the lower case for "trustee" and
of referring to the United States trustee in the singular notwithstanding that the Attor-
ney General of the United States appoints a different United States trustee for each of
21 regions. 28 U.S.C. § 581 (2000). Note, in addition, the Executive Office for United
States Trustees has assumed responsibilities, assigned by language in the Act to "the
United States trustee," for the approval of nonprofit credit counseling agencies and
providers of personal financial management instruction. See infra notes 18 and 42.
17. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code).
Hopefully bankruptcy court clerks will post the list on the Web for the convenience of
individual debtors and consumer bankruptcy attorneys, although, as suggested later,
many individual debtors would not benefit from any information on the Web. See infra
pp.268-70.
18. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM, PRESS RELEASE: U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM BE-
GINS APPROVAL PROCESS FOR BUDGET AND CREDIT COUNSELING AGENCIES, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTIONAL COURSES (June 30, 2005) [hereinafter TRUSTEE PRESS RE-
LEASE), available at http://www.usdoj .gov/usUeo/public_affairs/press/docs/pr20050630.
htm (copy also on file with author). The Executive Office for United States Trustees
concurrently published the following documents on its web site, http://www.usdoj.gov/
usUeo/bapcpa/ccde/index.htm: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES TRUSTEES, APPLI-
CATION FOR APPROVAL AS A NONPROFIT BUDGET AND CREDIT COUNSELING AGENCY (June
2005) [hereinafter CC AGENCY APP.); EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES TRUSTEES,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL AS A NONPROFIT BUDGET AND CREDIT
COUNSELING AGENCY (June 2005) [hereinafter COUNSELING AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS); Ex-
ECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES TRUSTEES, APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL AS A PRO-
VIDER OF A PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTIONAL COURSE (June 2005);
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES TRUSTEES, INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPLICATION FOR
APPROVAL AS A PROVIDER OF A PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTIONAL
COURSE (June 2005) [hereinafter PROVIDER INSTRUCTIONS).
19. TRUSTEE PRESS RELEASE, supra note 18.
20. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106 (a) (adding § 109(h) to the Bankruptcy Code);
id. § 106 (b) (adding § 727(a)(11) to the Bankruptcy Code); id. § 106(c) (adding § 1328(g)
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236 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
obtain the briefing and budget analysis within five days of requesting
the counseling.21
The justifications for and implications of these two new conditions
to bankruptcy relief warrant extended discussion.
A. PRE-PETITION BRIEFING AND BUDGET ANALYSIS
For individuals seeking bankruptcy relief, the Act requires an in-
dividual or group "briefing" with an approved counseling agency
within the lBO-day period preceding the date of the filing of the peti-
tion.22 The briefing, which may be conducted in person, by telephone,
or over the Internet, must outline opportunities for credit counseling
and assist an individual in performing a related budget analysis.23 In
a complementary provision, the Act amplifies the written notice that
the clerk of the bankruptcy court must provide to an individual whose
debts are primarily consumer debts before that individual commences
a case. The notice must briefly describe the types of services available
from counseling agencies in addition to briefly describing Chapters 7,
11, 12, and 13 and the purposes, benefits, and costs of each.24 The Act
21. [d. § 106(a) (adding § 109(h) to the Bankruptcy Code).
22. [d.
23. [d.
24. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 104 (amending § 342(b) of the Bankruptcy Code).
Section 342(b) of the Bankruptcy Code has previously required that the clerk's notice to
individual debtors "indicate[ ] each chapter ... under which ... [an] individual may
proceed." 11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2000). Some clerks have posted the written notice on the
Internet. E.g., the web site of the United States District and Bankruptcy Court for the
District ofIdaho, at http://www.id.uscourts.gov/trustinfo.htm (last visited July 23,2005)
(which, incidentally, incorrectly lists the information as being provided pursuant to
"U.S.C. § 341"). To see whether or how web sites of bankruptcy courts throughout the
country display the required information, select some of the links at the web site main-
tained by the Administrative Office of United States Courts on behalf of United States
courts, at http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks/index.cfm (last visited July 23, 2005).
Heretofore, the notice, whether or not posted on the Web, has been virtually worthless.
Most individuals would not know to look or know how to find or look on a web site
containing the information, and a significant number of debtors would not have conve-
nient or cost free Internet access. Individuals represented by attorneys generally would
not receive the notice from the clerk's office because usually only the attorney, the attor-
ney's employee, or a runner files the petition and schedules. Even if an individual, ei-
ther represented by an attorney or pro se, visits the clerk's office to file the petition and
schedules, his or her decision to file has already effectively been made and will rarely if
ever be altered by a notice of alternatives then provided by the clerk. Persisting in the
Pollyannaish notion that the notice of alternatives might accomplish something, the
BAPCP Act insures that debtors get the notice in one of two ways. An individual debtor
whose debts are primarily consumer debts and who files a petition identifying an attor-
ney or petition preparer must file a certificate that the attorney or petition preparer
delivered the clerk's notice to the debtor. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 315(b) (amend-
ing § 521 of the Bankruptcy Code). Such a debtor whose petition names neither an
attorney nor petition preparer must file ~ certificate that the debtor received and read
the certificate. [d. If such a requirement is to have any meaning, Bankruptcy Rule
1007(c), which presently permits filing of schedules and statements within fifteen days
 LA [V
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 237
also requires that consumer bankruptcy attorneys and bankruptcy pe-
tition preparers furnish that notice to their clients.25
The pre-petition briefing and budget analysis requirement is one
product of congressional concern about the increase in individual
bankruptcy filings. Some may view the requirement as a wasteful de-
tour deliberately designed to discourage bankruptcy even by those
with no other realistic alternative. If not that, the requirement must
reflect either hope or assumption that fewer individual debtors will
pursue bankruptcy relief if each must first consult with a representa-
tive of an approved counseling agency or interact with the agency over
the telephone or Internet to learn about, assess the viability of, and
possibly pursue a workout with creditors, known in the credit counsel-
ing industry as a Debt Management Plan ("DMP"). In a DMP, formu-
lated by a credit counseling agency and administered either by the
agency or an affiliate, the debtor makes lump sum monthly payments
to the agency or affiliate in lieu of payments to individual creditors.
The agency or affiliate in turn disburses payments to creditors pursu-
ant to the workout that the agency has arranged. Creditor conces-
sions in the workout rarely reduce the principal amount owing but
may include "re-aging" an account (i.e. changing the status of the ac-
count from delinquent to current), waiving or reducing fees such as
late payment fees or fees for exceeding an allowable credit limit, or
reducing interest rates.26
In evaluating the credit counseling detour, I pursue three lines of
inquiry. First, I consider whether the detour likely will divert a mean-
ingful number of individual debtors from a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13
filing to a DMP and whether the benefits of such diversion, for both
unsecured creditors and debtors, justify the costs of the detour. Sec-
ond, I consider some troubling questions about the nature and scope of
the required briefing. Third, I consider the application of the require-
of the filing of a petition, should be amended to require the filing of such a certificate
with the petition. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
CPA2005fl'ext_Consumer_Rules.pdf (last visited January 27,2006). Picture, then, the
uninformed pro se debtor approaching the bankruptcy clerk, petition and schedules in
hand. Under such a rule, the clerk would refuse to accept the filing and hand the debtor
the required notice. Most likely the notice would not alter the debtor's decision to file,
but the debtor nonetheless must retreat, obtain and sign a certificate stating that he or
she has received and read the notice, and then make a second trip to the clerk's office.
To avoid that waste of time, sympathetic bankruptcy judges might require their court
clerks to have a certificate at the ready.
25. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 228(a) (adding § 527 to the Bankruptcy Code).
26. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAw CENTER INC. & CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA,
CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS: THE IMPACT ON CONSUMERS OF FUNDING CUTS, HIGHER
FEES AND AGGRESSIVE NEW MARKET ENTRANTS 21-22 (Apr. 2003) [hereinafter NCLC RE·
PORT), available at http://www.consumerlaw.orglinitiativeslcredit30unselinglcontentl
creditcounselingreport.pdf.
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238 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
ment to debtors facing exigent circumstances that require an immedi-
ate bankruptcy filing.
1. Extent, benefits, and costs of diversion
Some individuals in financial distress consult a credit counseling
agency before considering bankruptcy even absent a requirement to do
SO.27 Others seek help only from a consumer bankruptcy attorney.
The economics of consumer bankruptcy law practice dictate that con-
sumer bankruptcy attorneys offer clients relief under Chapter 7,
under Chapter 13, or under both, but little else.28 Consumer bank-
ruptcy attorneys are unlikely to suggest a visit to a credit counseling
agency if the attorney believes that a DMP would not be feasible.
Even if feasible, the attorney may persuade a client that Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13 is preferable to a DMP. Congress may believe this to be
particularly likely in high volume bankruptcy law offices (sometimes
derisively referred to as "bankruptcy mills"29) that advertise debt re-
lief without mention of bankruptcy yet produce a large number of
bankruptcy filings. The pre-petition briefing requirement thus will
channel all individual debtors first to an institution that is both more
hospitable to a non-bankruptcy workout than a consumer bankruptcy
attorney and also structurally better suited to provide a workout at a
lower cost than the consumer bankruptcy attorney.
Surely there are some financially distressed debtors for whom a
DMP might be feasible who would not, but for the requirement, con-
tact a counseling agency before filing bankruptcy. A subset of those
debtors will be diverted from bankruptcy by the pre-petition briefing
requirement. We just don't know how many, nor do we know how
many of those diverted debtors would have chosen Chapter 13 rather
than Chapter 7.30 Were we able to approximate the number of debt-
27. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures,
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 524 (1993).
28. Gary Neustadter, When Attorney and Client Meet: Observations ofInterviewing
and Counseling in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 177,235-40
(1986); Braucher, supra note 27, at 522-26.
29. E.g., Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Alert, Advertisements Promising
Debt Relief May Be Offering Bankruptcy, at http://www3.ftc.gov/bcp/conlineipubsJ
alerts/bankrupt.htm (last visited July 23, 2005). In its press release announcing this
consumer alert, the F.T.C. referred to "bankruptcy mills." Press Release, Federal Trade
Commission (Mar. 26, 1997), reprinted in Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998; Responsible
Borrower Protection Act; and Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accounta-
bility Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and H.R. 3146 Before the House
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong., Pt. III, at 90-91 (1998) [hereinafter Hearings Part Ill].
30. A study conducted by the National Foundation for Credit Counseling ("NFCC")
(at the time known as the National Foundation for Consumer Credit) of 129,556 coun-
seling sessions by NFCC member agencies in 1996, 1997, and 1998, found the following:
5% ofthose counseled were advised that they could handle repayment on their own with
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ors diverted from Chapter 7, we could claim as a benefit of the pre-
petition briefing requirement the amounts paid to unsecured creditors
through DMPs that would not have been paid had the debtor filed
Chapter 7. We couldn't calculate that amount, however, because we
would have no reliable way to measure how much pre-petition un-
secured debt that debtors diverted from Chapter 7 would have paid
following a Chapter 7 discharge (voluntarily without reaffirmation,
pursuant to a reaffirmation, or because non-dischargeable). Likewise,
were we able to approximate the number of debtors diverted from
Chapter 13, we could claim as a benefit the amounts paid to unsecured
creditors through DMPs that debtors would not have paid in a Chap-
ter 13. But we would have no reliable way to measure that amount
either. In short, we are unlikely to know how many debtors who oth-
erwise would not have visited a counseling agency will be diverted to a
DMP through the briefing requirement and unlikely to know how
much more money, if any, such debtors will pay through a DMP than
they would not have paid in or following bankruptcy.
In addition to the speculative amount of benefit to be reaped by
unsecured creditors, some diverted debtors will reap some benefit
from the pre-petition briefing requirement, even if they pay more in
principal, interest, and fees through a DMP than they otherwise
would have paid, to their own attorney and to creditors, in connection
with or after bankruptcy. Some will reap psychological and emotional
satisfaction in avoiding bankruptcy, although the psychological and
emotional satisfaction could be outweighed by the stress and other
personal or family problems associated with a continued financial
struggle to abide the terms of a DMP, a struggle that would be abated
or mitigated by the filing of a Chapter 7. In addition, each debtor will
avoid mention of bankruptcy on his or her credit record, but that may
the help of intensive budget counseling; 7.4% of those counseled chose a DMP; 8.8% of
those counseled were advised to increase income or reduce expenses before a DMP
would work; 12.6% of those counseled were referred for other action (e.g. to a social
service agency for unstable family issues); 32.2% of those counseled were referred for
legal advice. NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR CONSUMER CREDIT, THE IMPACT OF CREDIT
COUNSELING ON BANKRUPTCIES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1999), available at http://
68.72.75.llresearchlnfccimpact.html. Without more, the study does not directly predict
the number of debtors that pre-petition counseling might divert from bankruptcy.
Many of the subjects may have self-selected counseling because they were pre-disposed
to avoid bankruptcy. The study also did not attempt to determine whether those who
filed bankruptcy without first consulting a counseling agency might have avoided bank-
ruptcy had they first visited a counseling agency. For anecdotal evidence comparing
consumer credit counseling with Chapter 7 relief, see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998
Part I Before the House Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., pt. I, at 94-95 (1998) (prepared statement of Nicholl Rus-
sell, Sioux Falls, S.D., comparing benefits of consumer credit counseling for financial
problems encountered after bankruptcy with earlier visit to attorney who filed the
bankruptcy).
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240 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
not improve, indeed in some cases it may hinder, a debtor's access to
future credit.31 Finally, diversion from bankruptcy will preserve a
debtor's right to a discharge in a subsequent bankruptcy, if needed, no
matter when it is filed.32
The benefits of diversion, difficult if not impossible to quantify,
should be weighed against the costs in time and money that the pre-
petition briefing requirement will impose both upon debtors and upon
the United States trustee.
The requirement will waste the time (less if by telephone or In-
ternet than if in person) of the substantial number of debtors hope-
lessly mired in overwhelming debt who otherwise would not have
contacted a counseling agency. The required pre-petition contact by
these debtors will serve only to confirm that a DMP is not feasible.
Credit counseling might have helped such debtors earlier in the his-
tory of their financial difficulties but no longer can.
The requirement also will waste the time of some debtors who
have previously contacted a credit counseling agency and who none-
theless have decided to file bankruptcy. Some will have visited an
agency not on the clerk's list of approved agencies, not knowing that
they will have to visit an approved agency before filing bankruptcy.
The Act does not require that agencies disclose to debtors, in advertis-
ing, at the debtor's initiation of contact with the agency, or thereafter,
that the agency has not been approved by a United States trustee or
that a debtor must visit an approved agency if he or she thereafter
31. A financially distressed debtor is likely to have a bad credit record even with-
out filing bankruptcy. In contrast, some extenders of credit may be more willing to
extend credit to debtors who have obtained a Chapter 7 discharge, or seek out debtors
who have obtained a Chapter 7 discharge, because such debtors thereafter cannot re-
ceive another Chapter 7 discharge for a significant period of time. See infra note 32.
32. By avoiding Chapter 7, a debtor avoids a bar on discharge in either a subse-
quent Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Under the Act, a debtor will be ineligible for a Chapter
7 discharge if the debtor received a discharge in a Chapter 7 case commenced within
eight years (changed from six years) preceding the date of the filing of the petition in the
second case. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 312 (amending § 727(a)(8) ofthe Bankruptcy
Code). A debtor will be ineligible for a Chapter 13 discharge if the debtor received a
discharge in a Chapter 7 case filed during the four-year period preceding the date of the
order for relief under Chapter 13. [d. § 312 (adding § 1328(0 to the Bankruptcy Code).
By avoiding Chapter 13, a debtor also avoids a bar on discharge in either a subsequent
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Under existing law, a debtor is ineligible for a Chapter 7
discharge if the debtor received a discharge in a prior Chapter 13 case commenced
within six years preceding the filing of the subsequent Chapter 7 case, unless the debtor
paid at least 70 percent of unsecured claims in the Chapter 13 case under a plan pro-
posed in good faith that reflects the debtor's best effort. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (2000).
Under the Act, a debtor will be ineligible for a Chapter 13 discharge if the debtor re-
ceived a discharge in a prior Chapter 13 case commenced during the two-year period
preceding the date of the order for relief in the subsequent Chapter 13 case. BAPCP
Act, supra note 13, § 312 (adding § 1328(0 to the Bankruptcy Code).
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wishes to file bankruptcy.33 Out of self-interest, an agency presuma-
bly would not disclose this information unless asked, or it might dis-
semble. Debtors in this situation must contact an agency, and
perhaps pay a consultation fee, a second time. Other debtors must
contact an agency anew if the first contact, even with an approved
agency, occurred more than 180 days preceding the contemplated
bankruptcy filing, or if the debtor does not have and cannot obtain a
copy of any debt repayment plan prepared by the agency. The debtor
might well have discarded the repayment plan upon realizing that it
was not feasible; the Act does not require that agencies, as a condition
to approval, disclose to debtors that they must retain the plan if they
wish to file bankruptcy.
The implementation, operation, and supervision of a system ofre-
quired pre-petition briefing will cost money. Debtors not diverted
from bankruptcy, debtors diverted from bankruptcy, and taxpayers
will share the cost. Counseling agencies to which debtors must turn
for a briefing have typically generated revenue from some combination
of fees charged a debtor for an initial consultation, fees charged a
debtor for setting up a DMP, fees taken from a debtor's monthly DMP
payment, and a "fair share" contribution from some creditors that re-
ceive DMP payments.34 Agencies may need to generate additional
revenue either to fund compliance with standards for United States
trustee approval or to serve a greater number of debtors or both. A
raft of new debtors, appearing at agency doorsteps to have their bank-
ruptcy ticket punched, may require additional agency resources or di-
vert resources from service to debtors for whom a DMP might be
feasible.35 In addition, to preserve tax-exempt status, some agencies
33. An approved agency may state that it is approved, but the United States trus-
tee requires any advertising to that effect to state the following, verbatim: "Approved to
issue certificates in compliance with the Bankruptcy Code. Approval does not endorse
or assure the quality of an Agency's services." CC AGENCY APP., supra note 18, Appen-
dix A at 2.
34. NCLC REPORT, supra note 26, at 10-17. "Fair share" contributions, which vary
among creditors, are payments to the agency of a percentage of the debtor's DMP pay-
ment. Id. Using 1999 figures, the then president and CEO of the National Foundation
for Credit Counseling indicated that while fair share payments were made in only 35%
ofDMPs, they nonetheless served as a primary revenue source to cover expenses associ-
ated with an agency's education and counseling activities. ANNE STANLEY, A Panel Dis·
cussion on Dynamics in the Consumer Credit Counseling Service Industry in FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA: PAYMENT CARDS CENTER 1, 3 (2001), available at http:!
/www.phil.frb.org/pcdworkshopslworkshop1.pdf.
35. Oklahoma's experience with the consequences of a law governing payday lend-
ers may be instructive. Its law required that borrowers seeking five payday loans
within ninety days would first have to contact a qualified financial counselor before
being granted another loan. Soon after the law became effective, the qualified counsel-
ing agencies were overwhelmed with calls from borrowers desperate for the next payday
loan and feared losing legitimate counseling clients to others. Ginnie Graham, Credit
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242 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
may have to generate additional revenue to fund educational activities
not currently provided.36
Deriving sufficient additional revenue may be problematic. Agen-
cies might generate sufficient revenue through fair share contribu-
tions from creditors for an increased volume of DMPs, but likely not
from increased rates of fair share contributions, which have recently
declined.37 A recent proposal of the Congressional Joint Committee on
Taxation, if implemented, would significantly impair if not preclude
the ability to raise additional revenue from fair share contributions by
conditioning an agency's tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code upon limitation of its DMP activities.38 If
fair share contributions cannot provide necessary additional revenue,
agencies must generate additional revenue by charging debtors for
services rendered, through some combination of fees for initial coun-
seling, fees to set up a DMP, fees drawn from a debtor's monthly DMP
payment, or from some other source.39 The Act permits counseling
agencies to charge debtors a "reasonable fee" for the briefing and
budget analysis but also requires agencies to "provide services without
Counselors Feel Holiday Pinch, TuLSAWORLD, Dec. 18, 2003, at AI; Discredit, TuL-
SAWORLD, Dec. 19,2003, at A24.
36. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
37. Within the past several years, major creditors have stiffened conditions to an
agency's receipt of fair share contributions or have reduced the percentage of fair share
contributions on eligible DMPs, or both. NCLC REPORT, supra note 26, at 10-13; MAJOR-
ITY AND MINORITY STAFFS OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF SENATE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PROFITEERING IN A NONPROFIT INDUSTRY: ABUSIVE
PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING 25-28 (Comm. Print Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter PROF-
ITEERING REPORT], available at http://hsgac.senate.govCfilesl032404psistaffreport_
creditcounsel.pdf. Conceivably, creditors might in the future condition fair share contri-
butions on an agency's approval by the United States trustee. Some creditors may de-
cide to abandon fair share contributions altogether because the United States trustee's
approval process requires that an agency agree not to exclude any creditor from a DMP
because the creditor declines to make such a contribution. CC AGENCY APP., supra note
18, Appendix A at 2. Citicorp and Bank of America have reduced fair share contribu-
tions in favor of grants allocated on the basis of a demonstrated commitment to educa-
tion and counseling. Leslie E. Linfield, Credit Counseling Update: The 'Perfect Storm'
Brewing, XXIV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 46 (Apr. 2005).
38. Among other things, the proposal would deny section 501(c)(3) status (charita-
ble or educational organization) to credit counseling agencies whose aggregate debt
management plan services during a defined period exceed 10 percent of the agency's
total activities during the same period. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OP-
TIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 332 (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.house.gov/jctls-2-05.pdf. The proposal would not deny section
501(c)(4) status (social welfare organization) to such an agency, but section 501(c)(4)
status would reduce or eliminate grant funding to the agency, such as grants referred to
supra note 37, because a charitable deduction for grants would not be available to do-
nors. 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1), (c) (2000).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 243
regard to ability to pay the fee."40 Fee ceilings imposed in some states
also will constrain this source of revenue for some agencies.41 Ironi-
cally, to the extent that agencies generate additional revenue by
charging, or charging more, for initial counseling, debtors who can af-
ford to pay that fee (presumably including some who thereafter par-
ticipate in a DMP) will be subsidizing those who can't afford to pay the
fee (presumably including many who thereafter file bankruptcy).
Likewise, to the extent that agencies generate additional revenue by
charging debtors more for a DMP, the very debtors whom supporters
of the Act would presumably applaud for avoiding bankruptcy will be
subsidizing counseling services provided to debtors who thereafter file
bankruptcy.
The United States trustee must evaluate agency applicants and
approve (in effect "license") a sufficient number of counseling agencies
for each district lest debtors be exempt from the briefing requirement,
and it must re-evaluate an approved agency after an initial probation-
ary period not to exceed six months and then re-evaluate each agency
annually.42 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the cost
40. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code).
The United States trustee elaborated by stating that the applicant "will not withhold a
certificate of counseling because of an inability to pay." COUNSELING AGENCY INSTRUC-
TIONS, supra note 18, at 3. The Act gives no guidance, and the United States trustee has
not yet publicly provided any guidance about what fee would be unreasonable and what
degree of financial need would excuse a debtor from paying any fee. In contrast, the Act
authorizes a bankruptcy court to waive an individual debtor's Chapter 7 filing fees for
an individual with income less than 150 percent of the income official poverty line appli-
cable to a family ofthe size involved, ifthe individual is unable to pay the fees in install-
ments. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 418 (adding subsection (f) to 28 U.S.C. § 1930).
Section 23(d)(3) of a proposed uniform state law regulating credit counseling agencies
would establish a generally applicable maximum fee of $100 for education and counsel-
ing services, subject to inflation adjustments. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION-
ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM CONSUMER DEBT COUNSELING ACT §§ 23(d), 32(f)
(2005) (to be renamed Uniform Debt-Management Services Act if approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) [hereinafter UNIFORM
ACT], available at http://www.law.upenn.edulblVulclUCDC/2005AMDraft.htm#TOC1_2.
41. NCLC REPORT, supra note 26, at 40-41. Some agencies might not comply with
state law, particularly if providing services by telephone or Internet. In response to a
telephone survey conducted by the National Consumer Law Center, some agencies unli-
censed in a state requiring a license of credit counseling agencies nevertheless ex-
pressed willingness to help debtors living in such a state. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAw
CENTER INC., CREDIT COUNSELING IN CRISIS UPDATE: POOR COMPLIANCE AND WEAK EN-
FORCEMENT UNDERMINE LAws GOVERNING CREDIT COUNSELING AGENCIES 8, 9 (2004),
available at http://www.consumerlaw.org!initiativeslcredit_counseling!contentlcc_en-
forcement.pdf [hereinafter COUNSELING AGENCY COMPLIANCE REPORT].
42. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code).
The Act refers to approval by the "United States trustee (or the bankruptcy administra-
tor, if any)." [d. While this language might be interpreted to vest responsibility in each
of the twenty-one United States trustees, the United States Trustee Program published
the application for approval and the instructions for completing it and directed that an
application package be mailed to the Executive Office. TRUSTEE PRESS RELEASE, supra
note 18; COUNSELING AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18. The application calls for the
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244 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
of these tasks, ultimately borne by taxpayers, to be $4 million in fiscal
year 2006 and from $6-8 million in each of the four ensuing fiscal
years.43
At least initially, the United States trustee may be flooded with
applicants for approval. The National Foundation for Credit Counsel-
ing ("NFCC"), founded in 1951, claims nearly 150 member agencies
with more than 1,300 community based offices,44 and the Association
of Independent Consumer Credit Counseling Agencies ("AICCCA"),
founded in 1993, claims 23 member agencies that provide nationwide
service and many more that provide service in a specific state.45 A
Google search under "credit counseling agencies" discloses scores of
other counseling agencies, including Christian-based organizations,
some of which claim assorted memberships, affiliations, licenses, or
applicant to notify the Executive Office of any change in circumstances that would
cause an answer in the application to change and also calls for the applicant to list each
judicial district for which the Agency requests approval. CC AGENCY APP., supra note
18, at 1, 2. At the same time, the United States trustee for each judicial district appears
to retain some unspecified role in the process because the instructions require that an
applicant provide all information and documents required either by the Executive Office
or by the United States trustee responsible for each judicial district in which the appli-
cant seeks approval. COUNSELING AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, at 1. On Sep-
tember 20, 2005, approximately two and one half months after first inviting
applications, the United States Trustee Program posted on its web site its initial list of
approved credit counseling agencies. United States Trustee Program, List of Credit
Counseling Agencies Approved Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 111, at http://www.usdoj.gov/
ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc_approved.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2005) (copy on file with au-
thor). Among the agencies initially approved were three agencies approved for counsel-
ing in all judicial districts (other than in Alabama and North Carolina, which are not
governed by the United States Trustee Program); each such agency offers in-person
counseling in some districts and telephonic and Internet counseling in all districts. [d.
43. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, S. 256 BANKRUPTCY ABUSE
PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, 3, 6 (2005) [hereinafter CBO
COST ESTIMATE], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocsl62xx1doc6266/s256hjud.pdf.1t
is unclear whether these estimates, identified under the heading "Credit Counseling
Certification (Section 106)," also include estimated expenditures for approval and re-
approval of instructional courses that will be required to fulfill the separate mandate of
the Act that the debtor obtain instruction in personal financial management as a condi-
tion to discharge. The reference at page 3 of the estimate to "Credit Counseling Certifi-
cation" suggests that the estimate is limited to the task of approval and re-approval of
credit counseling agencies, as does the explanation at page 6 of the estimate. [d. On
the other hand, the reference at page 3 of the estimate to "Section 106," which also
governs instructional courses, suggests that the estimate might include the task of ap-
proval and re-approval of instructional courses. [d.
44. NFCC web site, at http://www.debtadvice.orglAboutUslaboutus_01.html (last
visited July 23, 2005).
45. AICCCA web site, at http://www.aiccca.org/findn.cfm (last visited July 23,
2005).
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accreditations.46 As of 2003, 872 counseling agencies with section
501(c)(3) status were operating in the United States.47
The Act requires that the United States trustee conduct a thor-
ough review of a counseling agency's qualifications and services prior
to approval and re-approval.48 At least de jure, the standards for ap-
proval, which must be "fully" satisfied,49 are rigorous. They require
qualified, experienced, and trained counselors who provide adequate
counseling, without commissions or bonuses based on outcome, ade-
quate provision "for safekeeping and payment of client funds," includ-
ing an annual audit and appropriate employee bonding, a board of
directors a majority of which is disinterested, no more than a reasona-
ble fee for client services and the provision of services without regard
to ability to pay the fee, full disclosures to clients of specified informa-
tion, and adequate financial resources to provide continuing support
services for clients over the life of any repayment plan.50 The litera-
ture suggests that some counseling agencies operate in ways that
would fall short of compliance with one or more of these standards,51
and recent congressional hearings as well as recent I.R.S. and F.T.C.
46. For example, Family Credit Counseling Service describes itself as a "non-de-
nominational Christian organization" that is a member of the Better Business Bureau,
the International Christian Business Association, and the American Association of
Christian Credit Counselors, that is licensed by the New York Banking Department,
and whose counselors are certified by the Institute for Personal Finance. Family Credit
Counseling Service web site, at http://www.familycredit.org/AbouUaffiliations.cfm (last
visited July 23,2005). In contrast, AMMEND Credit Counseling and Debt Consolida-
tion claims no memberships, accreditations, or affiliations. AMMEND Credit Counsel-
ing and Debt Consolidation web site, at http://home.fuse.neU04HELPCCCSCredit
Counseling (last visited July 23, 2005).
47. PROFITEERING REPORT, supra note 37, at 3.
48. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code).
49. Id.
50. Id. The standards are elaborated in the United States trustee's instructions for
an application for approval, which require, among other things, that an applicant must
have provided credit counseling services for the two years preceding the application or
must currently employ in each office location that serves clients at least one office su-
pervisor with experience and background in credit counseling for two of the preceding
three years, and that a counselor will be deemed adequately trained and experienced if
the counselor is accredited or certified by a recognized independent organization or has
successfully completed a course of study acceptable to the United States trustee and
worked a minimum of six months in a related area. COUNSELING AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS,
supra note 18, at 3-4.
51. Howard B. Hoffman, Consumer Bankruptcy Filers and Pre-Petition Consumer
Credit Counseling: Is Congress Trying to Place the Fox in Charge of the Henhouse, 54
Bus. LAw. 1629 (1999) (including discussion of existing federal and state regulation);
David Lander, Recent Developments in Consumer Debt Counseling Agencies: The Need
for Reform, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (Feb. 2002); Abby Milstein & Bruce Ratner, Con-
sumer Credit Counseling Service: A Consumer·Oriented View, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978
(1981).
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246 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
actions confirm that significant problems in the industry persist.52 It
is ironic that the Act imposes the new briefing requirement precisely
at the time when the credit counseling industry faces renewed criti-
cism and scrutiny, but not surprising that the Act presumes that eval-
uation by a federal bureaucracy with finite resources and multiple
competing tasks will adequately respond to these problems.
The United States trustee may not approve an agency unless it is
a nonprofit organization.53 In most cases, tax-exempt status under
the Internal Revenue Code will serve as a convenient surrogate for
nonprofit status.54 The United States trustee requires that an appli-
cant for approval identify the applicant's basis for claiming nonprofit
status and suggests as an example the applicant's status as tax-ex-
empt under the Internal Revenue Code.55 An analysis by the Na-
52. Profiteering in a Non·Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling
Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 108th Congo (2004) (including testimony concerning inadequate
counseling, payment of commissions, excessive fees, inadequate disclosures) [hereinaf-
ter Profiteering Hearings); stipulated judgment in F.T.C. v. Debt Management Services,
Civ. No. 8:04-cv-01674-EAK-MSS (M.D. Fla. 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/osl
caselistl0423029/050330sstip0423029.pdf (enjoining, inter alia, deceptive marketing
practices in connection with debt management services). See also Linfield, supra note
37 (describing process of ms review and possible revocation of tax-exempt status).
53. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code).
Some states restrict debt management services to nonprofit organizations, and creditors
have required nonprofit status as a condition to fair share contributions. NCLC RE-
PORT, supra note 26, at 27. This does not explain why the Act limits approval to non-
profit organizations. Perhaps the Act imposes the limit to prevent consumer
bankruptcy attorneys from offering those services, for the reasons discussed supra pp.
238. Whatever the reason for the limit, a consumer bankruptcy attorney could test the
acceptability, both with the ms and with the United States trustee, of setting up a
separate nonprofit organization to provide the counseling, with the lawyer or his or her
staff first wearing a credit counseling hat and then representing the debtor in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding unless the client chooses to pursue a DMP or other solution. See
Leslie E. Linfield, Strange Bedfellows: Bankruptcy Reform and Mandatory Credit Coun-
seling, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12,65 (May 2005) (describing this strategy and identify-
ing potential obstacles to its success).
54. While nonprofit status and tax-exempt status are not synonymous, the tax-
exempt status of a credit counseling agency may serve as a convenient surrogate for
nonprofit status. Corporations organized for charitable or educational purposes are ex-
empt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code if no part of
the corporation's net earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual and if no substantial part of its activities consist of propaganda or otherwise at-
tempting to influence legislation or intervention in any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004). Two Reve-
nue Rulings by the Internal Revenue Service in the 1960s confirmed the tax-exempt
status of two credit counseling agencies. Rev. Rul. 65-299, 1965-2 C.B. 165; Rev. Rul.
69-441,1969-2 C.B. 115. Revocation of tax-exempt status of two credit counseling agen-
cies by the Service was reversed in two cases. See Credit Counseling Ctrs. of Okla., Inc.
v. United States, No. 78-1958, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11741 (D.D.C. 1979) and Con-
sumer Credit Counseling Servo of Ala. v. United States, No. 78-0081, 1978 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15942 (D.D.C. 1978).
55. CC AGENCY APP., supra note 18, at 2.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 247
tional Consumer Law Center of claims by credit counseling agencies of
tax-exempt status, and recently enhanced Internal Revenue Service
scrutiny of existing claims and new applications, suggest that some
agencies could not substantiate a claim of tax-exempt status because
of failure to provide educational or charitable services, excessive com-
pensation to executives, or inappropriately close relationships with
profit making organizations.56 Nevertheless, in view of the balance of
its investigative responsibilities in evaluating an applicant, and per-
haps also to avoid duplicating Internal Revenue Service activity, the
United States trustee may not attempt to verify independently the
factual basis for either tax-exempt or nonprofit status. The United
States trustee also might not investigate, or thoroughly investigate,
whether an agency otherwise complies with state law, notwithstand-
ing evidence that some agencies do not comply with state law,57 even
though an applicant must represent to the trustee its compliance with
all applicable state law.58
The Act also imposes a variety of other costly new responsibilities
on the United States trustee.59 It is therefore appropriate to wonder
whether the trustee can consistently perform them all well with funds
actually allocated. If funding is inadequate, we may fairly surmise
that some other United States trustee tasks or this new task won't be
performed as promptly or as well notwithstanding the best of inten-
tions and the efforts of capable people.60 As a result, the United
States trustee may not approve or re-approve a sufficient number of
agencies or debtors in some districts may be required to procure coun-
seling from agencies whose compliance with the standards may be
marginal or dubious.
56. See NCLC REPORT, supra note 26, at 26-34; PROFITEERING REPORT, supra note
37, at 3-5, 31-32; Profiteering Hearings, supra note 52, at 181-88 (written statement of
Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue); id. at 78-79 (testimony of Mark
W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
57. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. The most recent draft of the
Uniform Consumer Debt Counseling Act, UNIFORM ACT, supra note 40, suggests the
scope and content of possible state regulation.
58. CC AGENCY APP., supra note 18, Appendix A at l.
59. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that implementation of the Act
would result in $392 million in gross discretionary costs during the period 2006-2010,
primarily to pay for all of the increased responsibilities of the United States trustee. It
also estimated that those costs would be partially funded by an estimated $75 million in
additional bankruptcy filing fees and an estimated $60 million from a temporary reallo-
cation of bankruptcy filing fees during the same period. CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra
note 43, at l.
60. Resource allocation constraints in state offices charged with the licensing of
credit counseling agencies presage this possibility. See COUNSELING AGENCY COMPLI-
ANCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 6-8.
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248 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
2. Nature and scope of the required briefing
In assigning to the United States trustee the task of evaluating
counseling agencies, the Act leaves several questions unanswered,
among them the following: To secure approval, must a counseling
agency offer a DMP? Must the service it offers be free from the imme-
diate or direct influence of a consumer bankruptcy attorney? Ifoffered
over the Internet, may the service be entirely automated? Does the
statute's requirement that an agency provide "adequate counseling"
require that the agency include in its briefing a discussion of bank-
ruptcyalternatives? Must there be a sufficient number of counseling
agencies for a district that offer services in languages other than En-
glish before the United States trustee concludes that there are a suffi-
cient number of agencies to serve debtors in that district? The
trustee's resolution of each of these issues would appear to be subject
to judicial review and thus subject to ultimate resolution in the
courts.61
A system marketed by one entrepreneur, a consumer bankruptcy
attorney who directs the operations of Hummingbird Credit Counsel-
ing and Education ("Hummingbird"),62 squarely poses some of these
questions. Hummingbird proposes to provide a briefing and budget
analysis through an automated program accessible over the Internet
from the office of any bankruptcy attorney in the country who has reg-
istered with Hummingbird. Upon the debtor's completion ofthe inter-
active program, typically in 10-15 minutes, the program prints for the
debtor the required certificate and budget analysis. The attorney,
billed monthly by Hummingbird, would presumably pass the $34-$39
fee to the client.63 Hummingbird will not offer a DMP and, accord-
ingly, describes its complete independence from creditors and its free-
61. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 701, 702 (2000). The Act ex-
plicitly authorizes an interested person to seek judicial review of a final decision made
by the United States trustee to approve or disapprove a counseling agency following the
end of an initial six-month probationary period or following evaluation for successive
one-year approval periods. [d. Because the Administrative Procedure Act otherwise
permits judicial review of any such decision by the United States trustee, including a
decision upon an initial application, the explicit authorization for judicial review ofdeci-
sions made on other than an initial application is puzzling.
62. Hummingbird Credit Counseling and Education was a vendor at the 13th An-
nual Convention of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, in San
Diego, California (Apr. 29-May 1,2005). My description of its system is based upon my
conversations with Hummingbird representatives at the convention and upon its pro-
motional flyer (copy on file with author).
63. The Act requires that approved counseling agencies provide service without re-
gard to a debtor's ability to pay the fee. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding
§ 111 to the Bankruptcy Code). Hummingbird would waive the fee if called by the
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 249
dom from "anti-bankruptcy bias." If a client decides to pursue a DMP,
Hummingbird will refer the client to an agency that can provide one.
It is unsurprising that someone would develop an idea like this,
designed to minimize the inconvenience of the briefing requirement.
The Act explicitly permits counseling over the Internet, and the
United States trustee has concluded that the provider of credit coun-
seling need not offer a DMP.64 Nonetheless, the United States trus-
tee, or a court thereafter, might conclude that such a system
minimizes the potential effectiveness of the pre-petition credit coun-
seling in a manner inconsistent with the purpose if not the explicit
language of the requirement. It could conclude, for example, that a
debtor using the system would be unduly dissuaded from making an-
other contact in order to pursue a DMP because the debtor is in the
attorney's office, subject to the attorney's influence, perhaps already
prepared to file for bankruptcy. It could also conclude that a briefing
over the Internet, to be effective, should be longer than ten to fifteen
minutes and involve a trained counselor at the other end of the con-
nection (such as by email or instant message).65
The United States trustee must also determine what "adequate
counseling" requires. The Act requires "adequate counseling with re-
spect to a client's credit problems that includes an analysis of such
client's current financial condition, factors that caused such financial
condition, and how such client can develop a plan to respond to the
problems without incurring negative amortization of debt."66 The
trustee's instructions for an application for approval as a credit coun-
seling agency go further, requiring that an applicant provide "credit
counseling services to clients which include consideration of all alter-
natives to resolve a client's credit problems ...."67 Perhaps the most
sensitive and important question here is the extent to which credit
counseling can or must include advice about filing Chapter 7 or Chap-
ter 13 (and in a rare case Chapter 11 or 12), advice about the timing of
any such filing, and discussion of advantages and disadvantages of
64. Section 6 of the United States trustee's instructions for applying to be an ap-
proved counseling agency applies only if the applicant offers DMPs. COUNSELING
AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, at 4.
65. Section 4 of the United States trustee's instructions for applying to be an ap-
proved counseling agency states that an adequate briefing should average 90 minutes in
length. COUNSELING AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, at 3. The instructions state
that an applicant must demonstrate sufficient experience and proficiency in designing
and providing services over the Internet and state that the applicant must provide
trained and experienced counselors. Id. at 3-4. This could be read to require either that
trained counselors participate in a counseling session or only that trained counselors
participate in designing and implementing an automated Internet counseling session.
66. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code)
(emphasis added).
67. COUNSELING AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, at 3 (emphasis added).
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250 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
doing SO.68 Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 are methods of responding
to financial distress that do not incur negative amortization of debt
and they clearly are among the alternatives available to resolve a cli-
ent's credit problems. Thus, one may interpret the Act and the trus-
tee's instructions to applicants as requiring that an agency include in
its briefing of debtors an honest and meaningful discussion of those
bankruptcy alternatives.
This mandate poses two problems. First, an agency and individ-
ual counselors providing information about and discussing bank-
ruptcy alternatives would invariably run the risk of unauthorized
practice of law, a criminal act under state law.69 Agencies might
therefore justifiably wish to resist talking about bankruptcy alterna-
tives at all, but in that case would fail to fulfill the apparent statutory
and United States trustee's mandate to do so. If an agency neverthe-
less must discuss bankruptcy alternatives, either the United States
trustee or approved agencies face the difficult task of defining the per-
missible scope of the counseling, and agencies must sufficiently moni-
tor the activity of counselors to assure that advice given is sufficient
but not impermissible.70 Differences among states in the definition of
unauthorized practice exacerbate the difficulty; an agency's discussion
68. In addition to the most obvious or common kinds of advice about Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13, there may be a need for more subtle advice. For example, on the assump-
tion that counseling agencies should have to discuss bankruptcy options, two analysts
at the Executive Office for United States Trustees argued that counseling agencies
should disclose that the IRS expense allowances relevant to means testing are generally
more generous than the expense allowances used by the collection agency to assess the
feasibility of DMPs. Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Planning for Change: Credit Coun-
seling at the Threshold ofBankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INsT. J. 20 (2001). If this is true
for a particular counseling agency, shouldn't the agency inform the debtor that the
debtor might confirm a Chapter 13 plan (whose disposable income requirement in some
cases must reflect the IRS expense allowances) with smaller monthly payments to un-
secured creditors than would be required under a DMP? Fuller v. U.S. Dep't of Educ.
(In re Fuller), 296 B.R. 813 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003), suggests another example of the
difficulty of assessing whether a counseling agency is providing "adequate counseling."
The bankruptcy court denied Mr. Fuller an undue hardship discharge of student loans
in part because of the court's finding of the debtor's earlier lack of good faith in paying
credit card debt instead of student loan debt, even though he did so on the seemingly
sensible advice of a credit counselor to first retire debt accruing higher rates of interest.
69. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6126 (West 2003).
70. The difficulty is emphasized by language in Oregon State Bar v. Smith, 924
P.2d 793 (Or. Ct. App. 1997):
We cannot, and will not, purport to derive an omnibus definition of "practice of
law" from [prior casesl. Indeed, [one prior casel cautions that a determination
of unauthorized practice may depend on case-specific circumstances. Never-
theless, regardless of any uncertainty at the margins, certain core criteria are
well settled. Most significantly, for present purposes, the "practice of law"
means the exercise of professional judgment in applying legal principles to ad-
dress another person's individualized needs through analysis, advice, or other
assistance.
Oregon State Bar, 942 P.2d at 800 (citation omitted).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 251
of bankruptcy alternatives with a debtor residing in one state might
be permissible whereas the same discussion with a debtor residing
elsewhere (even in the same United States trustee region) might be
impermissible.71
Second, any requirement to objectively discuss bankruptcy alter-
natives would pose an obvious conflict of interest for an agency.72 Un-
like an agency adopting a model comparable to that proposed by
Hummingbird Credit Counseling and Education, many counseling
agencies derive significant revenue from the fair share contributions
of creditors and some revenue from fees charged debtors for DMPs.73
Not surprisingly, web sites for counseling agencies typically describe
bankruptcy summarily, promote the avoidance of bankruptcy, demean
bankruptcy, or avoid the mention of bankruptcy altogether.74 The
counseling presently provided by many counseling agencies no doubt
mirrors the perspective evident from the web sites.75 If so, interpreta-
tion of "adequate counseling" that requires objective and meaningful
71. The potential impact of differing definitions of unauthorized practice is illus-
trated by the application of unauthorized practice rules to the activities of bankruptcy
petition preparers. Compare, e.g., In re Boyce, 317 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Utah 2004)
(holding petition preparer's use of bankruptcy software to prepare the debtor's sched-
ules and automatically select the debtor's exemptions did not constitute unauthorized
practice under Utah law), with In re Kaitangian, 218 B.R. 102 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998)
(holding petition preparer's use of bankruptcy software to prepare the debtor's sched-
ules and automatically select the debtor's exemptions constituted unauthorized practice
under California law). Compare, e.g., In re Leon, 317 B.R. 131 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 2004)
(holding bankruptcy petition preparer did not engage in unauthorized practice under
California law by furnishing client with copy of a document entitled ~Bankruptcy Over-
view Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 California"), with In re Doser, 281 B.R. 292 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2002) (holding, without reference to Idaho law defining unauthorized practice,
bankruptcy petition preparer engaged in unauthorized practice by furnishing client
with a copy of a document entitled "Bankruptcy Overview-Chapter 7 Idaho").
72. In 1997, for example, the Federal Trade Commission and the National Founda-
tion for Consumer Credit (NFCC), addressing the conflict of interest, developed a policy
requiring all NFCC offices to disclose to debtors that the bulk of funding comes from
creditors and that counselors have an allegiance not only to the debtor but also to the
creditors who fund the offices. Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Works
with Credit Counseling Agencies to Ensure Disclosure of Counselors' Dual Role of AB-
sisting Both Consumers and Creditors (Mar. 17, 1997), http://www.ftc.gov/opaJ1997/03/
nfcc.htm.
73. See supra p. 241.
74. For example, Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Greater Atlanta uses the
word "bankrupt" once on its home page in a link (one of twenty-six on the right side of
the page) to an article about how bankruptcy becomes harder under the Act. The word
"bankruptcy" also appears in another link on the home page only if one selects the drop
down menu entitled "Money Smarts Center." That link leads to a short article empha-
sizing disadvantages of bankruptcy. Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Greater
Atlanta web site, at http://www.cccsatl.org (last visited July 23, 2005).
75. See Affidavit of Ruth Ellen Doscher, posted at the web site of Coalition For
Responsible Credit Practices in 2004, archived at http://web.archive.org/web/
20040705210730/responsiblecreditpractices.com/resourceslaffidavitsldoscher.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2006).
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252 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
discussion of bankruptcy options (yet short of unauthorized practice of
law) would require that counselors adopt a new script.76 One wonders
how faithfully they would read it.
One mitigation of both the unauthorized practice and conflict of
interest problems consistent with the statutory mandate would be to
forbid counselors from discussing bankruptcy at all with debtors but
require counselors to furnish to every debtor a United States trustee
written or approved general description of bankruptcy alternatives,
advantages and disadvantages, and resources, and a list of local con-
sumer bankruptcy attorneys or the phone number of a local attorney
referral service.77 Proponents of the Act's measures to reduce the inci-
dence of consumer bankruptcy well might view that suggestion with
alarm.
The last question pursued here concerns counseling for debtors
who don't speak English or don't speak it very well. Such debtors can-
not be given meaningful credit counseling only in English unless they
can find and persuade an English speaking relative, friend, or some-
one else to translate. The United States Trustee Program implicitly
recognizes this problem because its web-posted "Bankruptcy Informa-
tion Sheet" offers translations in eight foreign languages.78 Many
debtors cannot speak English, or speak it very well, although the
number of such debtors varies widely among United States trustee
regions because of significant variations in race, ethnicity, or national
origin. For example, the 2000 Census revealed that 25.6% of the pop-
ulation of Santa Clara County, California (total population 1,682,585,
part of United States Trustee Region 17) was Asian and 24% of the
population was Hispanic or Latino.79 In contrast, in Decatur County,
Iowa (total population 8,689, part of United States Trustee Region 12)
0.6% was Asian and 1.7% was Hispanic or Latino.8o Not surprisingly,
differences in race, ethnicity, and national origin account for wide dis-
parities in ability to speak English, prompting recognition in other le-
76. Because a debtor is ineligible to file bankruptcy unless he or she has obtained
the required counseling within 180 days prior to the filing of the petition, should the
script include advice to the debtor to file bankruptcy, if at all, within 180 days of the
credit counseling in order to avoid the necessity of repeating the credit counseling
process?
77. The United States Trustee Program already posts a "Bankruptcy Information
Sheet" on its web site. http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/r18/r_bkinfo.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,
2006). Referring a debtor to the Web-posted "Consumer Education Center" ofthe Amer-
ican Bankruptcy Institute, http://www.abiworld.org!I.emplate.cfin?Section=consumer_
Education_Center (last visited Aug. 25, 2005), or to a hard copy equivalent, would be
more useful.
78. [d.
79. United States Census, 2000, American Fact Finder, Data Sets, Census 2000
Summary File 1, Table GCT-P6, at http://factfinder.census.gov.
80. [d.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 253
gal contexts of the need to provide appropriate translation.81 These
differences, for Santa Clara County, California and Decatur County,
Iowa, are reflected in the following chart.82
Age 5 or older*
Total population
Speak no English
Speak English "not well"
Speak English less than
"very well"










*In both counties, well over a majority of those who spoke no English, who spoke it "not
well," or who spoke it less than "very well" were 18 - 64 years old.83
Disparity in the ability of potential bankruptcy filers to speak En-
glish raises a host of difficult questions. Among the counseling agen-
cies approved by the United States trustee, must there be at least
some that offer briefings available in every language spoken in the
relevant geographical region, or in every language spoken by some
minimum percentage or number of people in the relevant geographical
area, analogous to requirements under the Voting Rights Act of 1965
mandating the provision of non-English voting materials in certain
states or political subdivisions?84 What should the location and the
81. California law, for example, requires persons engaged in a trade or business
who have negotiated specified contracts in Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, or
Korean to deliver to the other party prior to execution of the contract a translation of
the contract in the language used during the negotiations. CAL. Cry. CODE § 1632 (West
Supp. 2005). The legislature's statutory finding and declaration in support of the
amendment reads:
According to data from the United States Census of 2000, of the more than 12
million Californians who speak a language other than English in the home,
approximately 4.3 million speak an Asian dialect or another language other
than Spanish. The top five languages other than English most widely spoken
by Californians in their homes are Spanish, Chinese, Tagalong, Vietnamese,
and Korean. Together, these languages are spoken by approximately 83 per-
cent of all Californians who speak a language other than English in their
homes.
§ 1632.
82. United States Census, 2000, American Fact Finder, Data Sets, Census 2000
Summary File 3, Table QT-P17, at http://factfinder.census.gov.
83. [d.
84. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, requires (through August 5, 2007)
a State or political subdivision to provide various voting materials in the language of a
single language minority group if more than 5% of the citizens of voting age of a state or
political subdivision are members ofa single language minority and are limited-English
proficient, or if more than 10,000 citizens of voting age of a state or political subdivision
are members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient, and if the
illiteracy rate of such citizens is higher than the national illiteracy rate. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa-1a (2000). Pursuant to Administrative regulations that implement this re-
quirement, found in Implementation of the Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Regard-
ing Language Minority Groups, 28 C.F.R. 55 (2004), the Director of the United States
Census has published a notice of the political subdivisions within each state that are
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254 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
minimum number of such agencies be? Will there be sufficient eco-
nomic incentive for counseling agencies to provide briefings in lan-
guages other than English that are spoken only by a relatively small
number of people? Would the United States trustee have the re-
sources to hire people to determine initially and annually thereafter
whether counseling in languages other than English is adequate?
Would agencies that provide briefings in languages other than En-
glish be less accessible or more costly? May the United States trustee
determine that there is a sufficient number of agencies for English
speaking debtors, such that English speaking debtors are not eligible
for relief absent pre-petition counseling, and at the same time deter-
mine that there is an insufficient number of agencies for debtors who
don't speak English or don't speak it well enough, such that those
debtors are exempt from the pre-petition counseling requirement? If
so, who would determine (and when) whether or not a debtor speaks
enough English? The United States trustee has not publicly indicated
that it is considering any of these questions.85
3. The debtor facing exigent circumstances
In addition to the foregoing concerns, consider issues posed by the
exemption from the pre-petition briefing requirement that the Act ex-
tends to debtors who demonstrate exigent circumstances. A debtor
who certifies exigent circumstances that merit waiver of the counsel-
subject to the requirement with a corresponding listing of the single language minority
group for which the political subdivision must furnish minority language voting materi-
als. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1992, Determinations Under Section 203, 67
Fed. Reg. 48871 (July 26, 2002). While the conditional statutory right to a bankruptcy
discharge does not rival in importance the ability to meaningfully exercise a constitu-
tional right to vote, the United States trustee nonetheless could rationally respond to
the problem oflimited-English proficient debtors by crafting standards analogous to the
voting rights standards and single language minority group designations already in
place. Consider, for example, the comparison in the text between Santa Clara, Califor-
nia and Decatur, Iowa. The notice in the Federal Register identifying single language
minority groups designates Hispanic, Chinese, Filipino, and Vietnamese for Santa
Clara, California, but designates no minority groups for the State of Iowa. [d. Using
that approach, the United States trustee could determine that there are not enough
approved instructional providers in the Northern District of California unless there are
a sufficient number of providers offering instruction in English, Spanish, Chinese, Ta-
galog, and Vietnamese. In that case, those limited-English proficient citizens speaking
other languages would be left to their own devices. For example, residents of Santa
Clara County speak over 30 languages. Web site of Santa Clara County Public Health
Department, at http://www.sccgov.org/portal/site/phd (last visited July 24, 2005) (lan-
guage information located under the "Public Health Department - Facts & History" link
on that page).
85. The application for approval as a credit counseling agency does not require the
applicant to state whether it will provide credit counseling in languages other than En-
glish, CC AGENCY i\pP., supra note 18, and the instructions for the application do not
refer to the language in which counseling is to be provided. COUNSELING AGENCY IN·
STRUCTIONS, supra note 18.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 255
ing requirement and certifies inability to obtain the required counsel-
ing within five days (not five business days) of making a request for
counseling may file a petition before receiving the counseling, with the
consequent benefit of the automatic stay.86 Thereafter the debtor
must obtain the briefing within 30-45 days.87 The most obvious and
not uncommon kinds of exigent circumstances would be imminent
foreclosure on a residence, repossession of a vehicle, garnishment of
wages, or utility cut-off. The Act's standards for approval of counsel-
ing agencies do not require that an agency devote resources sufficient
to assure that most debtors be afforded an opportunity for a briefing
within five days ofthe debtor's request for a briefing. Thus, there may
be cases in which a debtor may appear to qualifY for an exemption and
therefore be tempted to file prior to obtaining a briefing.
Should a court conclude after notice and hearing that circum-
stances were not exigent, or that the briefing was available within five
days of a request, the court presumably may dismiss the petition be-
cause the debtor would have been ineligible for relief, much as a court
may dismiss a Chapter 13 petition upon a finding that the debtor's
unsecured or secured claims exceed the maximum amounts specified
in section 109(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.88
In the meantime, however, the debtor will likely have obtained
the required briefing and, ifthe first petition is dismissed, could re-file
without need of the exemption. But this would risk premature termi-
nation of the automatic stay in the second case under provisions of the
Act intended to deal with bad faith repeat filings. Under those provi-
sions, if the debtor's first case was pending within the one-year period
preceding the filing of the second case, and if the first case was dis-
missed, the automatic stay will terminate with respect to a debt or
86. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(a) (adding § 109(h) to the Bankruptcy Code).
The certification must be "satisfactory to the court." Id. That could mean that the form
of the certification is satisfactory to the court, or that the description of the exigent
circumstances and of the debtor's inability to obtain timely counseling is factual rather
than conclusory, or that the circumstances recited merit a waiver of the requirement.
This last construction is less reasonable than the others because it would make the
"satisfaction" requirement redundant to the requirement that the circumstances "merit"
a waiver of the requirement. The pre-petition counseling requirement also does not
apply to debtors unable to complete the requirement because of mental incapacity,
physical disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone. Id.
87. Id. Experience in the Netherlands, which imposes a comparable condition to
seeking debt relief under Dutch law, suggests the possibility that debtors in the United
States might encounter significant delay in obtaining the required counseling. Jason
Kilborn, The Hidden Life of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Danger Signs for the New
U.S. Law From Unexpected Parallels in the Netherlands 18 (Aug. 16, 2005), available
at http://www.ssrn.com/updatellsnlindex.html (unpublished manuscript, posted on Le-
gal Scholarship Network, copy on file with author) (reporting two to sixth month delay
to get appointment in two-thirds of Dutch municipalities).
88. E.g., In re Hounsam, 294 B.R. 399 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
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256 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
property securing such debt, or with respect to any lease, on the thirti-
eth day after the filing of the second case.89 By motion, the debtor
may seek to extend the period of the stay by arguing that the second
case was filed in good faith because the debtor, or the debtor's attor-
ney, erroneously believed the exemption from pre-petition counseling
to be applicable to the first case.
A substantial number of individual debtors may have difficulty
affording the cost of opposing dismissal of the first case (arguing that
an exemption from the pre-petition briefing requirement was appro-
priate) or the cost of seeking to extend the automatic stay in the sec-
ond case (arguing that it was filed in good faith), or both. Thus, the
debtor claiming the exemption in the first case will have to worry
about prematurely losing the benefit of the automatic stay in the sec-
ond case if the first case is dismissed. All of this suggests that well
advised and risk-averse individual debtors may be loath to claim the
exemption from the pre-petition briefing requirement, and consumer
bankruptcy attorneys fearful of a malpractice claim may be loath to
recommend claiming the exemption, an outcome that effectively nar-
rows the exemption. Risk-taking debtors and ill-advised pro se debt-
ors who claim the exemption may be courting trouble. On the other
hand, some judges, sympathetic to this predicament, may signal a
willingness to read the exemption expansively.
The exemption is not available to the debtor facing exigent cir-
cumstances if the debtor can obtain the required briefing within five
days of a request. This suggests another difficulty. Consider the
debtor facing a foreclosure sale on a residence scheduled for the day
after the debtor first visits an attorney. If the debtor, immediately
advised by the attorney to seek the briefing, cannot first obtain a brief-
ing until the day after the scheduled foreclosure sale, then the debtor
may not file a petition to stay the foreclosure sale. (To avoid this pre-
dicament, should the United States trustee approve a counseling
agency model such as that proposed by Hummingbird Credit Counsel-
ing and Education?90) Depending upon the type of foreclosure (judi-
cial or pursuant to a private power of sale) and applicable state law,
the foreclosure might be final and without right of redemption. The
requirement for pre-petition briefing in such a case would thus emas-
culate the protections otherwise afforded to homeowners by the Bank-
ruptcy Code, such as the critical cure provision in Chapter 13.91
Other creditor remedies such as garnishment, repossession, or utility
cut-off that could not be stayed because of a delay in filing may be
89. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 302 (amending § 362(c) of the Bankruptcy Code).
90. I discuss that model supra pp. 248-49.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2000).
 LA [V .
  ­
ft   fi  .89   
    




ff r  t  fi   
 fr  fi  ­
  ­
fi ), . ,
  fi   
 fi   ­
. Al
  t
fr fi  ,







  fi  fi
  .  ffi .
 s    
fi rn  





c tion?9 (j ­
   
s  fi i .  
fi   ­
ff r ­
  .91 
ff      fi
    kr  .
.
HeinOnline -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 257 2005-2006
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reversible,92 but only after incurring additional legal fees and suffer-
ing deprivation. Because of these possibilities, the coupling of the
five-day period with exigent circumstances seriously undermines the
usefulness of the exemption by denying it to those whose exigency
may be the most extreme.93
Finally, the variety of individual facts in and variety of state law
applicable to cases in which a debtor claims exigent circumstances
likely will generate considerable variation among districts in applica-
tion of the exemption. Varying interpretations of the condition that
the debtor be unable to obtain the briefing within five days of a re-
quest will magnify the disparity. How many counseling agencies must
a debtor try to contact before claiming an inability to obtain the brief-
ing within five days? What if the briefing is only immediately availa-
ble for a higher fee or at a more inconvenient time (e.g. a babysitter is
unavailable) or location (e.g. not accessible by public transportation)?
Must the debtor seek a briefing by telephone or over the Internet
counseling even if the debtor would prefer a personal appointment?
Apart from the particular difficulties associated with exigent cir-
cumstances, we have seen significant reasons to question the useful-
ness, effect, and operation of the pre-petition counseling requirement.
It may divert some individual debtors from bankruptcy and this may
92. E.g., Maus v. Joint Township Dist. Mem'l Hosp. (In re Maus), 282 B.R. 836
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) (post-petition recovery of preferential pre-petition wage gar-
nishment); Whittaker v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (In re Whittaker), 882 F.2d 791 (3d Cir.
1989) (post-petition restoration of utility service discontinued pre-petition); Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Radden (In re Radden), 35 B.R. 821 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) (post-
petition recovery of vehicle repossessed pre-petition).
93. A debtor might attempt the following end run to preclude exercise ofthe credi-
tor's remedy without having first obtained the required counseling: file a petition prior
to exercise of the remedy (e.g. prior to a foreclosure sale), gain the benefit of the auto-
matic stay, and then re-file if the case is dismissed, in the meantime having obtained
the required counseling. This effort would be rebuffed if a bankruptcy court clerk ref-
uses to accept a filing from an individual debtor unaccompanied by either the required
proof of pre-petition counseling or a certification claiming the exemption. Moreover,
this strategy, more so than the re-filing discussed earlier in the text in which the debtor
claims the exemption in the first filed case (supra pp. 254-56), risks premature termina-
tion of the automatic stay in the second filed case because the second filed case may not
be filed in good faith if part of a strategy in which the first case was filed with knowl-
edge that the debtor was not yet eligible for relief. An attorney probably could not ethi-
cally advise or participate in this course of action. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003) (stating ural lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is ... fraudulent, but a lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client ... "). In
doing so, the attorney would also risk sanctions. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. Ironically, if
not rebuffed by the clerk, the same sequence of actions might work for the pro se indi-
vidual debtor who files the first case either ignorant of the pre-petition counseling re-
quirement or believing that it couldn't possibly apply under the circumstances. If the
end run is successful, the five-day restriction on availability of the exemption will sim-
ply have increased costs with no commensurate benefit to anyone.
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258 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
benefit unsecured creditors and the debtors diverted. Whether or not
it does so, the requirement adds significant costs to the bankruptcy
system and imposes significant new burdens upon the United States
trustee. It also suggests for the trustee difficult questions concerning
the nature and scope of the required briefing. We may never be able
to accurately quantify the benefits of the requirement and may there-
fore be limited in our ability to fairly assess whether the benefits jus-
tify the burdens and other difficulties that it generates.
B. POST-PETITION INSTRUCTION IN PERSONAL FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT
Heretofore, some Chapter 13 trustees have required instruction
in personal financial management of Chapter 13 debtors or offered it
to them.94 One panel trustee has offered some instruction for Chapter
7 debtors in Nashville, Tennessee.95 The Coalition for Consumer
Bankruptcy Debtor Education recently concluded a pilot project offer-
ing a free, voluntary, three-hour course in personal financial manage-
ment to 600 individual debtors filing in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of New York.96 The Act goes well be-
yond these scattered efforts, requiring that all individual debtors re-
ceive post-petition instruction in personal financial management as a
condition to the Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 discharge.97 The United
94. Professor Braucher describes mandatory Chapter 13 financial management ed-
ucation programs in Greensboro, North Carolina, and Forth Worth and San Antonio,
Texas, and a voluntary program in Columbus, Ohio. Jean Braucher, An Empirical
Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not
Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 580-87 (2001).
95. See id. at 588.
96. Susan Block-Lieb et aI., The Coalition for Consumer Bankruptcy Debtor Educa-
tion: A Report on Its Pilot Program, 21 BANKR. DEV. J. 233 (2005) [hereinafter Pilot
Program). A complete report of the findings of the project will appear in Susan Block-
Lieb, Corinne Baron-Donovan, Karen Gross, & Richard L. Wiener, Debtor Education,
Financial Literacy, and Pending Bankruptcy Legislation, BEHAV. SCI. & L. (forthcoming
2005).
97. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(b) (adding § 727(a)(1l) to the Bankruptcy
Code); BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(c) (adding § 1328(g) to the Bankruptcy Code).
Although the Act does not require that the debtor file with the court a certificate of
completion of pre-petition counseling, a proposed interim amendment to the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure requires that the debtor file such a statement, prepared
as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(7) (proposed
interim amended rule), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslCPA2005.html
(Draft Interim Consumer Rules) (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). In Chapter 7 cases, the
debtor must file the form within forty-five days after the meeting of creditors under
section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c) (proposed interim
amended rule), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CPA2005.html (Draft In-
terim Consumer Rules) (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). Should illness or other unforeseen
circumstances prevent the debtor from timely completing the instructional course and
timely filing the statement of completion, the debtor must seek an extension of time by
noticed motion. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c).
 LA [V .
fi .  
fi
fi a
e . ffi er
fi .
fy fi  ­
 fi ­





.94  ffer  
i .95  
l j ff ­
 fr , l fi ­
fi
r rn  .96 ­
 ff , ­
fi t  
.97 
r i ­
 r r i
  lunt  l ,
f cy  
AM ANKR  
. .  
 I. cy ­
 ,  ANKR . i ft
) .   i   ­
r     
cy cy HA  . r
. ( (   
;     ).
 i r  i
l     
 i   
 ffi i .  ANKR .
 l  : / . t
ft  l t . ). In  
t i  it - i ft   
  . . ANKR .
 l  : www v/r l s/ .ht ft ­
 l t .   
  fr l t  
 fi i   
. ANKR
HeinOnline -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 259 2005-2006
       
       
 
          
      
        
          
              
              
           
   
            
             
              
         
            
              
              
            
             
            
              
               
           
             
               
          
            
   
              
               
               
               
            
              
                
             
              
            
            
           
             
               
                 
       
               
            
               
           
           
               
              
             
             
  
2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 259
States joins Canada in imposing this education requirement.98
The justification for this mandatory education is at best obscure.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended addi-
tional voluntary financial education programs and suggested that
98. Bankruptcy relief for individuals in Canada involves either personal bank-
ruptcy (roughly analogous to our Chapter 7) or the filing of a proposal (roughly analo-
gous to our Chapter 13). For a general description of both, see PERSONAL INSOLVENCY
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT 1-5 (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter PERSONAL INSOLVENCY REPORT),
http://strategis.ic.gc.calepiC/internetlinbsf-osb.nsf/en/br01285e.html. The Canadian
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act requires counseling as a condition to an automatic dis-
charge following either a personal bankruptcy or consumer proposal. Act of June 23,
1992, ch. 27, § 32,1992 S.C. 598-600 (adding § 66.13(2)(b) to the Canadian Bankruptcy
Act, contemporaneously renamed Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, requiring
the administrator to provide or provide for counseling, in accordance with directives
issued by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, to debtors who wish to make a consumer
proposal); id. § 58, at 639 (adding § 157.1(1) to the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insol-
vency Act, requiring trustee, in accordance with directives issued by the Superintendent
of Bankruptcy, to provide counseling for an individual bankrupt), § 61, at 640-41 (ad-
ding § 168.1(1)(0 to the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, providing for dis-
charge of individual who has never previously been a bankrupt under the laws of
Canada or of any prescribed jurisdiction), § 58, at 639 (adding § 157.1(3) to the Cana-
dian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, denying discharge under § 168.1(1)(f) to individ-
ual who has refused or neglected to receive the required counseling). Directives issued
by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy are binding. Act of June 23,1992, ch. 27, § 5(4),
(5),1992 S.C. 561-62. The Superintendent of Bankruptcy implemented the counseling
requirements in Directive No. 1R2, Counseling in Insolvency Matters (Dec. 21, 1994),
http://strategis.ic.gc.calepiC/internetlinbsf-osb.nsf/en/br01091e.html. The directive re-
quires that a qualified counselor provide the debtor or bankrupt with two stages of
counseling to be completed no later than 210 days following the filing of a consumer
proposal or the effective date of a bankruptcy. [d. In the first stage, the directive re-
quires the counselor to provide advice, either individually or in a group not to exceed
twenty participants, in the areas of money management, spending and shopping habits,
warning signs of financial difficulty, and obtaining and using credit. [d. In the second
stage, to be conducted no earlier than thirty days after completion of the first stage, the
directive requires, among other things, that the counselor follow up on the debtor's ap-
plication of principles presented in the first stage to identify the debtor's strengths and
weaknesses in money management and budgeting skills, assist the debtor in identifying
non-budgetary causes (e.g. alcohol abuse) that may have contributed to the debtor's fi-
nancial difficulties, and make appropriate referrals to specialized counseling to deal
with non-budgetary causes of financial difficulty. [d. Fees for the counseling are paid
from funds committed by an individual debtor to a consumer proposal, Act of June 23,
1992, ch. 27, § 66.12(6)(b), 1992 S.C. 599, or, in the case of an individual bankrupt, from
the estate. [d. § 157.1(1), at 639.
Both the first stage and part of the second stage of this counseling are comparable
to the Act's required instruction in personal financial management. The Act provides
no counterpart to that part of the second stage of the Canadian counseling that assists
the debtor in identifying non-budgetary causes of bankruptcy and provides appropriate
referrals. The educational component of the Canadian counseling should also be distin-
guished from counseling a Canadian debtor receives when he or she first visits a trustee
to discuss the filing of a consumer proposal or a bankruptcy. lain Ramsay, Mandatory
Bankruptcy Counseling: The Canadian Experience, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 525,
528 (2002). That pre-filing counseling is akin to the Act's requirement of pre-petition
credit counseling.
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260 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
judges might require the education in some circumstances,99 explain-
ing in part that "[t]he people who file for bankruptcy often have
demonstrated the pressing need for heightened understanding of fam-
ily finances."lOO Several witnesses testifying in 1998 House subcom-
mittee hearings on bankruptcy reform spoke in support of financial
literacy education in the bankruptcy process. Some favored voluntary
programs.101 Some of those favoring mandatory education more or
less suggested the need to reduce bankruptcy recidivism. 102
Fears or complaints of bankruptcy recidivism have been a recur-
rent theme in the United States,103 and reduction of recidivism ap-
pears to have been at least one goal of the Canadian mandatory
education requirement first adopted in 1992.104 But if recidivism is a
concern, mandatory financial management education for all individ-
ual debtors makes sense only if the rate of bankruptcy recidivism is
99. NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS, FINAL
REPORT, Vol. I, at 114-16 (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter COMM'N REPORT], available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edulnbrc/reporttitlepg.html. The Commission's recommenda-
tion was supported by a wealth of testimony and earlier comparable recommendations
and by a report submitted to the Commission by Professor Karen Gross, well-known for
her interest and expertise in financial literacy education. Karen Gross, Introducing a
Debtor Education Program into the U.S. Bankruptcy System: A Roadmap for Change,
COMM'N REPORT, supra Vol. II, App. G-3.a. Rer report expressed sympathy for
mandatory education but endorsed voluntary education. Id. at 18.
100. Id. at 114.
101. E.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998; Responsible Borrower Protection Act; and
Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of1998 Part II: Hear·
ing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and H.R. 3146 Before the House Subcomm. on Commercial
and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Pt. II, at 120-26
(1998) (prepared statement of Karen Gross, Professor, New York Law School).
102. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 Part I: Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before
the House Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 105th Cong., Pt. I at 12, 13 (1998) (prepared statement of Ron. James P. Moran,
member of Rouse of Representatives); id. at 94-95 (prepared statement of Nicholl Rus-
sell); Hearings Part III, supra note 29, at 36, 41 (Appendix C to proposal of National
Federal Credit Union to improve the bankruptcy process, attached to prepared state-
ment of Brian L. McDonnell, President and CEO, Navy Federal Credit Union).
103. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 191-92 (1989)
[hereinafter As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS].
104. Ruth E. Berry & Sue L.T. McGregor, Counseling Consumer Debtors Under Ca·
nada's Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 369, 370-73, 376 (1999).
Canada's mandatory counseling also was motivated in part by a conclusion that individ-
uals often end in bankruptcy as a result of "psychosocial" problems such as alcohol or
drug abuse, inadequate family role models, or problems in schooling, because the second
stage of the Canadian required counseling provides for assessment of potential non-
monetary causes of financial difficulty and referral to additional non-monetary counsel-
ing. See supra note 98. See also Carol Ann Curnock, Insolvency Counseling-Innovation
Based on the Fourteenth Century, 37 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 387 (1999) (describing and
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 261
significant and if ineffective financial management contributes to the
first or subsequent bankruptcy filing. Each is a dubious premise.
Bankruptcy recidivism among individual debtors who have previ-
ously filed Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 probably does not exceed 10% of
those who have filed once. In a sampling of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
cases filed in the United States by individuals in 1981, about 8% of the
debtors were repeat players,105 but only about half of those, 3.7% of
the sample, were potentially seeking a second discharge. lo6 Some, for
example, were seeking a Chapter 7 discharge after dismissal of a
failed Chapter 13, such that a second filing did not indicate financial
difficulty independent of the difficulty that precipitated the first fil-
ing.107 After further excluding self-employed individuals whose busi-
ness ventures had failed, only about 2.6% of the sample was wage
earners potentially seeking a second discharge. Data from another
study, based on a sample of Chapter 7 cases filed in 1995, indicated
that 4.6% of the debtors disclosed a prior bankruptcy by themselves or
their spouses, relatives, or affiliates. lo8 One study in Canada found a
percentage of repeat individual bankrupts (10%), but did not isolate
the number of individuals seeking a second discharge. lo9 Another
study of files in Canada found that 8% of the sample had previously
filed the rough Canadian equivalent of our Chapter 7 case.110
However, presupposing either a higher rate of recidivismlll or
conceding that even the rates mentioned above are cause for concern,
inability of individuals to effectively manage their personal finances is
not the likely culprit. Data reported in The Fragile Middle Class112
105. As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 103, at 192.
106. Id. at 192-94.
107. Id. at 193.
108. The study from which the data derives is described in Marianne B. Culhane &
Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study ofReaffirmation, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 709 (1999) [hereinafter Reaffirmation Study). That article did not include
data about repeat filers. Professor Culhane provided me with the data after a query to
the database. Email from Marianne Culhane, Professor of Law, Creighton University
School of Law, to author (Aug. 27, 2002) (on file with author).
109. Wally Clare, Repeat Bankruptcies of Consumer Debtors, 10 INSOLV. BULL. 201
(1990).
110. lAIN D.C. RAMSAY, Individual Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of A Socio-
Legal Analysis, 37 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 15, 65 (1999).
111. In a proposal to Congress to improve the bankruptcy system, the National As-
sociation of Federal Credit Unions referred without citation to "[s)everal recent studies
[showing) that as many as 20 percent of bankruptcy filers find it necessary to refile for
bankruptcy a second time." Hearings Part III, supra note 29, at 41.
112. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000) [hereinafter FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS).
In her review of FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, Professor Margaret Howard summarizes its
findings more fully. Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Empiricism: Lighthouse Still No
Good, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 425, 427-39 (2001). Professor Howard then argues that the
empirical data it reports are unlikely to persuade policymakers, academics, or others
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262 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
indicate alternative reasons for most individual bankruptcy filings.
"[T]he data reveal a middle-class population ofbankrupts"113 who had
been but a traumatic event away from financial crisis. The leading
cause of financial crisis and then collapse is disruption of the debtor's
debt to income equilibrium caused by "the loss of income and long-
term reduction in income that result from job loss or job changes,"114
loss of income or large uninsured medical debt resulting from illness
or injury,115 and divorce.116 For many individual debtors the crisis
leads to bankruptcy because, absent broader social safety nets, indi-
viduals and families are unable to tolerate the effect of those trau-
matic events upon precarious budgets that are laden with otherwise
payable mortgage obligations or other debt, including substantial
amounts of credit card debt.1 17
One might attribute precarious budgets of some debtors to ineffec-
tive financial management. Some debtors with large amounts of
credit card debt are "sliders," slipping into greater debt incrementally
through small individual charges coupled with minimum monthly
payments.118 And from among a small group of individual bank-
ruptcy debtors surveyed who identified their bankruptcy as in part
related to problems with credit cards (5.4%), many identified them-
selves as foolish, stupid, or lacking in money management knowledge
or skills.119 These and some other debtors might lack effective finan-
cial management skills, and acquisition of those skills might teach
them to avoid credit that again puts them on the brink. Yet it seems
equally likely that many individual bankruptcy debtors managed
their finances quite effectively until catastrophe struck, successfully
maintaining in the meantime a budget made precarious by limits to
their income and by their reasonable expenses rather than by ineffec-
tive financial management.120 In sum, more effective financial man-
agement would not have prevented many first time individual
bankruptcy filings. If the same is true of repeat individual filers,
predisposed to views that the data challenges. [d. at 439-59. In response to that and
other criticisms of the usefulness of empirical research in law generally and its impact
on consumer bankruptcy law, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Con-
sumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEx. L. REV. 2123 (2002).
113. FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 112, at 5.
114. [d. at 239.
115. [d. at 240-41.
116. [d. at 241-42.
117. [d. at 242-43, 256-61; See Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan, & Elizabeth
Warren, Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bank·
ruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001).
118. FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 112, at 111-12 ("sliders" is a term intro-
duced by the authors of FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS).
119. [d. at 133.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 263
mandated financial management education will do little to reduce
recidivism.
Ifnot to reduce recidivism, the justification for conditioning a dis-
charge for an individual debtor upon completion of personal financial
management instruction cannot be to increase notoriously low Chap-
ter 13 completion rates,121 both because the education mandate is also
applicable to individuals in Chapter 7 and because, for Chapter 13
debtors, the education need only be completed prior to discharge, not
at a time proximate to the beginning of plan payments.122 Even if
Chapter 13 debtors were required to complete the instruction earlier,
Professor Braucher's study of plan completion rates in five Chapter 13
trusteeships, three with and two without mandatory debtor education
programs, casts doubt upon a claim that timely mandatory education
would increase Chapter 13 completion rates. She concluded that, tak-
ing other local practices and individual debtor characteristics into ac-
count, "debtor education is not associated with increased
completion."123
Professors Block-Lieb, Gross, and Wiener suggested another justi-
fication in support of financial management instruction in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. In their preliminary description of a pilot program
providing financial instruction to volunteering Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 debtors in the Eastern District of New York, the authors suggested
that "the filing of a bankruptcy creates, in the parlance of educators
and psychologists, a 'teachable moment,"'124 at which time instruction
can empower debtors to achieve a more meaningful fresh start by pro-
viding them with information critical to navigating a complex credit-
121. The data available suggest that only 20-40% of Chapter 13 filers nationwide
complete their Chapter 13 plan and receive a discharge. Some of the studies reaching
this conclusion are identified in Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes:
An Empirical Study ofDischarge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13,7 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 415, 439 n.83 (1999). Professor Norberg's study found a completion rate of 33%
in a limited number of cases filed in 1992 and 1998 in the Southern District of Missis-
sippi. [d. at 439.
122. Ordinarily, plan payments must commence within thirty days of the time that
the debtor files the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) (2000). The plan must be filed within
fifteen days of the filing of the petition, unless the court extends the time period for
cause. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b). Under a proposed interim amendment to Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 1007, a Chapter 13 debtor need not file a statement of completion of a course
in personal financial management until the time of the debtor's last plan payment or
the time of the filing of a motion for discharge under section 1328(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c) (proposed interim amended rule), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/ruleslCPA2005.html (Draft Interim Consumer Rules) (last visited
Aug. 25, 2005).
123. Braucher, supra note 94, at 558.
124. Susan Block-Lieb et al., Lessons from the Trenches: Debtor Education in Theory
and Practice, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 503, 508 (2002) [hereinafter Lessons from
the Trenches).
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264 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
based economy.125 However, in articulating their reason for an empir-
ical study of the pilot program, they acknowledged that their beliefs
"rest on humanistic optimism and not empirical proof,"l26 and they
did not claim justification for a mandatory program.l27
Instruction in personal financial management may therefore
serve nothing more than "the rhetorical function of assigning debtors
responsibility for their own problems."l28 Absent a clearly articulated
justification for mandatory instruction, it will be difficult to assess its
efficacy. The Act nonetheless calls for the Director of the Executive
Office of United States Trustees to develop a curriculum and materi-
als for a financial management training program, test them in six ju-
dicial districts for eighteen months, and report to Congress on the
effectiveness and costs of the curriculum and materials as well as the
effectiveness and costs of a sample of other consumer education pro-
grams. l29 Quite obviously the required evaluation is neither long
enough nor focused enough to measure whether the instruction will
reduce bankruptcy recidivism, and, as previously mentioned, it cannot
measure whether the instruction affects Chapter 13 plan completion
rates. At most it could measure and compare the extent to which the
test program and other consumer education programs improve an in-
dividual's ability to manage personal finances, compare the costs of
such programs, and recommend guidelines for effective instructional
courses. l30 It may therefore help instructional providers of the future
maximize the potential benefit from a "teachable moment," but it is
unlikely to yield any justification for mandating the moment as a con-
dition to discharge.
125. [d. at 505-10. At one point the authors hypothesized that "most" debtors can
benefit from the education but at another point they stated that debtors can "all" bene-
fit. [d. at 508.
126. [d. at 513.
127. [d. at 522-23.
128. Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh
Start or Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1083 (2004).
129. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 105.
130. A fairly recent review of some of the research on the efficacy of varying kinds of
financial literacy training reported more success in training aimed at achievement of
specific goals (e.g. maintaining mortgage payments) but less clear cut success as a re-
sult of more abstract training. Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, Federal Reserve
Board Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Financial Literacy: An Overview
ofPractice, Research, and Policy, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 445, 452 (Nov. 2002). This review
of research also reported the conclusion of one study that consumers benefit more from
ready access to information on an ongoing basis than from the teaching of financial
literacy in the abstract. [d. at 452. It also reported the results of a Federal Reserve
Board study of perceived effectiveness of different means of information delivery in
which consumer respondents to survey questions reported greater effectiveness from
information on demand than from information at the time of another's choosing and
greater effectiveness from mass media, brochures, and home video than from the In-
ternet, seminars, or classroom instruction. [d. at 453-55.
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2006) 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 265
Pending the results of that study, we may gain some initial in-
sight about the value of mandatory personal financial management
instruction in bankruptcy by considering the experience of Canada,
which introduced its mandatory education requirement (there named
"counseling") in 1992.131 The Canadians adopted the requirement
both to reduce perceived recidivism and to identify and refer for pro-
fessional counseling debtors with certain psychological or social
problems (e.g. alcohol abuse) perceived to be at the root of many bank-
ruptcies.132 Professor lain Ramsey describes two studies of the effec-
tiveness of the required education in Canada, both of which appear to
have been based primarily, if not exclusively, on interviews with the
professionals who performed the counseling and with the debtors who
received it.133 Well over half of the Canadian trustees interviewed in
both studies had concluded that the counseling was of little or no use
to most debtors. "A common theme [among trustees) was the mis-
match between the assumptions of the counseling directive and the
reasons for bankruptcy. In many cases, the trustees stated that the
reason for bankruptcy was not financial mismanagement but loss of
income or other change of circumstances."134 In the second study,
55% of the professional, non-trustee counselors interviewed had con-
cluded that the counseling was very useful, a view that Professor
Ramsey suggests might be self-serving.135 In contrast, a significant
majority of debtors interviewed in both studies expressed enthusiasm
about the success of the counseling.136 A more recent study gathered
current credit profiles on Canadian debtors who had filed both prior to
and after implementation of the mandatory counseling, but did not
provide "any significant and unambiguous indication as to the benefi-
cial impact of counseling."137 Giving all praises their due, these find-
ings neither signify a successful Canadian experience nor predict a
successful experience in the United States.138
Without knowing how well the mandatory instruction under the
Act may achieve some unstated objective, it is troubling that debtors
will be burdened with the expense of this instruction in addition to
131. See supra note 98.
132. See supra notes 98, 104.
133. Ramsay, supra note 98, at 536-38.
134. [d. at 533.
135. [d. at 538.
136. [d. at 536-38.
137. [d. at 538-39.
138. The Personal Insolvency Task Force, an advisory group established in 2000 by
the Office of the Canadian Superintendent of Bankruptcy to suggest possible revisions
of the personal insolvency provisions of the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,
declined to recommend any changes to the mandatory counseling requirement after
having received a preliminary government report on the subject. PERSONAL INSOLVENCY
REPORT, supra note 98, at 9.
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266 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
fees, if applicable, for pre-petition credit counseling,139 increased
bankruptcy filing fees for some debtors,140 and likely increased attor-
neys' fees for some debtors.141 Some debtors will be spared the ex-
pense of the instruction because, as in the case of credit counseling,
the Act requires that the fee for instruction be reasonable and that
providers offer the instruction to a debtor without regard to the
debtor's ability to pay the fee. 142 Those able to pay must do SO.143
Beyond the out-of-pocket expense, of course, debtors without access to
Internet or telephone instruction may have to take additional time off
work or incur transportation, childcare, or other incidental expenses.
The contours of the required education are less obscure than its
justification. The Act identifies in general terms the standards for in-
structional courses144 and, as is the case with approval of counseling
139. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
140. The Act increases Chapter 7 filing fees from $155 to $200. BAPCP Act, supra
note 13, § 325 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1930). Congress subsequently amended § 325 of
the Act to increase the filing fee to $220. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
§ 6058, 119 Stat. 231, 297 (2005). Pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(b),
the Judicial Conference of the United States requires that all debtors pay an additional
$39 administrative fee and that Chapter 7 debtors pay an additional $15 fee for the
trustee serving in the case, both payable at filing or in installments. Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule 2 (effective
Jan. I, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/fedcourtfeesl010305bankruptcyFee.pdf. There-
fore, unless the bankruptcy court waives the fees, Chapter 7 debtors must pay to the
clerk of the bankruptcy court fees totaling $274 either at the time of filing or, pursuant
to FED. R. BANKR. P. 1006(b), in installments. Some individuals filing Chapter 7 will not
have to pay the fees, however, because, for the first time, the Act authorizes the bank-
ruptcy court to waive the fees for an individual with income less than 150 percent ofthe
income official poverty line applicable to a family of the size involved, if the individual is
unable to pay the fee in installments. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 418 (adding subsec-
tion (f) to 28 U.S.C. § 1930). Close to 30% of individual Chapter 7 debtors might meet
the income qualification. See Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Num-
bers: The Impact of the Coming Fee-waiver Provision, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/pub-
lic_affairsiarticlesidocs/abi01julnumbers.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (applying 1999
Census Bureau poverty thresholds to 5,165 no-asset Chapter 7 cases filed between 1998
and 2000). Very few of those individuals might be able to pay the filing fees in install-
ments. Id.
141. See infra note 270 and accompanying text, infra note 319 and accompanying
text, infra pp. 342-44, 350-54.
142. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code).
The United States trustee elaborates by stating the applicant "may not withhold ser-
vices because of an inability to pay." PROVIDER INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, at 6. The
Act gives no guidance, and the United States trustee has not yet publicly provided any
guidance about what fee would be unreasonable and what degree of financial need
would excuse a debtor from paying any fee. Contrast the specificity of the Act in identi-
fYing those debtors for whom filing fees may be waived. See supra note 140.
143. By way of very rough comparison, as of 2002, debtors in Canada paid $85 Ca-
nadian (roughly $70 dollars U.S. as ofJuly 15, 2005) for each of two one-hour counseling
sessions. Ramsay, supra note 98, at 530.
144. The standards for initial six-month probationary approval are the following:
trained personnel with adequate relevant experience and training, adequate learning
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 267
agencies, leaves interpretation and application of those standards to
the United States trustee.145 In its instructions for an application to
be approved as a provider of an instructional course, the United States
trustee identifies the minimum qualifications for persons employed by
an applicant to supervise instructors, requires that a course provide
written information and instruction on budget development, money
management, wise use of credit, and other identified consumer infor-
mation, and requires that courses be at least two hours long.146 Prior
to initial approval and annually required re-approval of an instruc-
tional course, the United States trustee must "thoroughly review the
qualifications ... of the provider of ... [an] instructional course" and
must be satisfied that the course "fully satisfies" the prescribed stan-
dards.147 As in the context of approval and re-approval of counseling
agencies, we may question here as well the adequacy of United States
trustee resources for this task,148 and also may suggest the impor-
tance of considering the issue of instruction for non-English speaking
or limited English-speaking debtors.149
materials and teaching methodologies, adequate facilities (including provision of in-
struction by telephone or Internet), preparation and retention of designated records.
For subsequent one-year approvals, the provider of the course must also demonstrate
that the course has been effective in assisting a substantial number of debtors to under-
stand personal financial management and is otherwise likely to increase substantially
debtor understanding of personal financial management. BAPCP Act, supra note 13,
§ 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code). Others have already questioned both
the rigor and the meaning of these standards. Lessons from the Trenches, supra note
124, at 521. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a provider can demonstrate that the
course has been effective in assisting a substantial number of debtors to understand
personal financial management if neither the provider nor the United States trustee
have any data to suggest how many debtors who file Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 do not
otherwise understand personal financial management or if any such data demonstrates
that most such debtors otherwise understand personal financial management. Finally,
"tal standardized approach that does not recognize the differences among debtors may
be ineffective." Richard L. Wiener, et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social
Analytic Jurisprudence to Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy,
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 474 (2005). Higher-income debtors may need in addition, or
instead, education about their attitudes toward unnecessary spending whereas lower-
income debtors may need education focused on their perceptions of control of their be-
havior. [d.
145. BAPCP Act, supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code).
146. PROVIDER INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, at 3-4. The instructions require that a
course offered via telephone or Internet be designed for average completion within a
minimum of two hours. [d. at 4.
147. [d.
148. It is unclear whether the Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for the
Act includes the cost of these tasks. See supra note 43.
149. See supra pp. 252-54. The application for approval as a course provider does
not require the applicant to state whether it will provide instruction in languages other
than English, PROVIDER i\pP., supra note 18, and the instructions for the application do
not refer to the language in which instruction is to be provided. PROVIDER INSTRUC-
TIONS, supra note 18.
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268 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
It will be a few years before we can evaluate the content and qual-
ity of approved instructional courses, the means of delivery, and their
cost and convenience to debtors. Notwithstanding this present foggy
view, we may reasonably expect the emergence of a cottage industry of
providers affording choices to debtors varying in efficiency, conve-
nience, and expense. Instruction over the Internet will playa promi-
nent role, advantageous to some but unavailable to others.150 We may
expect exclusive providers of Internet instruction to charge debtors
less for instruction than providers of on-site instruction because In-
ternet providers need not defray the cost of classroom facilities. 151 In-
ternet instruction will be considerably more convenient to many
debtors who will be able to avoid travel to possibly distant locations at
inconvenient times. For some debtors, Internet instruction may even
be more effective than on-site instruction because it can be self-paced
and repetitive as well as interactive.152 It will offer privacy to debtors
who don't wish to further expose their financial misfortune to other
debtors. Thus, there should be considerable merit to applications for
approval from providers of Internet instruction.
Yet Internet instruction will not be equally available to all. In
October 2003, the latest in a series of Bureau of Commerce reports on
computers and use of the Internet revealed that 61.8% of households
in the United States had a computer and 87.6% of those households
used the computer to access the Internet.153 Not surprisingly, it also
150. Trustees may also approve courses offered by telephone. For such a course, the
instructions for an application to be approved as a course provider require, among other
things, the use ofa toll-free number, distribution to the debtor of written materials prior
to the telephonic instruction session, and the telephonic presence of a teacher (i.e. no
pre-recorded instruction). PROVIDER INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, at 5.
151. The instructions for an application for approval of an instructional course re-
quire that classroom facilities comply with all applicable laws and regulations, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines and
all federal, state, and local fire, health, safety, and occupancy requirements. [d. at 6.
152. I refer here to interaction with an automated program. I infer that the United
States trustee will approve automated instruction over the Internet because its instruc-
tions for an application for approval of an instructional course provide that a teacher
shall be present telephonically if the instruction is conducted by telephone, but with
respect to Internet instruction state only that a teacher shall respond within twenty-
four hours to a debtor student's questions or comments. [d. at 5.
153. ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: ENTERING THE BROADBAND AGE 4, 5 (2004) [hereinafter A
NATION ONLINE], http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reportsianol/NationOnlineBroadband04.pdf.
The Pew Internet and American Life Project, a nonprofit organization funded by the
Pew Charitable Trusts, reports Internet usage over time. Web site of Pew Internet and
American Life Project, at http://www.pewinternet.org/index.asp (last visited July 28,
2005). Its reports include Internet usage among American adults from 1995 through
February, 2004. [d. at http://www.pewinternet.org/trendsllnternetAdoption.jpg (last
visited July 28, 2005). The web site also includes demographics of adult Internet users.
[d. at http://www.pewinternet.org/trendslUsecDemo_05.18.05.htm (last visited July
28,2005).
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reported that Internet access from any location, including but not lim-
ited to the home, is partially a function of income, climbing from a low
access rate of 31.2% of individuals aged three and older with family
income ofless than $15,000 to a high access rate of 86.1% of individu-
als aged three and older with a family income of $150,000 and
greater.154 Internet access is also at least partially a function of the
location of a person's household, with use by individuals with house-
holds in rural areas somewhat lower than use by individuals living in
urban areas other than the central city.155 For those without access
from home, either for lack of a computer or for lack of a connection to
the Internet, access at public libraries may be limited,156 access at
educational institutions typically will not be open to the public, access
at a cybercafe or other private facility with dedicated terminals usu-
ally will cost money, and wireless access at a wi-fi hotspot requires a
laptop computer with wireless access capability. Accordingly, of the
many individuals in bankruptcy with lower income,157 a significant
number may not have Internet access. 158 Moreover, only 19.9% of
households in the United States (slightly more than one third of
154. A NATION ONLINE, supra note 153, at A-I. We are, of course, interested in In-
ternet access by likely debtors, i.e. generally those over eighteen years old. Although
the United States Department of Commerce Report provides data on Internet use by
age, [d. at A-I - A-2, it does not provide data for Internet use by age for each income
group. The Pew Internet and American Life Project reports Internet usage by adults
ranging from 48% of adults with household income of less than $30,000/year to 92% of
adults with household income above $75,000/year. The Pew Internet and American Life·
Project, supra note 153, at http://www.pewinternet.org/trends/UsecDemo_05.18.05.
htm (last visited July 28, 2005).
155. A NATION ONLINE, supra note 153, at A-2.
156. In 1997, 79% of public libraries listed in an annual directory had Internet ac-
cess. In a sample of those libraries with Internet access, 23.4% had one computer with
access to the Internet, 17.2% had two such computers, 11.9% had three such computers,
10.5% had four such computers, 6.6% had five such computers, and 30.4% had more
than five such computers, and the number of computer terminals with access to the
Internet increases with the size of the population served by the library. THE LIBRARY
RESEARCH CENTER, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SCIENCE, UNIVER-
SITY OF ILLINOIS, SURVEY OF INTERNET ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN PuBLIC LIBRARIES, SUM-
MARY OF FINDINGS 2-3 (June 2000), http://lrc.lis.uiuc.edulweb/internet.pdf.
157. See Reaffirmation Study, supra note 108, at 770 (Table 22) (reporting median
gross income of $21,264 for 1,043 Chapter 7 debtors filing in 1995 and gross income of
$31,998 or less for 75% of filers); GoRDON BERMANT & ED FLYNN, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
UNITED STATES TRUSTEES, INCOMES, DEBTS, AND REPAYMENT CAPACITIES OF RECENTLY
DISCHARGED CHAPI'ER 7 DEBTORS (1999) [hereinafter EOUST STUDY], http://www.usdoj.
gov/ust/eo/publicaffairs/articles/docS/ch7trends-0I.htm (reporting median income of
$22,800 for 1,955 debtors throughout country filing in late 1997 or early 1998). Compa-
rable data is reported in FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 112, at 61-62, for Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 debtors filing in 1991, and in unpublished data that I compiled at the
request of Bankruptcy Judge Randall Newsome, based on over 3,000 Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy filings around the country in 1996, 1997, and 1998 (spreadsheets on file with
author).
158. Limitations on access to the Internet may be less of a drawback in the context
of required pre-petition credit counseling because at least some debtors represented by
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270 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
households with Internet access) have broadband Internet access that
would avoid teeth-grinding delay and frustration. 159 Instruction via
CD-ROM or DVD may be an acceptable alternative, but those media,
unlike a web site, are static and obviously are not available to those
without access to a computer.
Many credit-counseling agencies approved for pre-petition credit
counseling undoubtedly also will seek approval of instructional
courses, perhaps capturing market share for the instructional courses
by virtue ofthe credit counseling function they will have performed for
debtors pre-petition. Consumer bankruptcy attorneys will alert their
clients to the education requirement and refer clients to approved
providers, and perhaps some consumer bankruptcy attorneys, desiring
to offer or market convenient one-stop service to clients, will seek ap-
proval to offer the instruction themselves or through office staff.160
Pro se debtors must learn of the requirement on their own and choose
a provider based on advertising, suggestions from a bankruptcy peti-
tion preparer, word of mouth, or the list maintained by the clerk of the
bankruptcy court. We can only hope that not too many pro se debtors
will be lured to instructional courses not approved by the United
States trustee before checking the list.
We have seen, to summarize, that the justification for instruction
in personal financial management is obscure or nonexistent, and that
implementation of the requirement for such instruction will demand
the ongoing expenditure of resources by the United States trustee. It
will impose additional costs, in both time and money, upon financially
strapped individual debtors, many of whom are in bankruptcy for rea-
sons entirely unrelated to inept financial management and for whom
the education will be make-work. The requirement is almost certain
to be unevenly administered and not equally convenient to all individ-
ual debtors. At best we might rationalize the requirement in the fol-
lowing terms. Financial literacy among adults in the United States is
an important goal.161 The bankruptcy process provides a captive au-
an attorney may be able to obtain Internet counseling through a terminal in the attor-
ney's office, as in the proposed system described supra pp. 248-49.
159. A NATION ONLINE, supra note 153, at 4-5.
160. Unlike approved providers of credit counseling, approved providers of personal
financial management instruction need not be nonprofit. The Act refers to approval by
the United States trustee of "a nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency or an
instructional course concerning personal financial management ...." BAPCP Act,
supra note 13, § 106(e) (adding § 111 to the Bankruptcy Code) (emphasis added). The
attorney's service can only be one-stop service if the client can also obtain credit coun-
seling at the attorney's office, a possibility suggested supra pp. 248-49.
161. Concerning financial illiteracy in the United States, see Hearing on the State of
Financial Literacy and Education in America: Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous. and Urban Affairs, 107th Congo (Feb. 5, 2002) (first hearing in a series), available
at http://www.senate.gov/%7Ebanking/02_02hrg/020502lindex.htm; id. (Feb. 6, 2002)
 LA [V .
 
fr i . 159 
VD   t i   
 .
i   
  
 f  
.
t   i
   r  
ff  i ­





     
 .
i ,  
    ,
 




 . t 
 i ­
.  i   ­
.
rt .161  
rn     rn   ­
 ffi     .
  .
   
i        
 fi    
rn   . . .
      ).  
rn       i  ­
 rn ffi  lit  .
rn fi lit    f 
  i : . i  
.  ff t go fir   i )
 ://www e. g/ g/ li ;
HeinOnline -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 271 2005-2006
       
            
         
          
            
             
          
       
           
           
 
 
       
           
 
       
     
         
      
         
  
 
      
          
   
 
       
        
          
             
           
            
      
             
          
            
               
             
              
              
             
             
    
          
              
             
             
            
           
            
           
              
              
             
              
           
2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 271
dience, one that may include a percentage of adults likely to benefit
from personal financial management education that is higher than
any other subset of adults. The instruction might reduce the likeli-
hood of recidivism, however low the rate of recidivism may be, thus
providing some comfort to those who absorb or pass on the cost of un-
paid debt. Moreover, even if events beyond an individual's control
rather than ineffective financial management precipitate most bank-
ruptcy filings by individuals, filtering out those who would not benefit
from the education would consume too many resources and invoke too
much discretion.162 Finally, if the education program were voluntary,
too many debtors in need of the education might fail to participate.163
II. MEANS TESTING AND DISMISSAL OF CONSUMER
CHAPTER 7 CASES FOR ABUSE
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO MEANS TESTING AND DISMISSAL OF
CONSUMER CHAPTER 7 CASES FOR ABUSE
Creditors have advocated means testing of individual Chapter 7
debtors for decades. 164 In 1984 Congress rejected statutory language
that would have imposed an eligibility requirement for Chapter 7
based upon future income.165 Instead, it enacted section 707(b) of the
(second hearing in a series), available at http://www.senate.gov/%7Ebanking/02_02hrg/
020602lindex.htm. For additional resources on financial illiteracy and financial literacy
programs, see web site ofJump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy, at http://
www.jumpstart.org/index.cfm (last visited July 24, 2005); web site of Project Money
$mart, a project of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, at http://www.chicagofed.org/
consumer_informationlmoney_smart_index.cfm (last visited July 24, 2005).
162. One bankruptcy judge has described the prospect of screening out debtors who
do not require personal financial management education as a "nightmare administra-
tively." A. Mechele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma be Taught? Why Credit-
Focused Debtor Education May Not Work, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 945, 962 n.48 (1999).
163. Results from the pilot voluntary education program for Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 debtors in the Eastern District of New York suggest the difficulty in attracting volun-
tary participants, even though the free counseling, with a free set of materials, was
limited to one three-hour session, supplemented by a certificate, a small gift, and re-
freshments. Lessons from the Trenches, supra note 124, at 517-18; Pilot Program, supra
note 96, at 238-42.
164. Personal Bankruptcy Oversight Hearings: Before the House Subcomm. on Mo-
nopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Congo 545,
545-46 (1982) (prepared statement of Frank R. Kennedy); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S
DOMINION, A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAw IN AMERICA 154 (2001) (identifYing efforts of
consumer credit industry in the 1960s); Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse ofBank-
ruptcy: An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Qualification For Bankruptcy Discharge, 62
ALB. L. REV. 467, 500 (1998) (identifYing bills in 1964 and 1967).
165. Early versions of what would become section 707(b) ofthe Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 contained a future income test. The future
income test was dropped in favor of the substantial abuse language of section 707(b).
For descriptions of the legislative history, see Coulson, supra note 164, at 501-05;
Wayne R. Wells et aI., The Implementation ofBankruptcy Code Section 707(b): The Law
and the Reality, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 15, 28-30 (1991).
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272 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
Bankruptcy Code, which authorized the bankruptcy court to dismiss
the Chapter 7 case of an individual debtor whose debts were primarily
consumer debts if the court concluded that granting relief would con-
stitute a "substantial abuse" of Chapter 7. 166 Congress had never
before so restricted relief under Chapter 7. 167
Section 707(b) authorized a court to dismiss for substantial abuse
only on its own motion or upon motion of the United States trustee.16S
To forestall creditor leverage, the section even precluded any party in
interest from requesting or suggesting such a motion. Circuit court
interpretations of "substantial abuse" diverged169 and varying
166. 11 u.s.C. § 707(b) (2000).
167. The relevant characteristics of the first three bankruptcy statutes, adopted and
repealed in the 19th century, are reviewed in Coulson, supra note 164, at 471-76. In
brief, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, repealed in 1803, was limited to involuntary cases
against merchants or bankers, and discharge ofthe debtor was conditioned upon a find-
ing of the debtor's cooperation, including the surrender of non-exempt property, and the
signed consent of creditors holding at least 213 in number and value of proven debts. Id.
at 471-72. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841, repealed in 1843, introduced relief in voluntary
cases. Discharge was conditioned upon the debtor's cooperation, including surrender of
non-exempt property. If a majority of creditors in both number and value of debts ob-
jected to discharge, the debtor was nonetheless entitled to a discharge upon a finding of
full disclosure, cooperation, compliance with the Act, and surrender of property. Id. at
473-74. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, repealed in 1878, specified "numerous conditions
[to discharge] of candor and cooperation" and, for cases filed after January 1, 1869, also
required consent to the discharge by specified majorities of creditors in cases in which
specified amounts of dividends were not paid. Id. at 475-76. The Bankruptcy Act of
1898 introduced what we now know as the grounds for denial of discharge and specified
debts that are not dischargeable. It did not reintroduce the notion ofcreditor consent to
discharge. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
169. Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming
dismissal for substantial abuse based on totality of circumstances including incurring of
substantial debts from extravagant lifestyle and a substantial income that could repay
debt, but declining to spell out precise content of"totality of circumstances" test); Green
v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572-73 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing dismissal for
substantial abuse based solely on excess of income over necessary expenses and requir-
ing consideration of totality of circumstances, including five listed factors); In re Krohn,
886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal for substantial abuse based on
totality of circumstances demonstrating insufficient degree of honesty and need, al-
though either will suffice, and when insufficient need may be demonstrated by ability to
repay debts out of future earnings); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 1989)
(affirming dismissal for substantial abuse because disposable income was sufficient to
fund Chapter 13 plan); Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1988)
(remanding to bankruptcy court, but holding that a debtor's ability to pay his debts,
standing alone, sufficient to support a conclusion of substantial abuse); Price v. U.S.
Trustee (In re Price), 353 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal for sub-
stantial abuse based on debtor's ability to pay but noting that ability to pay debts does
not compel dismissal and that, in some cases, other circumstances alone could justifY
dismissal). For a comparison of some of these decisions and a survey of other ap-
proaches among bankruptcy judges, see Coulson, supra note 164, at 505-16; Honorable
Tamara O. Mitchell, Dismissal of Cases via U.S.C. § 707: Bad Faith and Substantial
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caseloads and philosophical dispositions of bankruptcy judges, coupled
with varying screening mechanisms used by different United States
trustees, compounded the effect of the disagreement.17o Accordingly,
the frequency of section 707(b) motions and dismissals varied widely.
Section 707(b) was the proverbial camel's nose under the tent.
The means-testing amendments to section 707(b) carried by the Act
shove in the rest ofthe camel. Under the means-testing amendments,
a Chapter 7 debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts will be
subject to a means test if the debtor's putative annual income exceeds
a specified state annual median income.171 If the putative annual in-
come does not exceed the specified median, the debtor is spared appli-
cation of the means test. Comparison of a debtor's putative annual
income to a specified state median income is thus a trigger for applica-
tion of the means test. The income level at which the means-test trig-
ger is set reflects a prediction that very few individual Chapter 7
debtors whose putative annual income falls short of the relevant me-
dian would be able to pay very much to non-priority unsecured credi-
tors if the case were to be dismissed or converted to Chapter 13.
Ifthe comparison of a debtor's putative annual income to the rele-
vant median triggers application of the means test, application of the
means test determines the amount that the debtor is presumed able to
pay on non-priority unsecured claims over a period of five years, based
upon calculations using the debtor's imputed income, imputed ex-
penses, some actual expenses, and payments due on secured and pri-
ority claims.172 . If, as a result of those calculations, the debtor is
presumed able to pay a stated minimum amount on non-priority un-
secured claims over a five-year period, the bankruptcy court must pre-
sume abuse of Chapter 7 (a finding of "substantial" abuse is no longer
required) and may dismiss the case or, with the debtor's consent, con-
vert to Chapter 11 or 13.173
170. See Wells et aI., supra note 165, at 15 (reporting the results of a survey ques-
tionnaire distributed to all bankruptcy courts, United States trustees, and assistant
United States trustees). They reported that 85% of courts responding to the survey did
not screen Chapter 7 cases for substantial abuse because of lack of time, concern as to
the role of a judge, reliance on the United States trustee, or objection to setting up a
screening process. [d. at 19-23. Survey responses also indicated different screening
mechanisms among United States trustee offices. Some relied on panel trustees and
some, but not all, United States trustee offices furnished screening guidelines to panel
trustees. Other United States trustee offices conducted their own screening, some by
reviewing all Chapter 7 petitions and some by reviewing a sample of Chapter 7 peti-
tions. In some offices the United States trustee or assistant trustee conducted the re-
view and in other offices other personnel conducted the review. [d. at 24.
171. See infra pp. 276-83.
172. See infra pp. 284-88.
173. See infra pp. 284-85. The first sentence of § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
states, in relevant part, "a court ... may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor
under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the grant-
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274 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
If the means test is not triggered or if application of the means
test does not create a presumption of abuse, the bankruptcy court may
nonetheless conclude that the debtor has abused Chapter 7 if it finds
either that the debtor has filed a Chapter 7 petition in bad faith or
that the totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situa-
tion demonstrates abuse.174 In such a case the court may then dis-
miss or, with the debtor's consent, convert to Chapter 13. On the
other hand, a debtor for whom abuse is presumed may rebut the pre-
sumption of abuse by itemizing, documenting, and explaining under
oath "special circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjust-
ments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable al-
ternative."175 Even if the debtor rebuts the presumption of abuse,
however, a court may nonetheless conclude that the debtor has abused
Chapter 7 and dismiss based upon a finding of bad faith filing or the
totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situation.176
The Act imposes significant new burdens upon the United States
trustee associated with the means test,177 estimated to cost $150 mil-
ing of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter." 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b) (2000) (emphasis added). The Act amends that sentence by deleting the word
"substantial" and adding the words "or, with the debtor's consent, convert such a case to
a case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title" after the words "consumer debts," but does
not alter the word "may." Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, § 102(a)(2)(B) (2005) [hereinafter BAPCP Act]
(amending § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code). It is curious, indeed almost bizarre (or
perhaps inadvertent), that exercise of the dismissal power remains permissive given
that one justification for means testing by formula has been to reduce or eliminate dis-
parity in the application of section 707(b). Perhaps the word "may" takes on a different
meaning after the amendment, namely, that the court must either dismiss or convert
but it may, with the debtor's consent, do either. But that would have been the meaning
had the language been amended to say that the court "must dismiss ... or may, with the
debtor's consent, convert to ... chapter 11 or 13 ...." Alternatively, perhaps the word
"may" reflects the possibility that a debtor may rebut a presumption of abuse and
thereby convince the court not to dismiss.
174. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(3) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
175. § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2)(B) to the Bankruptcy Code). The additional
expenses or adjustments to current monthly income must be sufficient to deprive the
debtor of means to pay a minimum amount to non-priority unsecured creditors over a
period of five years. [d. The minimum amount is identified in Table 1 and related text,
infra pp. 284-85. I discuss the meaning of "additional expenses or adjustments of cur-
rent monthly income" infra pp. 296-98.
176. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(3) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
177. The Act imposes the same burdens upon bankruptcy administrators. The Re-
port of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission succinctly explains the difference
between the United States Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrator programs: "The
United States Trustee Program is an executive branch agency within the department of
Justice that is responsible for overall bankruptcy administration in forty-eight states,
Puerto Rico & Guam." NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPfCY: THE NEXT TwENTY
YEARS, FINAL REPORT, Vol. I, at 844 [hereinafter COMM'N REPORT], available at http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reporttittlepg.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
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lion for the period 2006-2010P8 The United States trustee must re-
view every Chapter 7 case filed by an individual debtor for the
possibility of presumed abuse, file a statement with the court reflect-
ing a conclusion on that issue, and thereafter, in specified cases, either
file a motion to dismiss or convert to another Chapter based on pre-
sumed abuse or file a statement explaining reasons for not doing
SO.179 The Act also amends section 707(b) to permit any creditor of the
debtor, or the panel trustee, to file a motion to dismiss for abuse if the
debtor's putative annual income exceeds the relevant state median.180
This enhances creditor leverage outside bankruptcy ("we'll file a
707(b) motion if you file a Chapter 7 petition") and may also enhance
creditor leverage in bankruptcy ("we'll dismiss this 707(b) motion if
you reaffirm").
By adding section 707(b) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, Con-
gress took its first stab at denying a Chapter 7 discharge to an individ-
ual who, without inappropriate sacrifice, could afford to pay a
meaningful amount of his or her unsecured debt in a reasonable pe-
riod oftime.181 Two decades later, dissatisfied with judicial discretion
as the mechanism to achieve that objective, Congress has substituted
a detailed rule confining judicial discretion.182 The means test fixes a
The remaining six judicial districts in North Carolina and Alabama do not have
United States Trustees. The Bankruptcy Administrator system is responsible
for bankruptcy administration in those districts. Section 302(d)(3)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986 authorized the Judicial Conference ofthe United States to establish
a bankruptcy administrator program. The Bankruptcy Administrator system
is part of the judicial branch under the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
COMM'N REPORT, Vol. I, at 844 n.2112.
For simplicity, this Article refers throughout only to rights and duties of United
States trustees even though the Act affords the same rights and delegates the same
duties to bankruptcy administrators.
178. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, S. 256 BANKRUPTCY ABuSE PREVEN-
TION & CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, 5, available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs!
62xx/doc6266/s256hjud.pdf.
179. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, §102(c) (adding § 704(b) to the Bankruptcy Code).
180. §102(a)(2)(B) (amending § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code); id. §102(a)(2)(C)
(adding § 707(b)(6) to the Bankruptcy Code).
181. As suggested by a reading of judicial opinions seeking congressional intent at
the time, this may be slightly revisionist history. The federal circuit court cases are
identified supra note 169.
182. Professor Jack Williams has thoughtfully explored the debate about which
limit on judicial discretion, general standard or detailed rule, better serves the goal of
screening abuse by consumer debtors. Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and
Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105 (1999). Professor Ted Janger
explores competing visions of the design of bankruptcy legislation and the role of judi-
cial discretion in bankruptcy cases. Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law:
Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2001). Professor
Janger also cautions against an "unreflective shift to crystalline rules in bankruptcy."
Janger, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. at 623.
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276 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
meaningful amount of repayment, fixes five years as the reasonable
period of time, and requires bankruptcy judges to evaluate by formula
an individual debtor's ability to pay without inappropriate sacrifice.
The formula is complex. 183 Nonetheless, in several critical respects it
remains incomplete or unclear, guaranteeing the prospect of years of
judicial, regulatory, and legislative refinement. 184 Awaiting refine-
ment might be a price worth paying were the formula free of other
serious and enduring flaws, but it isn't. I elaborate on three in the
more detailed explanation that follows of the means-test trigger and
means test. First, the formula preserves significant judicial discre-
tion. Alone that would evoke praise. But the Act elsewhere exposes
consumer bankruptcy attorneys to the possibility of sanctions attend-
ant to the exercise of judicial discretion adverse to the debtor, thereby
jeopardizing the prospect of legal representation for some debtors or
increasing its cost. Second, for debtors potentially subject to the
means test, the formula multiplies the opportunities for pre-petition
planning, thereby assuring continuing waves of litigation as well as
renewed occasion to decry both disparate outcomes and gaming of the
system. Third, the means-test formula assumes that payment of se-
cured debt is not abusive, irrespective of the amount of debt and irre-
spective of the nature and value of the collateral. It thus can reward
prior extravagance or good fortune and punish prior parsimony.185 I
do not address the complex empirical and normative question of the
extent to which the means-test calculation of the debtor's ability to
pay understates or overstates expenses of living that society should
tolerate before denying a debtor Chapter 7 relief.
B. THE MEANS-TEST TRIGGER
A Chapter 7 filing by an individual whose debts are primarily con-
sumer debts will trigger means testing and the possibility of dismissal
for presumed abuse if the debtor's putative annual income exceeds the
relevant state median of annual income.186 The Act derives the
183. See infra pp. 284-88.
184. See infra pp. 289-300. Congress acknowledges in the Act the likely need for
regulatory or legislative refinement by expressing the sense of Congress that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury has the authority to alter existing Internal Revenue Service stan-
dards to accommodate their use in the means test and by requiring the Director of the
Executive Office of United States Trustees to submit a report containing findings on use
of those standards in the means test and recommending amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Code consistent with those findings. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 103.
185. As to this third observation, I elaborate on an argument advanced earlier by
Professor Tabb. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the
United States, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 18-29 (2001).
186. The Act establishes the trigger first by articulating a means test, BAPCP Act,
supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code), and then by
denying standing to invoke the means test unless the debtor's putative annual income
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 277
debtor's putative annual income (although it does not use that phrase)
by multiplying the debtor's current monthly income ("eMI") by twelve.
The Act derives the debtor's eMI by averaging the debtor's income for
a six-month period preceding the filing of the petition.
1. Current monthly income
The Act defines "current monthly income" as the following:
(A) ... the average monthly income from all sources that the
debtor receives (or in a joint case, the debtor and the debtor's
spouse receive) without regard to whether such income is tax-
able income, derived during the 6-month period ending on-
(i) the last day of the calendar month immediately pre-
ceding the date of the commencement of the case if the
debtor files the schedule of current income required by
section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii); or
(ii) the date on which current monthly income is deter-
mined by the court for purposes of this title if the debtor
does not file the schedule of current income required by
section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii); and
(B) includes any amount paid by any entity other than the
debtor (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse),
on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or
the debtor's dependents (and in a joint case the debtor's
spouse if not otherwise a dependent), but excludes benefits
received under the Social Security Act, payments to victims of
war crimes or crimes against humanity on account of their
status as victims of such crimes, and payments to victims of
international terrorism ... or domestic terrorism ... on ac-
count of their status as victims of such terrorism.187
While eMI includes the monthly income of the debtor's spouse
only in a joint case, the means-test trigger nonetheless appears to con-
sider the monthly income of both the debtor and the debtor's spouse
even in an individual case filed by a married debtor, except for certain
cases in which the debtor and the debtor's spouse are either separated
or living separate and apart.188 Thus, while eMI technically includes
the monthly income of a debtor's spouse only in a joint case, it is con-
exceeds the relevant median. [d. § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(7) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
187. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, §102(b) (adding § 101(10A) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
188. The relevant language denies standing to move for dismissal for presumed
abuse "if the current monthly income of the debtor ... and the debtor's spouse com-
bined ... [does not exceed the relevant medianl." [d. § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(7)
to the Bankruptcy Code). Because the Act defines "current monthly income" to include
income of the debtor's spouse in a joint case, that portion of the preceding phrase that
reads "and the debtor's spouse combined" appears to mean that for purposes of the trig-
ger the spouse's income should be considered even if the case is not a joint case. That
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278 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
venient to assume for discussion of the means-test trigger that CMI
also includes income of a debtor's spouse even if only one spouse files.
CMI is putative income because it derives from a six-month aver-
age. As an average, it will be skewed by shifts (especially spikes) in
income, up or down, such as those for seasonal employees, for persons
temporarily unemployed, for employees working overtime or receiving
a bonus, for persons irregularly receiving support payments, or in
myriad other circumstances. Here we see the first example of oppor-
tunities for pre-petition planning, by savvy or well counseled debtors
whose putative annual income is close to the relevant state median
and whose financial circumstances leave some flexibility in the timing
of the filing of a petition. The seasonal worker, for example, whose
season (and higher income) ended three months earlier and whose
next season does not begin for a few months might avoid the means-
test trigger by waiting a few months before filing and thereby decreas-
ing CM!. A companion worker, either unable to afford legal counselor
facing imminent foreclosure or wage garnishment that he or she can-
not otherwise forestall, may be denied the opportunity to postpone fil-
ing. Reminiscent of pre-petition exemption planning, which can lower
a debtor's price for Chapter 7 relief, pre-petition means-test planning
can affect the availability of Chapter 7 relief. Inconsistent and unpre-
dictable judicial treatment of pre-petition exemption planning is well
documented. l89 We may fairly expect the same result for pre-petition
planning aimed at avoiding the means-test trigger.
Pre-petition planning to avoid the means-test trigger will not be
risk-free however. Suppose that a debtor with lower than average re-
cent income delays filing, or a debtor expecting imminent increases in
income files quickly, in order to generate a figure for putative annual
income that falls short of the relevant state median. In either case,
the court may nonetheless find abuse based either upon a finding of
bad faith filing or based upon the totality of the circumstances of the
conclusion is reinforced because the trigger excludes the income of the debtor's spouse
when the spouses are separated or living separate and apart. [d.
189. E.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71
AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1997); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAw
OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 254-57 (4th ed. 2001) (comparing three outcomes in the 8th
Circuit particularly difficult to reconcile). See generally, Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Ste-
phen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve ofBankruptcy: Villains
or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (1995). The Act explicitly ad-
dresses another form of pre-petition planning by prohibiting an attorney from advising
a debtor to incur new debt in contemplation of bankruptcy (e.g. "buy a new car on
credit"), advice that might help the debtor pass the means test. See infra pp. 314-21. In
marked contrast, it does not prohibit advice to delay or to rush the filing of a petition or
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 279
debtor's financial situation.19o The debtor's strategy in the first case
may be inferred because the debtor still must file a Statement of Fi-
nancial Affairs that reveals the gross amount of the debtor's income
from the beginning of the calendar year to the date of the filing of the
petition and the gross amount of the debtor's income for the preceding
two calendar years.191 The debtor's strategy in the second case may
be inferred because the Act requires that the debtor file a statement of
any reasonably anticipated increase in income over the twelve-month
period following the filing of the petition.192 The United States trus-
tee may be tempted to seize upon either piece of information should
the debtor's putative annual income fall not too far below the relevant
state median. Variations in the screening policies among United
States trustees, comparable to current variations in screening for sub-
stantial abuse,193 and variations in judicial treatment of these kinds
of cases will render the pre-petition planning more successful in some
jurisdictions than in others. At the very least, however, the debtor's
planning will avoid any prospect of a motion to dismiss from a panel
trustee or creditor because only the court or United States trustee
may bring a motion to dismiss for abuse (not presumed abuse) if the
debtor's putative annual income does not exceed the relevant
median.194
The debtor whose filing is urgent and who is unable to avoid the
means-test trigger by delaying a filing might nonetheless have insuffi-
cient means under the means test to generate the presumption of
190. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(3) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
191. FED. R. BANKR. P. Official Form 7: Statement of Financial Affairs (2001). The
Act adds to the debtor's duties specified in section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code, and
restructures that section, but does not alter the existing requirement to file a statement
of financial affairs. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 315(b) (amending § 521 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
192. BABCP Act, supra note 173, § 315(b) (amending § 521 of the Bankruptcy
Code).
193. See supra note 170.
194. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(6) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code). Note, however, that the Act deletes language from existing section 707(b)
that prohibits the court from dismissing a case "at the request or suggestion of any
party in interest." Id. § 102(a)(2)(B) (amending § 707(b)of the Bankruptcy Code). The
deletion of that language might be construed as permitting the court or United States
trustee to bring the motion on the suggestion of a creditor, overruling cases such as In
Re Restea, 76 B.R. 728, 732 (Bankr. S. D. 1987) (dismissing United States trustee mo-
tion to dismiss for abuse because investigation for substantial abuse had been suggested
by creditor at section 341 meeting), in favor of cases such as In re Stewart, 201 B.R. 996,
1003 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996) (declining to dismiss United States trustee motion to
dismiss for abuse on ground that it had been suggested by a creditor).
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280 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
abuse.195 Alternatively, if that debtor's means generate the presump-
tion of abuse under the means test, he or she may seek to rebut the
presumption of abuse by claiming that anticipated drops in income
will leave the debtor with insufficient means. 196 But rebutting the
presumption will require the debtor, at additional expense to the
debtor and additional risk to a debtor's attorney, to oppose a motion
for dismissal that could not have been filed in the first place had the
debtor been able through delay to avoid the means-test trigger.
2. Relevant state median annual income
Under the Act, no one, including a bankruptcy judge, has stand-
ing to invoke the means test if the putative annual income of the
debtor, as of the date of the order for relief, does not exceed the follow-
ing median income:
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the
median family income of the applicable State for 1 earner;
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3 or 4 individu-
als, the highest median family income of the applicable State
for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individ-
uals, the highest median family income of the applicable
State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $525 per
month for each individual in excess of 4.197
195. The debtor's presumed expenses, including average monthly payments on ac-
count of secured debt and priority unsecured debt, may consume enough of the debtor's
presumed income to avoid the presumption of abuse. See infra pp. 284-85.
196. See infra pp. 296-98.
197. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(7) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code). The provision adds $525 per month for each individual in excess of four
rather than referring to medians for family sizes of five or more because national medi-
ans of family income, but obviously not expenses, peak at families offour and decline for
families of five, decline again for families of six, and decline again for families of seven
or more. United States Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables - Families, Table F-8,
http://www.census.gov/hhesiincomeihistindID8.html (reporting national median family
income by family size) (last visited July 24, 2005).
The Act does not define "applicable state." Absent definition, it should probably be
interpreted to mean the state in which the district court with proper venue is located.
That state is the state of the debtor's domicile or residence for the 180 days preceding
commencement of a case or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other
state. 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000). Contrast the Act's new and more elaborate provision
concerning the applicable state for the purpose ofclaiming exemptions ifthe debtor does
not elect the federal bankruptcy exemptions. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 307
(amending § 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code). The Act's reference to median family in-
come for a state may prompt some forum shopping. Consider the following example,
which uses 1999 median income figures reported by the 2000 Census. The median an-
nual family income for a family of two living in Oregon is $44,278 and the median an-
nual family income for a family of two living in California is $50,574 (derived in the
manner specified infra note 201, but without the required inflation adjustment de-
scribed infra note 206 and accompanying text). If the putative annual income of an
Oregon resident (including the income of his spouse) is $49,000, he and his spouse
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 281
In addition, only the bankruptcy judge and United States trustee
have standing to bring a motion to dismiss for abuse based on allega-
tions of bad faith or based on the totality of the circumstances of the
debtor's financial situation, if the debtor's putative annual income, as
of the date of the order for relief, does not exceed the relevant state
median.198
Note that while the statutory language predicates choice of me-
dian upon household size, the relevant median is a median of family
income, not household income, in the applicable state. The United
States Bureau of the Census ("Census Bureau") distinguishes between
a household and a family and calculates and publishes different me-
dian income figures for each. The Census Bureau defines household
as "all the people who occupy a housing unit" and defines householder
as "the person (or one of the people) who owns or rents (maintains) the
housing unit."199 It defines family as "a group of two or more peo-
ple . . . related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing to-
gether ...."200 Thus, for example, a married couple (with or without
children) occupying a housing unit, a single person occupying a hous-
ing unit, or two or more persons unrelated by birth, marriage, or adop-
tion occupying a housing unit all would be members of a household,
might relocate to California and wait ninety-one days before filing a petition to avoid
triggering the means test. Relocation to some states might not be advisable if exemp-
tions in the destination state are less generous than exemptions in the state of origin. If
exemptions are not an issue, the possibility of relocating for the purpose of avoiding the
means-test trigger raises a host of questions for a debtor: Will the benefit of a bank-
ruptcy discharge outweigh the cost and inconvenience of relocation or, in more distant
relocations, the higher cost ofliving, the need to find a new job and new schools, the loss
of contact with friends and family, and other psychological costs? Would the debtor's
attorney in the origination state commit malpractice by failing to mention the possibil-
ity? Might the debtor's petition be dismissed nonetheless for a filing in bad faith or
because of the totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situation? See
supra note 176 and accompanying text. An alternative and possibly less disruptive pre-
petition strategy for avoiding the means-test trigger would be for the debtor to increase
the size of the household (and thus the level of the relevant median) by inviting rela-
tives, friends, or others to share living accommodations. If discovered, this strategy
might also provoke a motion to dismiss for abuse based on a filing in bad faith or be-
cause of the totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situation.
198. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(6) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code). The Act also invokes the medians for other purposes that I do not discuss:
(1) triggering determination of a Chapter 13 debtor's disposable income by using the
means-test calculations if the debtor's putative annual income exceeds the relevant me-
dian, [d. § 102(h) (amending § 1325(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code and adding
§ 1325(b)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code); (2) extending the permissible or required length
of a debtor's Chapter 13 plan if the debtor's putative annual income exceeds the rele-
vant median, [d. § 318 (amending §§ 1322(d) and 1325(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
and adding § 1325(b)(4) to the Bankruptcy Code).
199. United States Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS) - Definitions
and Explanations (Jan. 20, 2004), http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.
html.
200. [d.
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282 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
but only the married couple (and its children) would be members of a
family. Families are therefore a subset of all households.
Through spring 2005, the Census Bureau reported median annual
family income for each state by family size based only upon its decen-
nial census (for the year preceding the decennial census). The rele-
vant data, based upon the 1999 decennial census, is available through
the Census Bureau's American Fact Finder.201 The Census Bureau
has not heretofore updated the data annually, on the basis of its an-
nual March Current Population Survey, because the sampling size of
the March Survey was too small.202 Someone on the Hill appears to
have realized or feared late in the 107th Congress that the required
data might not be available for each year. Rather than retreating to
proposals in earlier bills to use national median family income by fam-
ily size or national median household income by household size,203
201. For family sizes of two or more, consult the Census Bureau web site, at http://
www.census.gov (last visited July 24,2005) and proceed as follows: (1) select the link to
American FactFinder; (2) select the link to Data Sets; (3) select Census 2000 Summary
File 4 and select Detailed Tables from the menu thereby generated; (4) select "State" as
the relevant geographic type, select and add the desired state, and then select the link
entitled "Next"; (5) using the "show all tables" tab, find and add Table PCTU8, and then
select the link entitled "Next"; (6) select and add "Total Population" and then select the
link entitled "Show Result." For median family income for one earner, select Table
PCTU5 instead of Table PCTU8.
202. A representative of the Income Surveys Branch of the Housing & Household
Economic Statistics Division of the United States Census Bureau explained the
following:
The March [Current Population Survey) is designed to collect reliable data pri-
marily at the national level and only secondarily at the regional level. State
estimates of income are considerably less reliable. Specifically, the sampling
variability associated with the state estimates is higher than for estimates
based on the country as a whole or on regions, and year-to-year state estimates
fluctuate more widely than national estimates ....
It is the Bureau's policy not to publish any derived measure from the [Current
Population Survey) where the base is less than 75,000. Whenever a base of an
income distribution is relatively small, the medians, means, and percent distri-
butions are extremely unreliable because of the limited size of the sample and
they must be used with caution.
Email fromShirleyL.Smith. United States Census Bureau, to author (Mar. 22, 2001)
(on file with author).
203. Section 101(4) of The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Congo
(1998), referred to the national median family income for a family ofequal size or, in the
case of a household of one person, the national median household income for one earner.
Section 102(a)(5) of the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 (engrossed amend-
ment agreed to by the Senate), H.R. 3150, 105th Congo (1998), referred to the national
median household income of a household of equal size. Those medians would have dis-
advantaged debtors living in states with median incomes higher than the national me-
dian and favored debtors living in states with median incomes lower than the national
median. The use of state medians in the Act shifts the disadvantage to debtors living in
counties with median incomes higher than the state median and shifts the advantage to
debtors living in counties with median incomes lower than the state median.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 283
which are reported annually,204 the Conference Report on H.R. 333
added a definition of median family income that has been carried over
to the Act.205 Under the definition, the relevant figure for median
family income by family size for each state is that which the Census
Bureau has most recently calculated and reported, but if not calcu-
lated and reported in the current year (i.e. the year in which the peti-
tion is filed), the relevant figure is the figure calculated and reported
in the then most recent year adjusted through the intervening years to
reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consum-
ers.206 Serendipity, in the form of the Census Bureau's new American
Community Survey, launched by the Census Bureau in January
2005,207 spares us the necessity of estimating current medians by ad-
justing very old medians. It will provide the relevant data annually,
to be posted on the web site of the Executive Office of United States
Trustees.208
204. United States Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables - Families, Table F-B,
http://www.census.govlhhes/incomeihistindIDB.html(last visited July 24, 2005) (report-
ing national median family income by family size); United States Census Bureau, His-
torical Income Tables - Households, Table H-ll, http://www.census.govlhheS/income/
histindhll.html (last visited July 24, 2005) (reporting national median household in-
come by household size).
205. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(k) (adding § 101(39A) to the Bankruptcy
Code). H.R. 333 did not originally include the definition. H.R. 333, 107th Congo (2001)
(as engrossed and agreed to by the Senate). The Conference Report to accompany H.R.
333 added the definition. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-617, § 102(k) (2002).
206. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(k) (adding § 101(39A) to the Bankruptcy
Code). Consider the following example, which appears to be moot by virtue of develop-
ments described infra notes 207-0B and accompanying text. The United States Census
Bureau did not report the 1999 median income by family size for each state until 2003.
Thus, for purposes of a petition filed in 2005, the relevant median family income would
be the 1999 median, reported in 2003, adjusted by the percentage change in the Con-
sumer Price Index for All Urban Consumer ["CPI"] between December 31, 1999 and
December 31, 2004. One may derive that percentage change by visiting the web site of
the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, at http://www.bls.
gov/cpilhome.htm (last visited July 24, 2005). At that site, under the heading labeled
"Get Detailed CPI Statistics," select the link to "Most Requested Statistics" next to CPI
- All Urban Consumers (Current Series). Then check the box labeled "U.S. All items,
19B2-B4=100 - CUUROOOOSAO" and then the box labeled "Retrieve Data." The CPI for
December 1999 is 16B.3 and the CPI for December 2004 is 190.3, a difference of 22
points. The percentage change between the two is 13.1% (22116B.3). Thus, if the Cen-
sus Bureau reported the relevant 1999 median family income as $50,000, the relevant
median for a petition filed in 2005 would be $56,550 ($50,000 + 13.1% of $50,000).
207. The Census Bureau reports that the American Community Survey will produce
annually the same quality of statistical information that the Decennial Census pro-
duces. United States Census Bureau, American Community Survey Fact Sheet (Feb.
2005), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2004l05ACSmediafactsheet.pdf.
20B. A representative of the Statistical Information Staffof the Housing and House-
hold Economic Statistics Division of the Census Bureau advised me by email that the
Income Survey Branch of that division is working on tables designed for use with the
Act based on the American Community Survey. Email from Cheryl [last name not
given], United States Census Bureau, to author (May 1B, 2005) (on file with author).
The United States Trustee Program has posted the median family income data for the
:   KR YS
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284 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
C. THE MEANS TEST
1. An overview of the means test
Once triggered, the means test determines the extent of a debtor's
presumed ability to repay non-priority unsecured debt in a hypotheti-
cal five-year Chapter 13 plan. One calculates and evaluates the
debtor's presumed ability to pay in several steps. First, one calculates
the debtor's presumed monthly expenses (including a postulated aver-
age monthly payment on account of secured debt). Then, one sub-
tracts the presumed monthly expenses from the debtor's eM1, an
amount already determined in the process of assessing whether the
means test is even triggered,209 to arrive at a debtor's presumed
monthly disposable income, if any. Next, one multiplies the debtor's
presumed monthly disposable income by sixty, the number of months
in a five-year Chapter 13 plan,210 to arrive at the debtor's presumed
means. Finally, one compares the debtor's presumed means to a stat-
utory amount to determine whether the debtor's presumed means are
sufficient to raise a presumption that the debtor is abusing Chapter 7.
The statute states the amount to which one compares the debtor's pre-
sumed means in language that scales new heights of obscurity:
[T]he court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor's [pre-
sumed 5-year cumulative disposable income] ... is not less
than the lesser of -
(I) 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims in
the case, or $6,000, whichever is greater; or
(II) $10,000.211
The following table translates:
year 2004, to "be used ... until the data is adjusted in early 2006," on its web site.
United States Trustee Program, Census Bureau Median Family Income By Family Size
(in 2004 inflation-adjusted dollars), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/bci_dataime-
dian_income_table.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
209. In an individual case filed by a married debtor, the putative income of the
debtor nonetheless includes the income of the debtor's non-filing spouse for purposes of
the means-test trigger. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. Yet the means test
itself does not consider the income of the debtor's non-filing spouse in such a case, be-
cause it compares only the "debtor's current monthly income" with the debtor's pre-
sumed monthly expenses, BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding
§ 707(b)(2)(A) to the Bankruptcy Code), and the Act defines the "debtor's current
monthly income" to include the income of the debtor's spouse only in a joint case. [d.
§ 102(b) (adding § 101(10A) to the Bankruptcy Code). I cannot fathom a reason for this
seeming inconsistency.
210. The Act amends Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code to require plan payments
for five years if the debtor's putative annual income exceeds the relevant state median
income, unless the plan provides for full payment of allowed unsecured claims in a
shorter period. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 318 (amending §§ 1322(d) and 1325(b)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code and adding § 1325(b)(4) to the Bankruptcy Code).
211. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 285
Presumed 5-year cumulative
disposable income
If $5,999.99 or less (i.e. less than $100.00
presumed monthly disposable income)
If $10,000 or more (i.e. more than
$166.66 presumed monthly disposable
income)
If $6,000.00 - $9,999.99, inclusive (i.e.
$100.00 - $166.66 presumed monthly
disposable income, inclusive)
Consequence
Debtor passes means test (i.e. the
debtor's means are insufficient) and
abuse cannot be presumed
Debtor fails means test (i.e. the debtor's
means are sufficient), abuse is presumed,
and court may dismiss if debtor fails to
rebut presumption
Debtor passes means test (i.e. the
debtor's means are insufficient) if the
amount is less than 25% of the debtor's
non-priority unsecured claims
Debtor fails means test (i.e. the debtor's
means are sufficient) if the amount is
25% of the debtor's non-priority
unsecured claims or greater; abuse is
presumed and the court may dismiss
unless the debtor rebuts the
presumption212
The first step, calculating the debtor's presumed monthly ex-
penses, is intricate, fraught with difficult problems, and time-consum-
ing for debtors and consumer bankruptcy attorneys. The remaining
steps in the process are ministerial.213
2. The debtor's presumed monthly expenses
Calculation of a debtor's presumed monthly expenses starts with
monthly expense amounts specified by the Internal Revenue Service
in its Collection Financial Standards ("IRS Standards").214 The IRS
Standards identify categories and amounts of necessary monthly ex-
penses to be used by IRS field agents negotiating collection oftax obli-
212. For example, if a debtor's presumed five-year cumulative disposable income
were $7,000 and the debtor's non-priority unsecured debt were $32,000, abuse would
not be presumed because $7,000 is less than 25% of the debtor's non-priority unsecured
debt. However, if non-priority unsecured debt were $27,000, abuse would be presumed
because $7,000 is greater than 25% of the debtor's non-priority unsecured debt. This
portion of the means test rewards either irresponsible or deliberate pre-petition money
management to the extent that such behavior increases a debtor's non-priority
unsecured debt to a point four or more times greater than the debtor's presumed five-
year cumulative disposable income. Note, however, the Act prohibits debt relief
agencies (which include consumer bankruptcy attorneys) from advising a debtor to
incur debt in contemplation of a bankruptcy filing, a prohibition that might violate the
First Amendment. See infra pp. 314-19.
213. For two detailed hypothetical examples, one in which the means test is not
triggered and the other in which the means test is triggered, see David W. Allard,
Means Testing, Dismissal and Conversion Under the New Law, AM. BANKR. INsT. J. 8,
70, 72 (July/Aug. 2005).
214. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
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286 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
gations from delinquent individual taxpayers.215 Part 5 of the
Internal Revenue Manual elaborates on the interpretation and appli-
cation of the IRS Standards.216
The IRS Standards establish four groups of necessary expenses:
(1) food, housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, personal care
products and services, and miscellaneous,217 (2) housing and utili-
ties,218 (3) transportation,219 and, (4) other necessary expenses, rea-
sonable in amount, that a taxpayer can substantiate.22o For the first
group of expenses the IRS allows a taxpayer an amount based on na-
tional standards that apply irrespective of the location of a debtor's
215. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, COLLECTION FINANCIAL STANDARDS [hereinafter
IRS STANDARDS], at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/articlelO..id=96543.00.html (last vis-
ited July 24, 2005). The Executive Office of United States Trustees also has posted the
Standards on its web site, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usU (last visited March 3, 2006).
216. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANuAL, COLLECTING PRO-
CESS, § 5.15.1 [hereinafter ill MANuAL), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/index.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2005). The Executive Office of United States Trustees may also publish
relevant portions ofthe Manual on its web site, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usU(lastvisited
July 24, 2005).
217. IRS STANDARDS, supra note 215. Expenses for food encompass those for meals
both home and away. Expenses for apparel encompass those for both purchase and care
ofshoes and clothing, including laundry and dry cleaning and shoe repair. Expenses for
housekeeping supplies encompass those for postage and stationary, laundry and clean-
ing supplies, cleansing and toilet tissue, paper towels and napkins, lawn and garden
supplies, and miscellaneous household supplies. Expenses for personal care products
and services encompass those for hair care products, haircuts and beautician services,
oral hygiene products and articles, shaving needs, cosmetics, perfume, bath prepara-
tions, deodorants, feminine hygiene products, electric personal care appliances, per-
sonal care services, and repair of personal care appliances. IR MANuAL, supra note 216,
Exhibit 5.15.1-2. The amounts allowed are updated annually based upon results de-
rived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Annual Consumer Expenditure Survey. Id.
§ 5.15.1.7.3. The IRS sets the figure for miscellaneous expenses at $100/person and $25
for each additional person in a taxpayer's household. [d.
218. IRS STANDARDS, supra note 215. Expenses for housing encompass mortgage or
rent payments, property taxes, interest, parking, necessary maintenance and repair,
homeowner's or renter's insurance, and homeowner dues and condominium fees. Ex-
penses for utilities encompass those for gas, electricity, water, fuel oil, coal, bottled gas,
trash and garbage collection, wood and other fuels, septic cleaning, and telephone. IR
MANuAL, supra note 216, Exhibit 5.15.1-2.
219. Expenses for transportation encompass those for vehicle purchase or lease, ve-
hicle insurance, maintenance, fuel, state and local registration, required vehicle inspec-
tion, parking fees, tolls, a driver's license, and public transportation. IR MANuAL, supra
note 216, Exhibit 5.15.1-2.
220. IRS STANDARDS, supra note 215. Other necessary expenses include the follow-
ing: child care, dependent care for the elderly, invalid, or disabled, taxes, health care,
court-ordered payments, involuntary deductions, life insurance, disability insurance for
a self-employed individual, union dues, professional association dues, accounting and
legal fees for representing a taxpayer before the Service, optional telephone service (call
waiting, call identification, etc.) and long distance if they meet the necessary expense
test, charitable contributions if they are a condition of employment or otherwise meet
the necessary expense test, and education expenses that are a condition of employment
or are for a physically or mentally handicapped dependent and the education is not
provided by public schools. IR MANuAL, supra note 216, § 5.15.1.10.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 287
residence (except for Alaska and Hawaii). The standard amount var-
ies with the size of the taxpayer's family and the taxpayer's gross
monthly income, and the IRS will concede the standard amount even
if it exceeds a debtor's actual expenses for items in the groUp.221 For
housing and utilities the IRS allows a taxpayer a standard amount or
actual expenses, whichever is less. The standard amount depends
upon the location of the debtor's residence and varies with the size of
the taxpayer's family.222 For transportation the IRS allows a tax-
payer a standard amount or actual expenses, whichever is less, for
purchase or lease of up to two cars ("ownership expenses").223 It also
allows a taxpayer a standard amount or actual expenses, whichever is
less, for operating expenses and the costs of public transportation.224
The standard amount for both depends upon the number of cars that
the debtor operates and the Metropolitan Statistical Area in which the
debtor lives.225
The Act provides for the following adjustments to the amounts
allowed by the IRS Standards: (1) it allows a debtor to add no more
than 5% to the food and clothing allowance if reasonable and neces-
sary and increase the expense allowance for housing and utilities
based on actual expenses for home energy costs if reasonable, neces-
sary, and documented;226 (2) it requires that the debtor substitute av-
erage monthly debt service on account of secured debt (e.g. mortgage
or automobile installment payments), calculated in a specified man-
ner, for actual monthly debt service on account of secured debt;227 (3)
it allows the debtor to add 1I60th of the total amount of claims, if any,
entitled to priority under section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code;228 (4)
for debtors eligible for relief under Chapter 13, it allows the debtor to
add the actual administrative expenses of administering a Chapter 13
plan, up to a maximum of 10% of projected plan payments, as deter-
mined under schedules to be issued by the Executive Office for United
States Trustees;229 (5) it allows the debtor to add any reasonable and









229. [d. In reporting their empirical test of an earlier proposed means-testing
formula, Professors Culhane and White emphasized the necessity of presuming Chapter
13 administrative expenses as part of a debtor's monthly expenses in a means-test cal-
culation. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer
Bankr. Model for a Test Drive: Means Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR.
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288 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
necessary expenses to protect against identified types of family vio-
lence,23o any reasonable and necessary expenses to care for and sup-
port "elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household member[s] or
member[s] of the debtor's immediate family" who are unable to pay
such expenses,231 and any reasonable and necessary expenses, not ex-
ceeding $1,500 per year, for each child under the age of eighteen "to
attend a private or public elementary or secondary school," if not al-
ready accounted for in the IRS Standards.232
As I hope to demonstrate, the portions of this required calculation
that focus on the debtor's payment of debt introduce new and unwar-
ranted discrimination among debtors into the calculus of abuse, dis-
crimination that may only be mitigated by exercise ofthe very judicial
discretion that the means test was designed to constrain. We can see
the most significant instances of the discrimination in the Act's treat-
ment of a debtor's housing and utilities expenses and transportation
ownership expenses. We can see the continuing role for judicial dis-
cretion both in the Act's treatment of those expenses as well as in its
treatment of a debtor's "other necessary expenses."
means-test allowance for Chapter 13 administrative expenses is probably too low. In
1998, plan disbursements for debtors' attorney fees and standing chapter 13 trustee fees
amounted to 13% of total disbursements, and in 1999 disbursements for these fees
amounted to 12.4% of total disbursements. Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Sources of
Variability in Chapter 13 Performance, AM. BANKR. INsT. J. 20 (Apr. 2001). Thus, some
debtors will be dismissed from Chapter 7 for presumed abuse even though, on account of
actual Chapter 13 administrative expenses, they will be unable to pay non-priority un-
secured creditors in Chapter 13 the amount presumed by the means test.
Note that calculation of the adjustment to reflect anticipated Chapter 13 adminis-
trative expenses is circular. To determine a debtor's presumed expenses under the
means test, one includes an adjustment for anticipated Chapter 13 administrative ex-
penses. To determine anticipated Chapter 13 administrative expenses, one must calcu-
late a debtor's anticipated Chapter 13 plan payments. To determine a debtor's
anticipated Chapter 13 plan payments, one must calculate a debtor's disposable income.
To calculate a debtor's disposable income (for debtors whose putative annual income
exceeds the relevant state median), one must apply the means test. BAPCP Act, supra
note 173, § 102(h) (amending § 1325(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code and adding
§ 1325(b)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code). To apply the means test, one must include an
adjustment to reflect Chapter 13 administrative expenses. One could interrupt the cir-
cularity as follows. First, apply the means test without any adjustment for Chapter 13
administrative expenses. Next, multiply by 60 the figure for disposable income so gen-
erated to derive the total projected Chapter 13 plan payments. Multiply that total by
the allowed percentage (e.g. 10%) to generate projected Chapter 13 administrative ex-
penses. Reapply the means test with an adjustment for projected Chapter 13 adminis-
trative expenses so calculated.
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a. Housing and utilities expenses
The Act introduces sub silentio a distinction between mortgage
payments and rent into judicial decisions about abuse and in so doing
effectively prefers debtors who own homes to debtors who lease hous-
ing. Nothing in the legislative history explains or justifies this prefer-
ence; it appears to be either inadvertent or the result of benign
neglect.233
To see the distinction, recall that in assessing a taxpayer's ability
to retire a delinquent tax debt, the IRS Standards cap a taxpayer's
allowance for housing and utilities expenses equally for lessees and
homeowners.234 As a result, if a delinquent taxpayer's rent or mort-
gage payment, together with other housing and utilities expenses, ex-
ceeds the cap, the IRS Standards reflect a judgment that the taxpayer,
whether lessee or homeowner, should move to less expensive housing
and apply the money saved to payment of the tax debt. The means
test, in contrast, reflects that judgment only for lessees. Consider, for
example, the amount allowed by the means test for the housing and
utilities expenses of a childless married couple leasing housing in
Santa Clara County, California. As of January 1, 2005, the IRS Stan-
dards, and hence the means test, would permit that couple to claim
the lesser of $2,048/month or their actual expenses for rent, other
housing expenses (e.g. renter's insurance), and utilities expenses (e.g.
gas, electricity, water, telephone, trash collection).235 If their rent is
$1,200/month and their other housing and utilities expenses total
$750/month, the IRS Standards, and hence the means test, would per-
mit them to claim $1,950/month for the housing and utilities category
of expenses, but if their actual expenses for housing and utilities ex-
ceed$2,048/month, the means test caps their presumed expenses for
this category of expenses at $2,048/month.
For debtors seeking bankruptcy relief whose putative annual in-
come triggers application of the means test, this cap indirectly limits
the location, spaciousness, and quality of leased housing. In limiting
location, the cap also limits accessibility to desirable public schools. If,
for example, our couple's actual housing and utilities expenses for
leased housing exceed the cap by virtue of "excessive" rent, the means
test presumes lower rent and hence presumes a fictional disposable
233. One can imagine several possible justifications for a preference for home own-
ers, including the possible difficulty of obtaining the new credit, or the higher cost of
credit necessary to purchase a less expensive home or refinance an existing mortgage,
but none of the possible justifications would explain the kind of distinction about to be
described in the text.
234. "Housing expenses include: mortgage or rent ...." IR MANuAL, supra note 216,
§ 5.15.1.9.
235. IRS STANDARDS, supra note 215.
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290 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
income for them. Fearing a presumption of abuse, they may decide
not to file a Chapter 7 petition or may see their Chapter 7 dismissed
for presumed abuse. As an alternative, to qualify for confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan, they first would have to move to less expensive
leased housing, making the fictional disposable income real, because
the Act's amendment of Chapter 13 confirmation standards requires
that their presumed disposable income in Chapter 13 also be deter-
mined by application of the means test and hence by the same IRS
housing and utilities expenses allowance.236
As in the case of collection of delinquent taxes, this result might
not be troubling, or as troubling, were the means test to generate a
comparable result for homeowners. It does not. Were our Santa Clara
County couple to own a home encumbered by a mortgage, the means
test will sanction the location, spaciousness, and quality of their home
and the existing terms of their mortgage, no matter how high the
monthly mortgage payment.237 The means test calculation of pre-
sumed expenses states that, notwithstanding allowances under the
IRS Standards, such as for housing and utilities expenses, "the
monthly expenses of the debtor shall not include any payments for
debts."238 Shortly thereafter, however, the means test calculation
permits the debtor to claim as part of presumed monthly expenses the
debtor's average monthly payments on account of secured debt, in-
cluding debt secured by a mortgage, "scheduled as contractually due"
for the 60 months following the filing of the petition.239 Accordingly,
236. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(h) (amending § 1325(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code and adding § 1325(b)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code). The Act requires courts to mea-
sure disposable income by reference to the means test only if the debtor's putative an-
nual income exceeds the relevant state median income. [d.
237. I assume in the discussion that follows a debtor whose homestead exemption
protects any equity in the home.
238. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code). This will include payments on second and subsequent mortgages, if any,
including non-purchase-money mortgages securing either a lump sum advance or a re-
volving line ofcredit. For a revolving line ofcredit, the amount "scheduled as contractu-
ally due" probably means the minimum monthly payment under the line of credit. I do
not pursue a discussion of the additional discrimination between lessees and homeown-
ers implicit in permitting a home-owning debtor to include within presumed monthly
expenses the average monthly payments on account of non-purchase money mortgage
payments.
239. [d. Suppose that at the time of filing a Chapter 13 petition, our couple makes
mortgage payments of $2,000/mo. payable over the ensuing twenty-five years. They
also make automobile loan payments of $300/mo., payable over the ensuing forty
months. For purposes of the means test, the debtor's presumed monthly payments on
account of secured debt would be «$2,000 x 60) + ($300 x 40))/60 =$2,200. BAPCP Act,
supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code). The means
test uses this amount rather than the debtor's actual monthly payments on account of
secured debt ($2,300 for the next forty months and $2,000/month thereafter), to reflect
an assumption that the debtor could stretch out the car payments to sixty months in a
Chapter 13 plan. This means-test substitution of average payments on secured debt
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 291
homeowners such as our couple with a monthly mortgage payment
equal to or exceeding the rent paid by their neighbors who lease need
not move on account of the mortgage payment to avoid the presump-
tion of abuse in Chapter 7 or to confirm a Chapter 13.
The issue is more complex, however, because the preference for
homeowners under the means test wanes outside the means test.
Under the pre-Act version of section 707(b), exercising their discretion
to dismiss for substantial abuse, some courts dismissed Chapter 7
cases at least partially on the basis ofthe size of the debtor's mortgage
payment.240 The Act preserves this judicial discretion because a court
may still dismiss a Chapter 7 case for abuse based on the totality of
the circumstances ofthe debtor's financial situation, even ifthe debtor
passes the means test and avoids a presumption of abuse. Thus, while
the means test constricts judicial discretion with respect to all housing
expenses of a lessee, the Act leaves unchanged judicial discretion with
respect to the reasonableness of a homeowner's mortgage payment.241
Exercise of that discretion may continue to produce the kind of incon-
sistent results at which the means test was partially directed. Some
courts may infer from the means test a congressional intent to concede
a debtor's monthly mortgage payment as a matter of law and thus
decline to dismiss any case for abuse on the basis of a seemingly exces-
sive mortgage payment. Others may read the law differently and dis-
miss at least some cases for abuse after measuring the reasonableness
of a mortgage payment in whole or in part by reference to the IRS
Standards even if the debtor has passed the means test, a kind of
over a sixty-month period for actual payments on secured debt reconciles the means test
with the structure of the hypothetical Chapter 13 plan that the debtor could propose if
the court dismisses the Chapter 7 for abuse. Under such a plan, the debtor must pay
the mortgage without modification, may modify payments on other secured debt, and
must pay unsecured debt with remaining disposable income. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325
(2000). This reconciliation incorrectly assumes that a court will determine the amount
of disposable income that should be devoted to unsecured creditors in a Chapter 13 plan
without any consideration of the reasonableness of the debtor's payments on account of
secured debt. A court might find a debtor's mortgage or car payments unreasonable,
conclude that disposable income devoted to a plan is therefore insufficient, and deny
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. E.g., In re Baird, 2005 Bankr. Lexis 364 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 2005) (finding pre-petition purchase of home and car demonstrated lack of
good faith and also finding that disposable income devoted to plan was insufficient par-
tially on account of mortgage and car payments). The flawed assumption is mitigated
by the fact that the Act continues to permit a court to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for abuse
even if a debtor passes the means test. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
240. E.g., In re Mooney, 313 B.R. 709, 714-15 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004); Shaw v. U.S.
Bankr. Adm'r, 310 B.R. 538, 541 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2004). But see, e.g., Turner v. John-
son (In re Johnson), 318 B.R. 907 CBankr. N.D. Ga. 2005).
241. The means test does not entirely eliminate judicial discretion even with respect
to lessees because the court may still decline to dismiss, even if abuse is presumed, if
the debtor demonstrates special circumstances. See supra note 175 and accompanying
text.
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292 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
means test outside the means test. Still others might or might not
dismiss for abuse after assessing the reasonableness of a mortgage
payment on the basis of a variety of factors other than the IRS Stan-
dards, including the original purchase price or present value of the
home, the cost of relocation, including possible increased transporta-
tion costs, the potential sacrifice ofvalue likely to result from a rushed
sale of the home, the interest rate on and amortization period of the
mortgage, and the amount of the debtor's down payment.242
The contrast between the means-test treatment of mortgage pay-
ments and the IRS treatment of mortgage payments poses a related
problem. In both the bankruptcy and tax collection contexts, as we
have seen, lessees may claim the lesser of the entire IRS allowance or
their actual expenses for rent, other housing expenses, and utilities
expenses. In the tax collection context, the same is true for homeown-
ers (substituting mortgage payment for rent). In bankruptcy, how-
ever, the homeowner to whom the means test applies must back out
mortgage payments from the total IRS housing and utilities expense
allowance (before later re-introducing an average monthly payment on
debt). Not having been drafted to anticipate use in bankruptcy, the
IRS Standards do not separately identify the portion of the housing
and utilities allowance allocable to housing expenses other than mort-
gage or rent (e.g. homeowner's insurance, property taxes, and repair)
and to utilities expenses. The homeowner in Chapter 7 thus cannot
determine from the IRS Standards how much he or she may claim
under the means test for non-mortgage housing and utilities expenses.
Just prior to the effective date of the Act, we have been given a
regulatory response to this problem243 because judicial resolution of
the problem would be problematic. A court could permit a homeowner
to claim as non-mortgage housing and utilities expenses the full IRS
housing and utilities allocation (e.g. $2,048), or the debtor's actual
non-mortgage housing and utilities expenses, whichever is less. This
approach, informally but seriously advanced by one consumer bank-
ruptcy professional,244 unreasonably presumes congressional intent to
permit homeowners the entire allowance, if actually incurred, for non-
mortgage housing and utilities expenses in addition to payment of a
mortgage. A variation subject to the same criticism would be to allow
242. This potential disparity in judicial approach and case outcomes lurks else-
where as well because in preserving the court's power to dismiss for abuse outside the
means test the Act does not indicate the weight, if any, to be given to the IRS
Standards.
243. See infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
244. Standing Chapter 13 Trustee Henry Hildebrand III advanced this possible
reading of the Act in his remarks to attendees of the 13th Annual Convention of the
National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys in San Diego, California (Apr.
29,2005).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 293
the debtor's actual non-mortgage housing and utilities expenses only
to the extent the court deems reasonable, but in no event more than
$2,048. Alternatively, a court could permit the homeowner a maxi-
mum non-mortgage housing and utilities allowance equal to the differ-
ence between the maximum housing and utilities allowance (e.g.
$2,048/month) and the amount of the debtor's monthly mortgage pay-
ment. That reading is unreasonable, however, because the maximum
amount of the non-mortgage housing and utilities expense would
shrink or grow, dollar for dollar, with each dollar change in the
amount of the mortgage payment. At the extremes, a debtor with a
monthly mortgage payment equal to or greater than the total allow-
ance (e.g. $2,048/month or more) would not be permitted any amount
for non-mortgage housing or utilities expenses and a debtor with a
very low monthly mortgage payment would be permitted an excessive
maximum amount for non-mortgage housing and utilities expenses. A
third alternative would be for the court to evaluate the reasonableness
of a homeowner's non-mortgage housing and utilities expenses with-
out any reference to the IRS expense allowance, thereby exercising the
very discretion that the means test was designed to eliminate.245
To avert this difficulty, just prior to the effective date of the Act,
the IRS and the United States Trustee Program entered into a Memo-
randum of Understanding resulting in the publication of tables sepa-
rately identifying non-mortgage expenses and mortgage/rent
expenses,246 and the Judicial Council approved a form (Official Form
245. In doing so, it would still be appropriate for the court to refer to the Internal
Revenue Service Manual, which identifies permissible non-mortgage housing and utili-
ties expense items: property taxes, interest, parking, necessary maintenance and re-
pair, homeowner's or renter's insurance, homeowner dues and condominium fees. IR
MANuAL, supra note 216, Exhibit 5.15.1-2. A court would have to amortize any home
maintenance, repair expense, and other irregular periodic expenses to derive a monthly
expense for purposes of the means-test calculation.
246. Revisions to Interim Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms 2 (Oct. 3, 2005)
(memorandum from Hon. Thomas Zilly, Chair, Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure), http://www.uscourts.gov/
ruleslRevised_BK_Rules_and_Forms.pdf (copy on file with author). The United States
Trustee Program published the resulting tables on its web site, http://www.usdoj.gov/
ust/bapcpa/meanstesting.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice amended its Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses to include a dis-
claimer stating that its allowable expenses apply to delinquent taxpayers and referring
to the web site of the United States Trustee Program for expense information to be used
in bankruptcy calculations, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/smalllarticlelO..id=104696.00.
html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). Therefore, although the Act expresses the sense of
Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury may alter IRS Standards to accommodate
the means test, BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 103, the IRS has not altered its Stan-
dards but rather seems to have given the United States Trustee Program expense infor-
mation to use for means-test calculations. One wonders whether use of this expense
information is consistent with the mandate of the Act because the means test requires
use of IRS Standards.
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294 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
B22A) for means-test calculations conforming to that understand-
ing.247 If recognized as a legitimate solution to the problem, this un-
derstanding and the resulting tables will eliminate judicial discretion
under the means test to determine non-mortgage housing and utilities
expenses for homeowners. At the same time, however, a court exercis-
ing its discretion outside the means test might infer from this sepa-
rate identification of non-mortgage housing and utilities expenses an
upper limit on the reasonableness of a mortgage payment (by subtrac-
tion of the non-mortgage housing and utilities expenses from the total
housing and utilities expense allowance). Other courts might not
draw that inference, leaving the parameters of judicial discretion
outside the means test with respect to mortgage payments uncertain
or inconsistent.
b. Transportation ownership expenses
The Act's treatment of transportation ownership expenses for
debtors subject to the means test introduces discrimination among
means-tested debtors analogous to the discrimination that the Act in-
troduces between means-tested lessees and means-tested homeown-
ers. The IRS Standards allow delinquent taxpayers an amount for
transportation ownership costs not to exceed monthly loan or lease
payments of $475 for a first car and $338 for a second car.248 As indi-
cated above, however, the means test first requires that the debtor
back out payments on debt from the relevant IRS expense allowance
and then permits the debtor to reintroduce average monthly payments
on secured debt into the means-test calculation of the debtor's pre-
sumed monthly expenses.249 Thus, a debtor who, at the time of the
247. Revisions to Interim Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, at 2-3; Memoran-
dum from Judicial Conference of the United States to Chief Judges, United States Dis-
trict Court Judges, United States Bankruptcy Courts (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/DIR5_145.PDF (copy on file with author). Line 20A, Part V of Form
B22A requires the debtor to enter non-mortgage expenses and Line 20B requires the
debtor to enter mortgage/rent expenses and back out average monthly mortgage pay-
ments. Official Form B22A (Chapter 7) (10/05) (statement of Monthly Income and
Means Test Calculation), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/new_andJevised_officiaC
forms_101405.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
248. IRS STANDARDS, supra note 215. The IRS Standards also allow taxpayers a
separately identified amount for transportation operating costs or public transporta-
tion. Id. I do not discuss this allowance except to note that this separate identification
of transportation operating costs avoids a problem comparable to the problem, discussed
supra pp. 292-94, concerning identification of allowable non-mortgage housing utilities
expenses by homeowners subject to the means test.
249. The debtor who leases a vehicle also must back out lease payments from the
IRS transportation ownership allowance because the Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" as
liability on a claim and "claim" as a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12) (2000).
The Act elsewhere adds a provision to the Bankruptcy Code addressing the issue of
post-petition assumption by a debtor of a lease of personal property, thereby implicitly
acknowledging post-petition lease expenses for an automobile. BAPCP Act, supra note
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 295
petition, is making payments over some portion of the ensuing 60
months on one or more debts secured by a vehicle, including late
model or luxury vehicles, may claim all of those payments as part of
presumed monthly expenses no matter the number of vehicles in-
volved. In contrast, a debtor who, at the time of the petition, owns free
and clear an older vehicle possibly soon in need of replacement, or a
debtor who, at the time of the petition, doesn't own a vehicle but needs
to purchase one soon, may not claim any transportation ownership ex-
pense as part of the presumed monthly expenses.250
173, § 309(b) (adding § 365(p) to the Bankruptcy Code). Nonetheless, unless one con-
torts the meaning of "secured debt," the debtor who leases a vehicle may not reintroduce
average monthly payments on vehicle leases into the expense calculation because the
debtor may only reintroduce into presumed monthly expenses an average derived from
"the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors . ..."
BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code)
(emphasis added). A lease payment is not an amount due to a secured creditor. The
Uniform Commercial Code distinguishes a true lease from a security interest. U.C.C.
§ 1-203 (2001). The Bankruptcy Code defines a security interest as a lien created by
agreement and defines a lien as a charge against or interest in property to secure pay-
ment of a debt. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51), (37) (2000). The result of this reading of the means
test will be an artificially low figure for the presumed monthly expenses of a debtor who
leases a vehicle. As a consequence, abuse might be presumed for Debtor A, who leases a
vehicle, but not for the otherwise identically situated Debtor B, who is purchasing the
identical vehicle. Pending legislation to correct this problem, to overcome this obvious
anomaly a court would have to permit the debtor to reintroduce lease payments as part
of the debtor's average monthly payments on account of secured debt even though a
lease payment is not a payment to a secured creditor. Alternatively, a court could con-
clude that the debtor need not back out lease payments from the IRS transportation
allowance even though a lease payment is a payment on a debt. This is an inferior
solution because it would give an advantage to some debtors who lease vehicles over
some debtors who owe secured debt on vehicles. The leasing debtor would include ac-
tual expenses for lease payments (to the maximum amount permitted by the IRS trans-
portation ownership allowance) in presumed monthly expenses. The purchasing debtor
would have to back out actual debt repayment from presumed monthly expenses and
could only reintroduce into presumed monthly expenses an amount calculated on the
basis of a sixty-month average. In other words, the leasing debtor, unlike the purchas-
ing debtor, would not have to average lease payments over sixty months. The shorter
the remaining duration of the lease, the greater this advantage becomes. The advan-
tage would be big enough in some cases to avoid the presumption of abuse for the debtor
who leases whereas the virtually identically situated purchasing debtor might not avoid
the presumption of abuse.
250. This conclusion seems to follow from this statement in the IRS Standards: "If a
taxpayer has no car payment, or no car, only the operating costs portion of the transpor-
tation standard is used to come up with the allowable transportation expense." IRS
STANDARDS, supra note 215. Some might claim that a debtor with no vehicle payment
nonetheless should be entitled to claim some portion or all of the IRS transportation
ownership expense to reflect the possibility or likelihood of having to purchase a first
vehicle, or a replacement vehicle, within five years of filing the petition. This interpre-
tation was suggested in the Creighton Study, supra note 229, at 43-46, based in part
upon the authors' findings concerning the age of vehicles owned by Chapter 7 debtors.
[d. In a sample of Chapter 7 cases filed by individual debtors in 1995, approximately
half of the approximately 1,300 vehicles owned by debtors in the sample were owned
free and clear, all ofthe debt-free vehicles were at least five model years old, 550 were at
least ten model years old at the time ofthe filing ofthe petitions. Marianne B. Culhane




.  , fr
,  
 ,  
­
  .250 
 ­
 ,   
    
      
  t . .  
,   
).   .  
   t  . . .
).    t      
     t r  ­
  .  . . . ).   
ifi i    
 i . As     
  t  
l  r ,
    
  u t    
t  ym   l rn i  ­
     fr   i
     .  
l   
    ­
   ­
        
 fr
  l  
nt   t ­
    t  .
    ­
    
     
  .
t :  
 ,  r  t  ­
 t  i .
AN AR t t 
   ilit    
i   ,  i  ­
, ,  
i ern   t  .
.   i  
      
f   fi  
f i  . 
HeinOnline -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 296 2005-2006
 
     
             
           
          
              
            
          
         
          
 
            
            
           
             
            
          
          
       
 
   
        
              
            
         
          
          
          
             
            
              
             
                
              
             
             
            
             
             
             
             
              
                  
             
          
     
              
            
                
     
             
    
296 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
As in the case of a homeowner with a large mortgage payment, a
court might exercise its discretion outside the means test, based upon
the totality of the debtor's financial circumstances, to dismiss for
abuse the Chapter 7 case of a debtor paying more for a vehicle or pay-
ing for more vehicles than the court deems appropriate. For the same
reasons discussed with respect to possible dismissal for abuse because
of an "excessive" mortgage payment, however, exercise of that discre-
tion may produce results that are inconsistent or difficult to
predict.251
It is unclear whether the Act grants a court discretion that would
work in the opposite direction, saving a case that would otherwise be
subject to dismissal for presumed abuse. Consider the debtor with no
car payments at the time of the petition who hopes to rebut a pre-
sumption of abuse by claiming that post-petition purchase of a first or
replacement vehicle is reasonably necessary in the near future and
that payments for such a vehicle would reduce putative disposable in-
come sufficiently to avoid the presumption of abuse.252 A debtor may
rebut the presumption of abuse "by demonstrating special circum-
stances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to active
duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special circumstances ...
justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income
for which there is no reasonable alternative."253 We may assume,
without deciding, that a court might conclude that a special circum-
stance comparable to the two illustrations in the statutory language
& Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73
AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 738 (1999). This suggested interpretation explained a substantial
part of the difference between the findings of the Creighton Study (which assumed an
ownership allowance for debtors without a vehicle payment) and the findings of the
1999 EY STUDY (which did not) on the amount of repayment that might be generated by
application of a means test. Creighton Study, supra note 229, at 46. This important
reason for the difference in findings between the two studies, a difference identified
supra note 7, never penetrated the public debate and was either overlooked or conve-
niently ignored or dismissed by those supporting means testing. Assuming that many
debtors without a vehicle payment might reasonably need to replace a vehicle within
five years of filing a petition, some allowance for transportation ownership expense in
the means-test calculation would seem appropriate. But given the language of the IRS
Standards quoted above, the difficulty of predicting when the debtor may need to
purchase a vehicle, and the difficulty of predicting the amount of the monthly payments,
I do not think the means test can be so read. In his article devoted to means testing,
Judge Wedoff advances an opposing viewpoint. Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the
New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 257-58 (2005).
251. See supra pp. 291-92.
252. The debtor might purchase a vehicle prior to filing the petition and thereby
incur additional debt that would reduce putative disposable income sufficiently to avoid
the presumption of abuse, but the Act prohibits an attorney from advising a client to do
so. See infra pp. 314-21.
253. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code) (emphasis added).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 297
warrants a debtor's post-petition purchase of a vehicle in the near fu-
ture. Even so, however, the Act may not permit the debtor to rebut
the presumption of abuse by virtue of anticipated monthly payments
for the vehicle because the phrase "additional expenses" may refer
only to expenses as of the date of the petition that exceed expenses
allowed under the means test (e.g. expenses for housing and utilities
that exceed amounts permitted by the IRS Standards); the phrase
may not refer to anticipated new post-petition expenses. The quoted
language follows immediately the list of a debtor's presumed expenses
under the means test.254 Most of those expenses derive from the IRS
Standards. Thus, it would be natural to read "additional expenses" as
expense amounts as ofthe date of the petition that exceed those other-
wise allowed by the IRS Standards. Moreover, a debtor may rebut the
presumption based on additional expenses only if those expenses
"cause" (not "would in the future cause") the debtor's presumed dispos-
able income to fall below the amount at which abuse is to be pre-
sumed.255 In other words, the means test operates as a snapshot of
the debtor's financial circumstances as of the time ofthe petition. The
court, so the argument would run, should not project future expenses,
especially because it is impossible for the court to know when or
whether the debtor actually would incur the additional expenses or
how much those expenses would be. This narrower but reasonable in-
terpretation of "additional expenses" would preclude a court from al-
lowing the debtor to rebut the presumption of abuse by claiming
anticipated additional expenses for post-petition purchase of a vehicle.
Perhaps the Act should grant the court such discretion because con-
sideration of the anticipated additional expenses would help portray a
debtor unable to pay non-priority unsecured creditors the amounts
presumed under the means test. Yet the Supreme Court has declared
policy considerations of this sort (as well as legislative history and
prior bankruptcy law and practice) irrelevant to statutory interpreta-
tion if the statutory language has a plain meaning that does not lead
to an absurd result.256
254. [d.
255. [d. ("The presumption of abuse may only be rebutted if the additional ex-
penses ... cause ... ").
256. E.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Under-
writers, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1,6 (2000)). Celebrating the 25th
anniversary of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, a review of Supreme Court bank-
ruptcy jurisprudence since 1979 discusses cases in which members of the Court have
disagreed on whether Bankruptcy Code language has a plain meaning and cases in
which either the Court, or its majority or minority, has resorted to legislative history,
prior bankruptcy law and practice, or policy in interpreting language of the Bankruptcy
Code. Lee Dembart & Bruce Markell, Alive at 25? A Short Review of the Supreme
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298 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
The suggested statutory construction leaves a troubling question,
however, which might lead some to conclude that the meaning of "ad-
ditional expenses" is not plain. If we interpret "additional expenses"
only as expenses incurred as of the time of the petition that exceed
those otherwise permitted by the means test, what then do we make of
the accompanying phrase "adjustments of current monthly income"?
If the means test is a snapshot as of the date of the petition, and if we
construe the two phrases in pari materia, "adjustments of current
monthly income" must refer to some way of adjusting how we count,
total, or average a debtor's pre-petition income. But nothing in the
Act, including its definition of current monthly income, suggests what
could qualify as an appropriate adjustment and I haven't been able to
imagine what such an adjustment would be. Alternatively, "adjust-
ments to current monthly income" (which, you will recall, appears in
language permitting a debtor to rebut the presumption of abuse) could
refer to anticipated decreases in post-petition income. Such an inter-
pretation, however, would be inconsistent with a view of the means
test as a snapshot. Moreover, that construction would permit a debtor
to introduce evidence of anticipated decreases in post-petition income
for the purpose of rebutting the presumption of abuse without any
parallel permission to introduce such evidence for the purpose of
avoiding the means-test trigger.
There are, therefore, three choices for construing the statutory
language permitting a debtor to rebut the presumption of abuse, each
of them imperfect. By construing the two phrases in pari materia, a
court either could deem relevant both anticipated post-petition de-
creases in monthly income and anticipated new post-petition monthly
expenses or could deem both irrelevant. Alternatively, construing the
phrases independent of each other, a court could deem relevant antici-
pated post-petition decreases in monthly income but not anticipated
new post-petition monthly expenses. Only under the first construc-
tion (both deemed relevant) could a court exercise discretion in favor
of a debtor who seeks to rebut the presumption of abuse by claiming
the need to purchase a vehicle in the near future.
c. Other necessary expenses
As we have seen, exercise of judicial discretion with respect to
housing and utilities expenses and transportation ownership expenses
may lie primarily outside the means test, either leading to dismissal
for abuse when abuse is not presumed or saving a case from dismissal
when abuse is presumed. In addition, the Act preserves significant
judicial discretion within the means test by including in a debtor's pre-
sumed monthly expenses the debtor's actual monthly expenses for
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 299
what the Act refers to as "Other Necessary Expenses"257 and what the
Internal Revenue Manual refers to as "other expenses."258 The Inter-
nal Revenue Manual ("Manual") lists several expense items that may
qualify as other expenses, including child care, health care, life insur-
ance, and charitable contributions.259 The Manual allows these other
expenses to delinquent taxpayers if, considering the facts and circum-
stances of each case, the expenses are incurred to provide for the
health and welfare of a taxpayer or his or her family, or are incurred
for the production of income ("the necessary expense test"), and if the
amount of the expenses are reasonable.26o
By incorporating into the means test other expenses to the extent
necessary and reasonable, the Act requires that bankruptcy judges ex-
ercise the discretion that the Manual otherwise delegates to IRS col-
lection agents. For example, the Manual identifies term life insurance
on the life ofthe debtor as necessary, but does not describe the amount
of insurance or the amount of premiums that would be reasonable.261
It identifies child care expenses as necessary, but admonishes IRS
agents not to allow unusually large child care expense if more reason-
257. BAPCP Act, supra note 173, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(2) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
258. IR MANuAL, supra note 216, § 5.15.1.10.
259. [d. The imperfect fit between language of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended
by the Act, and language in the Internal Revenue Service Manual generates uncertainty
about the extent to which a debtor may claim charitable contributions as part of pre-
sumed monthly expenses. The Internal Revenue Service Manual (and hence the means
test) permits a taxpayer to include in "other necessary expenses" a reasonable amount
of charitable contributions to the extent necessary for the health and welfare of the
debtor or the debtor's family or to the extent necessary for the production of income. [d.
The Manual gives the following example of a charitable contribution that qualifies as a
necessary expense: "A minister is required to tithe according to his employment con-
tract." [d. In at least some cases, a debtor in Chapter 7 will not be able to demonstrate
such necessity, and in some cases, even if the contributions are necessary, the debtor
may not be able to demonstrate that the amount of the contributions is reasonable. The
language of the means test thus would suggest that the debtor may not include the
charitable contributions (or at least the unreasonable amount of such contributions) in
calculation of presumed monthly expenses. Yet the Act leaves unaffected the last sen-
tence ofcurrent section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which instructs the court that in
making a decision about whether to dismiss a case for abuse it may not consider
whether the debtor has made or continues to make defined qualifYing charitable contri-
butions. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (adopted as part of the Religious Liberty and Chari-
table Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. Law No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 518 (1998)). It
is unclear how that admonition should be read in light of the new means-test reference
to an Internal Revenue Service Manual that requires exclusion from presumed monthly
expenses of charitable contributions that are not necessary or reasonable. The two
seemingly inconsistent directives might be reconciled by concluding that a debtor may
always include in presumed monthly expenses the defined qualifYing charitable contri-
butions and may include additional charitable contributions to the extent that they are
necessary and reasonable.
260. IR MANuAL, supra note 216, §§ 5.15.1.7 (item 5), 5.15.1.10.
261. [d. § 5.15.1.10.
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300 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
able alternatives are available.262 It identifies health care expenses
as necessary, but not if for elective surgery.263 Of course, bankruptcy
judges have for years exercised that same kind of discretion in decid-
ing whether to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse or in
deciding whether a Chapter 13 debtor has devoted all disposable in-
come to a plan. That history should help counsel who are familiar
with local legal culture predict the kinds and amounts of "other ex-
penses" that local judges are likely to allow as well as how those
judges may exercise their discretion outside the means test to dismiss
when abuse is not presumed or to save from dismissal cases in which
abuse is presumed. For the first time, however, a debtor's counsel
may risk sanctions for an inaccurate prediction.264
III. REQUIRED CALCULATIONS AND DOCUMENTS
Ascertaining and reporting expenses and calculating imputed dis-
posable income in large part by reference to the IRS Standards will be
an intricate and time-consuming process. Disclosures in schedules al-
ready are incomplete or erroneous and the remedies for those deficien-
cies are inadequate.265 The new complexity will compound the
problem.266 The Act can be read to require the necessary work from
every consumer debtor filing a Chapter 7 petition, whether or not the
debtor is subject to the means test. The relevant, ungrammatical lan-
guage provides the following:
As part of the schedule of current income and expenditures
required under section 521, the debtor shall include a state-
ment of the debtor's current monthly income, and the calcula-
tions that determine whether a presumption arises under
262. [d.
263. [d.
264. See infra pp. 342-44, 347-54.
265. Honorable Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical Study of Consumer Bankruptcy
Papers, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 653 (1999). This study found a significant amount of incom-
plete and erroneous disclosures in a randomly chosen sample of Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 cases filed in one district. My experiences in reviewing Chapter 7 cases in the North-
ern District of California lead me to believe that the results ofthe study would be repli-
cated in other districts. The authors of THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, AMERICANS IN
DEBT, argued that there were "substantial reasons to support the general accuracy of
the data reported in the files," TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY LAw-
RENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, AMERICANS IN DEBT 8-9 (2000) [herein-
after FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS], but did not report any study of the files intended to
determine the completeness and accuracy of the disclosures.
266. The Rhodes study did not distinguish between debtors who were represented
by counsel and those who were not. It did find that the amount of incomplete or errone-
ous disclosure did not correlate with the size of the fee that an attorney charged.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY
subparagraph (A)(i) [the means test], that show how each
such amount is calculated.267
301
Failure to include the required statement and calculations requires
automatic dismissal ofthe case, effective on the forty-sixth day follow-
ing the filing of the petition (or earlier upon motion of any party in
interest) unless the court extends the time period, not to exceed forty-
five days, upon the debtor's request.26B
If required from every individual debtor whose debts are prima-
rily consumer debts, the information so reported would be superfluous
in an overwhelming number of consumer Chapter 7 cases because the
means test will not be triggered for most consumer Chapter 7 debt-
ors.269 In such cases the reporting requirement would impose sense-
267. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, § 102(a)(2)(C) (2005) !hereinafter BAPCP Act] (adding
§ 707(b)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code). Although the quoted language refers to "debtor"
rather than to an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the lan-
guage surely was not intended to require the statement and calculations from debtors
whose debts are not primarily consumer debts because such debtors are not subject to
the means test. Even if interpreted to apply to all Chapter 7 debtors, the court's power
under section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code to order "otherwise" remains unaltered. 11
U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000).
268. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 316 (adding § 521(i) to the Bankruptcy Code).
Upon request of a party in interest, "the court shall enter an order of dismissal not later
than 5 days after such request." [d. (emphasis added). The debtor may file a schedule
of current income and expenditures within fifteen days of the filing of a petition. FED.
R. BANKR. P. 1007(c). Presumably a court will not dismiss on request of a party in inter-
est made prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day period even though the amendment to
§ 521 would seem to permit such a request at any time.
269. A proposed amendment to S. 256, the bill carrying the Act, would have excused
debtors whose calculations showed income below the relevant median from having to
furnish further calculations. 151 Congo Rec. S2139 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2005) (Amendment
No. 110); 151 Congo Rec. S2307 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
Defeat of the amendment, 151 Congo Rec. S2311 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005), suggests that
the Act requires means-test calculations from every consumer debtor. There are no
studies estimating the percentage of consumer Chapter 7 debtors who would be subject
to the means test under the Act. Yet we can safely predict that the percentage would be
well below 33%, perhaps fewer than 20%, by extrapolating from earlier studies of some-
what different means-test triggers under prior versions of consumer bankruptcy reform.
The 1999 GAO REPORT compared results of four studies that applied differing versions
of means-test triggers in earlier legislation that used national medians. Under those
studies, the percentage of debtors who would have been subject to means testing was
estimated to be the following: 1998 EY STUDY (47%); Creighton Study (24.2%); 1999 EY
STUDY (19%); EOUST STUDY (17.7%). UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY, ANALYSIS OF FOUR RE-
PORTS ON CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS' ABILITY TO PAY, GAO/GGD-99-103 (June 21,1999), avail-
able at http://www.gao.gov/archivel1999/gg99103.pdf.at15. Table 3. The 1998 EY
STUDY is probably the least predictive of what might happen under the Act because the
means-test trigger used in that study would have subjected debtors to a means test if
their income was 75% of the relevant median, whereas the other three studies were
based on means tests, like the means test in the Act, that would have subjected a debtor
to the means test if their income exceeded 100% ofthe relevant median. The authors of
the Creighton Study imply that their percentage (24.2%) of non-business Chapter 7
debtors that would have been subject to a version of the means test using a national
:   KR   
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302 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
less cost, in the form of higher fees charged by consumer bankruptcy
attorneys,270 as well as inconvenience and delay. Pro se debtors271
will find preparation of the necessary documents considerably more
difficult than at present, even with the aid of inevitably more lengthy
self-help publications.272 This may discourage some from filing at all
and may fuel greater use of petition preparers by others.
The Act requires promulgation of a bankruptcy form for the state-
ment and calculations and authorizes general rules concerning its con-
tent.273 In responding to this mandate, Interim Bankruptcy Rule
1007(b)(4) and a new bankruptcy form entitled "Statement of Current
Monthly Income and Means Test Calculation" read the reporting re-
quirement narrowly. The interim rule provides that the debtor must
file the "calculations in accordance with § 707(b)" only if the debtor's
current monthly income exceeds the relevant state median,274 and
Part III of the new form excuses the debtor from the means-test calcu-
lations if the debtor's income does not exceed the relevant state me-
median might overstate the number who would be subject to a means test using state
medians. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bank·
ruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 27, 38-39 (Mar. 1999). Data from two earlier empirical studies also sup-
ports a prediction that considerably fewer than 33% of consumer Chapter 7 debtors
would be subject to a means test under the Act. See comparisons of the median annual
household income of a 1991 sample of bankruptcy debtors with the median annual
household income of the populations of five states. FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note
265, at 60, Table 2.1. Also see comparisons of mean family income of 1981 sample of
bankruptcy debtors with national mean family incomes. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZA·
BETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 92-93, Ta-
ble 5.3 and 151, Table 8.1 (1989).
270. Fees charged by consumer bankruptcy attorneys are, of course, subject to court
supervision. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (2000). Presumably, bankruptcy judges will permit addi-
tional fees on account of the additional obligations imposed by the Act.
271. In a sample of 1,043 Chapter 7 cases filed in 1995, 9% of debtors filed pro se,
and in a 1992 sample of 761 cases filed in San Jose, 35% of debtors filed pro se, some
with the aid of petition preparers. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt
After Discharge: An Empirical Study ofReaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 732. If
one assumes a 9% national pro se filing rate among individuals filing non-business
Chapter 7 cases each year, 100,599 pro se debtors filed such petitions in 2004. See
supra note 6. The rate may rise with an increase in fees charged by consumer bank-
ruptcy attorneys.
272. Self-help legal publisher Nolo Press currently publishes two relevant books,
one on Chapter 7 and one on Chapter 13. STEPHEN ELIAS ET AL., How TO FILE FOR
CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY (9th ed. 2001); ROBIN LEONARD, CHAPTER 13, BANKRUPTCY: RE-
PAY YOUR DEBTS (4th ed. 1999). Revisions to these books to reflect the means test and
other relevant changes to the Bankruptcy Code perforce will increase their complexity
and size. They are already 384 and 350 pages long, respectively.
273. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 1232 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2075).
274. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(4) (interim amended rule), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/ruleslinterim.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
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dian.275 This rule and form reflect a conclusion that calculations
demonstrating that the debtor's income does not trigger the means
test are alone sufficient to demonstrate that a presumption of abuse
does not arise under the means test. This is a sympathetic and sensi-
ble reading of the language of the Act's reporting requirement because
no one has standing to raise the presumption of abuse if the debtor's
income does not exceed the relevant median.276 A presumption can
hardly arise in connection with a motion that cannot be brought. On
the other hand, a judge or United States trustee may still seek dismis-
sal for abuse based on the totality of circumstances of the debtor's fi-
nancial situation. The data reported in means-test calculations might
be relevant to a court's assessment of the possibility of abuse under
that standard for decision even if it does not generate a presumption
of abuse.277 The interim rule, if adopted by the Supreme Court, there-
fore might impermissibly abridge or modify the right of a court or
United States trustee to consider dismissal for abuse by initially de-
priving them of potentially relevant information.278
The Act also requires the debtor to file with the court other docu-
ments not heretofore required. The debtor must file copies of all pay-
ment advices or other evidence of payment received from the debtor's
employers in the sixty days preceding the filing of the petition, a state-
ment of monthly net income, itemized to show how it was calculated,
and a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in in-
come or expenditures during the twelve-month period following the
filing of the petition.279 Here, too, failure to file the required docu-
ments requires automatic dismissal ofthe case.280 The court may de-
cline to dismiss for failure to file all required payment advices (but not
for failure to file the other required documents) if, on timely motion of
a trustee, the court finds both that the debtor attempted in good faith
275. Official Form B22A (Chapter 7) (10/05) (Statement of Monthly Income and
Means Test Calculation), http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslnew_andJevised_official_
forms_101405.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
Use of an Official Form is obligatory without the need for approval by the Supreme
Court or Congress. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 advisory committee's notes.
276. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. This reading of the requirement
rejects the inference that could be drawn from the defeat of proposed Amendment No.
110 to S. 256. See supra note 269.
277. I do not address the important and difficult question of whether dismissal for
abuse based upon the totality of circumstances of the debtor's financial situation in ef-
fect permits the court to apply some or all of the statutory formula for means testing
"outside the means test." The means-test calculations are relevant only if the court may
do so. If the court may do so, my earlier statement (supra text accompanying note 269)
exaggerates the superfluity of the reporting requirement.
278. Bankruptcy rules may "not abridge, enlarge, or modifY any substantive right."
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2000).
279. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (amending § 521 ofthe Bankruptcy Code).
280. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 316 (adding § 521(i) to the Bankruptcy Code).
  KR   
.275 fl  l
st






t    ­
   fi­
i l
 lit   
   
 ­
 fy   r
 ­
   .278 
  fi t ­










 e , r fi t  
. ffi  t  t t  
 i ) : www. urt v/ruleslnew_and e ise offi
.




to .  .
. rt ffi
   ­
rt     
. t  r
    
 fl  .
.  t  ifY   .
. . ).
.  ,   ).
.  ).
HeinOnline -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 304 2005-2006
    
  
            
        
 
  
         
                
   
           
             
       
 
  
             
            
            
           
            
          
           
          
          
           
           
           
           
          
             
    
 
     
               
               
               
            
              
   
               
               
             
                
              
                
               
               
              
         
              
               
               
             
             
            
          
             
             
304 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
to file all required payment advices and that the best interests of cred-
itors would be served by administration of the case.281 The language
requiring automatic dismissal does not appear to countenance an ex-
ception on the basis of a debtor's motion that he or she could not file all
required payment advices!282
The Act presumably requires a debtor to file payment advices so
that the court, the United States trustee, a panel trustee, or a creditor
can verify the debtor's claimed current monthly income.283 There is
no obvious reason, however, why the debtor also is required to file a
statement of the amount of net monthly income, a concept that is
neither defined in the Act nor relevant to means testing. Net monthly
income might mean the sum of taxable and non-taxable income less
deductions from taxable income required by law, or it might mean the
sum of taxable and non-taxable income less all deductions from taxa-
ble income, whether or not the deductions are required by law, includ-
ing such deductions as those for union dues, medical insurance
premiums, or contributions to retirement plans. It might even mean
only taxable income less deductions required by law or taxable income
less all deductions. The Act leaves the debtor guessing which is in-
tended, although the guess is irrelevant in any event because net
monthly income bears no relationship to the critical concept of current
monthly income. Current monthly income is an average computed on
the basis of all of the debtor's income over a six-month period, taxable
or otherwise, without any deductions.284 Because the Act assigns the
281. [d. Although a current procedural rule permits the debtor to file a schedule of
current income and expenditures within fifteen days of the filing of a petition, that rule
does not extend to the additional documents that the debtor now must file. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1007(c). Because that rule acknowledges the need to facilitate emergency
filings, it should be interpreted or amended to permit a fifteen-day delayed filing of
these additional documents.
282. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 316 (adding § 521(i) to the Bankruptcy Code).
283. The provision requiring the filing of payment advices is curious in at least two
respects. First, recall that current monthly income is derived from a six-month average.
See supra pp. 277-78. Yet the debtor need only file copies of payment advices for income
received within the sixty days preceding the filing of the petition. Second, in an individ-
ual case filed by a married debtor, the combined income of both the filing and the non-
filing spouse is relevant to determine standing to bring a motion to dismiss for reasons
other than presumed abuse. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § l02(a) (adding § 707(b)(6) to
the Bankruptcy Code). Yet a married debtor filing an individual petition need not file
copies of payment advices received by the non-filing spouse.
284. The definition of "current monthly income" in the Act does not refer to deduc-
tions from taxable income. It simply refers to "income from all sources that the debtor
receives ... without regard to whether such income is taxable income ...." BAPCP Act,
supra note 267, § l02(b) (adding § lOl(10A) to the Bankruptcy Code). However, "cur-
rent monthly income" must refer to all such income without deductions because the
means test otherwise accounts for deductions through its allowance of certain presumed
expenses. For example, the Internal Revenue Service Manual identifies taxes, involun-
tary deductions, and union dues as among other necessary expenses that the debtor
may subtract from current monthly income in determining whether or not the debtor
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 305
concept of net monthly income no other function, the requirement to
report it imposes a meaningless albeit small additional burden on
debtors.
The debtor also must file a statement of a reasonably anticipated
increase in income or expenditures. Post-petition increases in income
would not be relevant either to the triggering of the means test or to
its application if triggered. Both the means-test trigger and the
means test use average monthly pre-petition income.285 But an antici-
pated increase in income could justify the alternative motion to dis-
miss for abuse based on the debtor's alleged lack of good faith or the
totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situation, a mo-
tion for which a judge and the United States trustee have standing
even if the debtor's putative annual income falls below the relevant
median.286 An anticipated post-petition increase in expenditures ac-
companying an anticipated increase in income would be relevant in
opposition to such a motion, but, as previously discussed, may not be
relevant to a debtor's effort to rebut a presumption of abuse generated
by the means test.
The Act also requires consumer Chapter 7 debtors to provide cer-
tain tax returns. First, all consumer Chapter 7 debtors must provide
to the trustee a copy of the debtor's federal income tax return (or, at
the debtor's election, a transcript of the return) for the most recent tax
year ending immediately before commencement of the case and for
which a return was filed.287 The debtor must also furnish this return
(or transcript) to any creditor that timely requests it.288 For ease of
subsequent reference, I will call this the "first required return." The
court must dismiss the debtor's case for failure to provide the first re-
quired return unless the debtor demonstrates that the failure to pro-
vide the return is due to circumstances beyond his or her contro1.289
passes the means test. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANuAL, COL·
LECTING PROCESS, § 5.15.1.3.2.3. Reaching this conclusion, and therefore reaching the
conclusion that "net monthly income" is irrelevant under the means test, is an unfortu-
nate labyrinth.
285. See supra pp. 277, 284.
286. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 102(a) (adding § 707(b)(6) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
287. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (adding § 521(e) to the Bankruptcy Code).
A "tax year" is an annual accounting period for keeping records and reporting income
and expenses. A taxpayer may choose either a calendar year or a fiscal year as the
relevant accounting period. For purposes of this Article, I will treat tax year and calen-
dar year as synonymous, because most individuals treat the calendar year as their tax
year. A transcript will show most line items from a Form 1040EZ, Form 1040A, or
Form 1040, including accompanying forms and schedules. Internal Revenue Service,
Tax Tip 2005-13, Need a Copy of Your Tax Return Information? (Jan. 19,2005), http://
www.irs.gov/newsroomiarticle/0"id=105370,00.html.
288. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (adding § 521(e) to the Bankruptcy Code).
289. [d.
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306 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
There seems to be little good reason to require that a consumer
Chapter 7 debtor provide the first required return. It would provide
information with at best an attenuated relationship to the information
required to apply either the means-test trigger or the means test, and
in most cases it would not be reviewed by those with standing to seek
dismissal for abuse based on a debtor's bad faith or the totality of the
circumstances of the debtor's financial situation.
To be useful in relation to the means-test trigger or the means
test, the first required return would need to provide relevant current
information about income, expenses, or debt repayment. It doesn't do
so. By showing the debtor's income for the relevant tax year, the first
required return might generally imply the accuracy or inaccuracy of
the debtor's computation of current monthly income (a six-month av-
erage). It cannot verifY that computation, however, even taken to-
gether with copies of the debtor's payment advices, because the return
doesn't show monthly income and the required copies of payment ad-
vices reach back at most sixty days. Moreover, if the debtor files a
Chapter 7 petition between January 1 and April 15,290 the first re-
quired return will be an even less useful indicator of current monthly
income. In such a case the first required return will not be for the
preceding calendar year, but for the year before that.291 Moreover,
the debtor need not provide the first required return to the United
States trustee.292 Thus, even were the income information useful, the
United States trustee may not consider the first required return in its
mandated review of all materials filed by the debtor, a review under-
290. This and subsequent references to April 15 should be taken to refer to the date
of the Monday first following April 15 for years in which April 15 falls on a Saturday or
Sunday.
291. Consider the following example. Debtor files a Chapter 7 petition on January
15, 2005. The first meeting of creditors is first scheduled for February 15, 2005. The
debtor must provide the tax return not later than seven days preceding the date first
scheduled for the first meeting of creditors, i.e. not later than February 8, 2005. BAPCP
Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (adding § 521(e) to the Bankruptcy Code). The most recent
tax year ending immediately before commencement of the case is 2004, but the debtor
has not yet filed a return for that year. Therefore, the debtor must provide the tax
return for 2003, filed on April 15, 2004. Consider another example. Assume the debtor
files the Chapter 7 petition on April 1, 2005 and the first meeting of creditors is first
scheduled for May 1, 2005. The debtor must provide the return not later than April 23,
2005. However, the debtor could satisfy the requirement by providing a return more
than 7 days before the first scheduled meeting of the first meeting of creditors. Hence,
in this circumstance the debtor may choose whether to file the return for 2004 or the
return for 2005.
292. The debtor must provide the tax return "to the trustee [not United States trus-
tee]" and, upon timely request, to a creditor. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (ad-
ding § 521(e) to the Bankruptcy Code).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 307
taken for the purpose of deciding whether to file a motion to dismiss
for presumed abuse.293
The Act requires the debtor to file additional tax returns (or a
transcript of the relevant return) with the court, but only if so re-
quested by the court, the United States trustee, or any party in inter-
est.294 One such request may be for the federal income tax return
with respect to each tax year of the debtor ending while the case is
pending.295 I will call this the "second required return." While the
Act mandates dismissal of the case for the debtor's failure to provide
the first required return absent sufficient excuse,296 it (perhaps inad-
vertently) fails to specify either a consequence or an excuse for failure
to file the second required return. Presumably, the court may none-
theless dismiss for failure to file under its power to dismiss for
cause297 or excuse the filing under its equitable powers.298
Generally, the second required return will not be useful either.
Chapter 7 cases of consumer debtors who file between January 1 and
April 15 will almost always close the same year. Thus, for most such
debtors, no tax year will end while the case is pending and the re-
quirement would not apply. Debtors whose cases are pending on De-
cember 31, most of whom will have filed a Chapter 7 petition after
April 15 of the same year, will have already provided a tax return for
the tax year ending the preceding December 31. They need not file
with the court the second required return until the ensuing April
15,299 by which time many of their cases will have been closed or the
time for a motion to dismiss based on abuse will have expired.30o
Alternatively or in addition, the debtor also must file with the
court upon request a tax return (or transcript) first filed with the tax-
293. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Although the first required return
"shall be available to the United States trustee ... for inspection and copying ... ,"
BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (adding § 521(g) to the Bankruptcy Code), some-
one would first have to alert the United States trustee to the desirability of inspecting
and copying the return, an event unlikely to occur in many if not most cases.
294. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (adding § 521(0 to the Bankruptcy Code).
295. [d.
296. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
297. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2000).
298. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
299. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (adding § 521(0 to the Bankruptcy Code).
300. The United States trustee must file with the court, not later than ten days after
the date of the first meeting ofcreditors, a statement ofwhether the debtor's case would
be presumed to be an abuse and file any motion to dismiss or convert for presumed
abuse within thirty days after filing the statement. BAPCP Act, supra note 267,
§ 102(c) (adding § 704(b) to the Bankruptcy Code). An existing rule of procedure grants
the United States trustee a slightly longer time (sixty days after the first meeting of
creditors unless extended by the court for cause) and grants the court sixty days after
the first meeting of creditors for a motion sua sponte. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(e). The
rule will have to be amended to accommodate the time limit for the United States trus-
tee stated in the Act and also to state a time limit for a motion by a creditor or trustee.
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308 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
ing authority after commencement of the case with respect to any tax
year of the debtor ending in the three-year period ending on the date
of commencement of the case.30l I will call this the "third required
return." The Act fails to specify either a consequence or an excuse for
failure to file the third required return, but, as with the second re-
quired return, the court presumably may sanction failure to file with
dismissal or excuse the failure for good reason shown.302
This requirement appears to be aimed at debtors who should have
filed required tax returns with the IRS for certain years ending prior
to the commencement of the case but failed to do so. But, perhaps
without having been so intended, the third required return would also
provide information about the income of debtors for the calendar year
immediately preceding a filing between January 1 and April 15. The
debtor must file the third required return with the court "at the same
time filed with the taxing authority."303 This might imply that a
debtor who files a Chapter 7 petition between January 1 and April 15
need not file the third required return (for the immediately preceding
calendar year) with the court if the court, United States trustee, or
other party in interest fails to make the request before April 15, a
failure that grows more likely the closer the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition is to April 15.304
In sum, the tax returns required of consumer Chapter 7 debtors
who file a petition may be of little benefit in assessing the accuracy of
a debtor's computation of current monthly income. If the debtor files a
Chapter 7 petition between January 1 and April 15, the first required
return will reflect an annual, not monthly, income earned during a
period ending at least twelve months preceding the filing of the peti-
tion. In such cases, the debtor must furnish a report of income for the
immediately preceding calendar year (the third required return) only
upon request, and maybe only upon a request made prior to April 15.
If the debtor files a petition after April 15, the first required return
will reflect an annual, not monthly income, for a year ending, at a
minimum, three and one half months prior to the filing of the petition,
and thus more than half of the income reflected in the return will be
irrelevant to computation of current monthly income. The same will
be true with respect to a third required return requested of a debtor
301. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (adding § 521(f)(2) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
302. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
303. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(b) (adding § 521(f)(2) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
304. This timing requirement strengthens the inference that the provision was in·
tended to catch income tax returns that the debtor previously should have but failed to
file.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 309
who files between January 1 and April 15. Finally, many debtors
whose cases are pending on December 31 and who, upon request, must
file with the court a tax return for the tax year ending that December
31 (the second required return), need not file it until a date on which it
no longer will be useful.
Quite simply, information provided in a tax return ill fits an in-
quiry about the current income of a consumer Chapter 7 debtor be-
cause a tax return provides information about a year-long period
ending several months before the return is filed with the taxing au-
thority and consumer Chapter 7 cases typically close within six
months of the filing of a petition.
A tax return also will provide little if any useful information to
assist an assessment of the debtor's expense and secured debt profile.
Many consumer Chapter 7 debtors will have been earning less than
$50,000 annually in taxable income.305 If they do not claim depen-
dents and are single or married filing (a tax return) jointly, they may
have qualified to file, and may have filed, a Form 1040EZ federal tax
return.306 That form, which does not accommodate itemized deduc-
tions, provides not a single item of expense or debt information.307
Debtors with taxable income not exceeding $50,000 who do not qualify
to file a Form 1040EZ (because, for example, they claim dependents)
may file a Form 1040A if, among other things, they do not itemize
deductions.308 Form 1040A will reveal only a few selected expenses as
adjustments to total income and a few more expenses as income tax
credits, if the debtor incurred such expenses.309 Form 1040, necessary
if the debtor itemizes deductions,310 will reveal additional expenses, if
incurred.311 Yet even Form 1040 accompanied by a schedule of item-
ized deductions will not contain information about some expenses that
a debtor might claim in means-test calculations, such as an additional
allowance for food and clothing, and will not contain information
305. See supra note 157.
306. A taxpayer qualifies to use Form 1040EZ if the taxpayer is single or married
filing jointly, is under 65 and not blind, does not claim any dependents, has a taxable
income of less than $100,000, does not have taxable interest of over $1,500, does not
claim identified deductions or credits, has income only from wages or other listed
sources, and did not receive an advance earned income credit payment. Internal Reve-
nue Service, Publication 17, Your Federal Income Tax For Individuals 10 (2004) [here-
inafter Publication 17), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdflp17.pdf.
307. Internal Revenue Service, Form 1040EZ (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfl
fl040ez.pdf.
308. Publication 17, supra note 306, at 10.
309. Internal Revenue Service, Form 1040A (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfl
fl040a.pdf.
310. Publication 17, supra note 306, at 11.
311. Internal Revenue Service, Form 1040 (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfl
fl040.pdf.
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310 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
about the amount of a debtor's payment on secured debt.312 Moreo-
ver, the relationship between any expense data revealed by the use of
Form 1040A or Form 1040 and the debtor's expenses as of the filing of
a petition will be as attenuated as the relationship between the in-
come revealed by the form and the debtor's computation of current
monthly income.313
While of dubious relevance to the means-test trigger or to the
means test, perhaps the information in any of the required tax re-
turns, either alone or taken together with other information included
in the debtor's schedules or statements or other information known to
a creditor or trustee, might nonetheless prompt a motion to dismiss
for abuse based on the debtor's bad faith or the totality of the circum-
stances of the debtor's financial situation. In the great number of con-
sumer Chapter 7 cases, however, only the judge and United States
trustee would have standing to make such a motion.314 Yet the Act
does not require the debtor to provide the first required return to the
judge or United States trustee.315 It requires the debtor to provide
that return to the trustee, or creditor upon request, and either could
bring the return to the attention of the judge or United States trus-
tee,316 but one wonders how often the minimal additional information
in the return would tip the balance in favor of such a referral or con-
vince a judge or United States trustee to file the motion. The court or
United States trustee may request that the debtor file a copy of the
second or third required return (or transcript). Presumably, however,
either would make such a request only if there is already other infor-
mation suggesting the possibility of abuse that the return might con-
firm or disprove.
In conclusion, for most consumer Chapter 7 cases the value of the
required tax returns appears marginal, either for purposes of the
means-test trigger, means testing, or motion to dismiss for abuse
outside the means test. Were it not for concern about confidentiality
of information in a tax return (such as detail about a debtor's medical
expenses in a schedule of itemized deductions), the value of informa-
tion in the returns of a relatively small number of debtors might none-
theless justify the requirement that all consumer debtors provide the
312. Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Schedule A, Itemized Deductions,
http://www.irs.gov/instructionsli1040sa/ar01.html (last visited July 24, 2005).
313. See supra pp. 305-07.
314. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 102(a) (adding § 707(b)(6) to the Bankruptcy
Code) and the data reported supra note 157.
315. See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
316. The Act makes clear that both a trustee and a creditor could make such a refer-
ral. Amendment of language in § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code deleted language
prohibiting any party from suggesting a motion to dismiss. BAPCP Act, supra note 267,
§ 102(a)(1) (amending § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 311
returns, either automatically (as with the first required return) or
upon request (as with the second and third required returns). The
additional burden that the requirement imposes upon debtors is lim-
ited to finding and duplicating, or requesting a transcript of, the rele-
vant return.3l7 The Act expresses considerable concern for protecting
the confidentiality of the tax information revealed, instructing the Di-
rector of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to de-
velop procedural safeguards and to report to Congress assessing the
effectiveness of such procedures and, if appropriate, recommending
further protective legislation.3l8 Therefore, in evaluating the require-
ment that the debtor provide tax returns, we should also weigh
whatever burdens on trustees, the United States trustee, creditors,
and bankruptcy clerks may come to be associated with complying with
the resulting procedural safeguards. We may reach the conclusion
that the requirement to provide tax returns, or at least to provide a
specified return automatically, reaps too little benefit to justify the
burden that it imposes.
IV. REGULATION OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEYS
The Act regulates part of the practice of law for consumer bank-
ruptcy attorneys, imposes upon them new diligence obligations, and
exposes them to some additional risk of sanctions for failure to fulfill
those obligations. Critics ofthe Act have predicted that the new regu-
lation, the new obligations, and the increased risk of sanctions will
produce an epidemic of adverse consequences: exodus of experienced
attorneys from the consumer bankruptcy bar and a consequent decline
in the standard or efficiency of practice in bankruptcy court, a signifi-
cant increase in attorneys' fees charged by those remaining in practice
and a consequent increase in the number of pro se debtors and debtors
using bankruptcy petition preparers, a decrease in the number of at-
317. Many consumer Chapter 7 debtors may file federal income tax returns elec-
tronically over the telephone by using TeleFile. Internal Revenue Service, e-file Using a
Telephone (Telefile), http://www.irs.gov/efileiarticlelO,,id=98296,00.html (last visited
July 24, 2005). TeleFile is available to taxpayers who may file a simple tax return
(Form 1040EZ). [d. A taxpayer using TeleFile receives only a confirmation number
over the telephone if the filing has been accepted. Taxpayers who file federal income
tax returns electronically through use of a personal computer may print out a transcript
of the return at the end of the process. Taxpayers who file federal income tax returns
electronically through use of tax professional will typically receive a copy of the paper
return from the tax professional. Taxpayers who make a paper filing will have had the
opportunity to make a copy of the return. A taxpayer without either a copy or a tran-
script may request either from the IRS. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Tip 2005-13,
Need a Copy of Your Tax Return Information? (Jan. 19,2005), http://www.irs.gov/news-
room/article/0"id=105370,00.html. The IRS charges for a copy of the return but not for
a transcript. [d.
318. BAPCP Act, supra note 267, § 315(c).
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312 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
torneys willing to represent a debtor pro bono, and the retirement of
bankruptcy judges unwilling to abide the resulting debris.319 These
consequences would be the Act's worst legacy, but I suggest that the
fears may be overstated. After some years of experience under the
Act, empirical research should be able to test the accuracy of these
predictions. In the meantime, through analysis of the relevant provi-
sions, we may begin to evaluate the possible impact of the Act upon
consumer bankruptcy practice and access to counsel.
The provisions come in two parts, first in the regulation of "debt
relief agencies," defined by the Act to include consumer bankruptcy
attorneys and others, and second as part of the amendments to section
707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with dismissal for abuse. The
Act regulates debt relief agencies by prohibiting certain behavior, in-
cluding the giving of certain kinds of advice, by mandating specified
language in advertising, by requiring a written contract between the
agency and a client, and by requiring disclosure of information to a
client or potential client. The amendments to section 707(b) impose
due diligence obligations on consumer bankruptcy attorneys and
slightly modifY sanctions that might otherwise be imposed for viola-
tion of Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
A. REGULATION OF DEBT RELIEF AGENCIES
The Act mints the new label "debt relief agencies" and regulates
debt relief agencies through prohibitions of certain behavior, advertis-
ing and disclosure requirements, and sanctions for misbehavior. With
certain exceptions (including authors, publishers, distributors, and
sellers of works subject to copyright protection and nonprofit tax ex-
empt organizations), a debt relief agency "means any person who pro-
vides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for
the payment of money or other valuable consideration, or who is a
bankruptcy petition preparer under section 110."320 "Assisted person"
and "bankruptcy assistance" are also newly defined terms. An as-
sisted person "means any person whose debts consist primarily of con-
319. Thomas J. Yerbich, The Coming Exodus of Consumer Counsel, XXII AM.
BANKR. mST. J. 10 (July/Aug. 2003); American Bar Association Fact Sheet, Bankruptcy
Attorney Liability Legislation (Apr. 20, 2005), http://www.abanet.org/poladv/brat-
tyliabilityfactsheet(march112005).pdf. Predictions in the American Bar Association
Fact Sheet were dire: new sanctions would force "an attorney to hire private investiga-
tors and appraisers to verifY' information in schedules, "adding thousands of dollars to
the cost of representing a debtor in bankruptcy and making bankruptcy" representation
unaffordable for most debtors. [d.
320. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, § 226(a)(3) (2005) [hereinafter BAPCP Act] (adding § 101(12A)
to the Bankruptcy Code). I do not discuss the effect ofthe new provisions on bankruptcy
petition preparers.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 313
sumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property is less than
$150,000."321 Bankruptcy assistance
means ... services ... provided to an assisted person with the
express or implied purpose of providing information, advice,
counsel, document preparation, or filing, or attendance at a
creditors' meeting or appearing in a case or proceeding on be-
half of another or providing legal representation with respect
to a case or proceeding under this title.322
Voila! Consumer bankruptcy attorneys are now debt relief agen-
cies.323 The label is more than a statutory convention because con-
sumer bankruptcy attorneys and others who provide bankruptcy
assistance to an assisted person must use "debt relief agency" in their
advertising.324
This new label lumps consumer bankruptcy attorneys together
with bankruptcy petition preparers ("a person, other than an attor-
ney" or an employee of an attorney "who prepares for compensation a
document for filing"325), unlicensed individuals targeted with strict
regulation in 1994.326 In so doing, the label diminishes the attorney's
professional cachet, earned through extensive specialized education,
screening, and licensing, and masks the proud historical tradition of
persons with specialized knowledge and training who provide confi-
dential, zealous, and conflict-free representation to persons in need of
help. The label also dehumanizes attorneys by conveying an impres-
sion of assistance from an organization rather than assistance from an
individual, much as we would dehumanize doctors by calling them
321. Id. § 226(a)(1) (adding § 101(3) to the Bankruptcy Code).
322. Id. § 226(a)(2) (adding § 101(4A) to the Bankruptcy Code).
323. The reference to "attorney" in the title of a notice that debt relief agencies will
be required to provide to assisted persons makes this point abundantly clear. The title
of the notice must read: "IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT BANKRUPTCY AS-
SISTANCE SERVICES FROM AN ATTORNEY OR BANKRUPTCY PETITION
PREPARER." Id. § 228(a) (adding § 527(b) to the Bankruptcy Code). The Act also pro-
vides that nothing in the regulation of debt relief agencies shall be deemed to limit or
curtail the authority or ability of a state or instrumentality thereof or federal court "to
determine and enforce qualifications for the practice of law." Id. § 227(a) (adding
§ 526(d)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code). On the effective date of the Act, Chief Judge La-
mar W. Davis of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia issued a
General Order, absent a case or controversy, concluding that the phrase "debt relief
agencies" does not include attorneys and ruling that attorneys regularly admitted to the
Bar of his Court or admitted pro hac vice are not covered by the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code regulating debt relief agencies "so long as their activities fall within the
scope of the practice oflaw and do not constitute a separate commercial enterprise." In
re Attorneys at Law and Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005). This
extraordinary order - the judicial equivalent of "take that!" - came too late for an evalu-
ation or response in this Article.
324. See infra pp. 323-24.
325. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(1) (2000).
326. Id. (added by The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§ 308(a), 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)).
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314 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
"pain and illness relief agencies" or dehumanize priests, rabbis, or
other spiritual leaders by calling them "faith agencies."
The label also may misdirect debtors. While consumer bank-
ruptcy attorneys who advertise must use the label in their advertis-
ing, and while such advertising must state that the debt relief agency
provides bankruptcy relief,327 the advertising need not state that the
service provider is an attorney. Some debtors, therefore, quite natu-
rally may believe that the advertiser provides credit counseling. Such
a debtor may reach a consumer bankruptcy attorney or bankruptcy
petition preparer instead and, contrary to the purpose of some of the
Act's consumer bankruptcy reforms, be enticed or persuaded to pursue
bankruptcy relief that he or she otherwise might not have considered.
1. Restrictions on advice
Heightened regulation of consumer bankruptcy attorneys reflects
a congressional conclusion that consumer bankruptcy attorneys con-
tribute to a surfeit of consumer bankruptcy filings and that state regu-
lation of the practice of law through rules of ethics and malpractice
liability is insufficient to curb the perceived excess.328 Nonetheless,
some of the Act's restrictions on attorney behavior largely mimic ex-
tant rules of ethics or standards of reasonable care. The Act's regula-
tions, in new section 526(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, provide that a
debt relief agency shall not misrepresent the nature of the services
that it will provide,329 fail to perform promised services,33o counsel
any assisted or prospective assisted person to make an untrue or mis-
leading statement "in a document filed in a case or proceeding under"
the Bankruptcy Code,331 or misrepresent, either affirmatively or by
327. See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
328. Note, however, that the new regulation of debt relief agencies is not to "annul,
alter, affect, or exempt any person" from state law regulation, except to the extent that
state law is inconsistent with the new federal regulation. BAPCP Act, supra note 320,
§ 227(a) (adding § 526(d)(1) to the Bankruptcy Code).
329. [d. § 227(a) (adding § 526(a)(3)(A) to the Bankruptcy Code).
330. [d. (adding § 526(a)(1) to the Bankruptcy Code). For a rule of ethics that
reaches the same conduct, see, for example, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3
(2003), which states that "[allawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client," elaborated in Comment 4 to the Rule as "carry through to
conclusion all matters undertaken for a client." [d. R. 1.3 cmt. 4.
331. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 227(a) (adding § 526(a)(2) to the Bankruptcy
Code). For a rule of ethics that reaches the same conduct, see, for example, MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003), which states that "[allawyer shall not coun-
sel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent ...." Section 526(a)(2) would reach slightly further because it also applies to
statements in documents that the attorney should have known through the exercise of
reasonable care to be untrue or misleading. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 227(n) (ad-
ding § 526(a)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 315
material omission, the benefits and risks of becoming a debtor under
the Bankruptcy Code.332
Another of the Act's regulations goes well beyond rules of ethics
and standards of reasonable care. An attorney may not "advise an
assisted or prospective assisted person to incur more debt" either in
contemplation of filing a case under the Bankruptcy Code or for the
purpose of paying the attorney for bankruptcy services.333 In part,
this prohibition, if constitutional and enforceable, will inhibit one type
of pre-petition planning - - incurring additional secured debt to be re-
affirmed post-petition - - that could save a debtor from the presump-
tion of abuse under the means test by increasing the debtor's
presumed monthly expenses.334 Thus, for example, the prohibition
prevents an attorney from advising a client to incur secured debt
through a pre-petition installment purchase of a vehicle in contempla-
tion of bankruptcy.335 This prohibition raises significant First
Amendment issues.336
Most legal advice from an attorney to a client likely enjoys First
Amendment protection. While not the explicit holding of any decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, this conclusion is implicit
in many of its decisions concerning attorneys speaking in a profes-
sional capacity. The Court has protected some commercial speech of
attorneys designed to attract clients,337 extrajudicial public state-
332. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 227(a)(B) (adding § 526(a)(3) to the Bankruptcy
Code). For a rule of ethics that reaches the same conduct, see, for example, MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2003), which states that "lallawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed deci-
sions regarding the representation."
333. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 227(a) (adding § 526(a)(4) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
334. See supra pp. 284-85.
335. Although the prohibition applies to an attorney's advice to incur any debt,
whether secured or unsecured, there is less reason to be concerned about the likelihood
of an attorney giving a debtor advice to incur unsecured debt unless the client would
otherwise have difficulty paying for the attorney's bankruptcy services. If a client in-
curs unsecured debt, in contemplation of bankruptcy, with no intent to repay the debt
incurred, the creditor may request a determination that the debt is not dischargeable.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (c) (2000). An attorney giving advice to incur debt in those cir-
cumstances would be committing malpractice and is therefore unlikely to give such ad-
vice in any event. I discuss an attorney's advice to incur debt for the purpose of paying
for the attorney's bankruptcy services infra pp. 321-23.
336. In addition to the First Amendment analysis explored in the text, if a law is
unclear about what speech it restricts, the law will be invalidated if it is vague. See
generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1347-50
(15th ed. 2004).
337. On several occasions the Court has applied the First Amendment to state bar
disciplinary rules restricting advertising and solicitation by attorneys. E.g., Florida Bar
v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). In sweeping dictum in this commercial
speech case, the Court stated "professional speech may be entitled to 'the strongest pro-
tection our Constitution has to offer.'" Id. at 637. In this and others of its attorney
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316 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
ments on behalf of clients that are not substantially likely to prejudice
an adjudicative proceeding,338 and attorney solicitations encouraging
potential clients to express personal political beliefs or advance civil
liberties objectives through litigation.339 Yet some legal advice to a
client, like other forms of speech such as fighting words, obscenity, or
inaccurate commercial speech, may lie outside the ambit of First
Amendment protection or may command less rigorous First Amend-
ment scrutiny.34o Neither Supreme Court precedent nor First
Amendment theory tells us, however, whether or to what extent the
First Amendment protects attorney advice that would facilitate a
debtor's evasion of the means-test presumption of abuse.341
As a starting point, we might assume that the First Amendment
does not protect an attorney's advice to a client that the client engage
commercial speech cases, the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny as originally ar-
ticulated in Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
338. Gentile V. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
339. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
340. Chaplinksy V. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Roth V.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. V. Pub.
Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (inaccurate commercial speech).
341. Recent First Amendment scholarship identifies the broad theoretical difficul-
ties attending the question. "Current First Amendment analysis lacks a coherent view
of speech in the professions." Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional
Speech, and the Constitutional Status ofSocial Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772
(1999). "Despite the century-old recognition of the regulation of professions, we still
have ... no paradigm for the First Amendment rights of attorneys, physicians, or finan-
cial advisers when they communicate with their clients." Id. at 772. Frederick Schauer
identifies the variety of types of speech considered to be beyond the boundaries of First
Amendment protection, including those where "boundary disputes have largely been
invisible." Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration ofConstitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004). These in-
clude "content-based restrictions in the Securities Act of 1933, the Sherman Antitrust
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, the law of fraud,
conspiracy law, the law of evidence," and "almost all of the regulation of professionals."
Id. at 1768, 1784. He argues that "the boundaries of the First Amendment ... turn out
to be a function of a complex and seemingly serendipitous array of factors that cannot be
(or at least have not been) reduced to or explained by legal doctrine or by the back-
ground philosophical ideas and ideals of the First Amendment." Id. at 1768. In discuss-
ing and rejecting the "speech/conduct" distinction in First Amendment jurisprudence,
Eugene Volokh suggests that professional licensing requirements and bans on seem-
ingly unsound advice by an attorney may be constitutionally permissible but that
broader bans on professional advice may not be constitutionally permissible. Eugene
Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses ofConduct, "Sit-
uation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1343-
46 (2005). We should distinguish First Amendment analysis of restrictions on the con-
tent of an attorney's advice from First Amendment analysis of licensing restrictions
that prevent all but attorneys from giving legal advice. For discussion of the latter, see
Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth": Professional Licensing and the First Amend-
ment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885 (2000).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 317
in conduct that is either criminal or fraudulent,342 although some
lower court authority might suggest the contrary.343 On that assump-
tion, if advice to incur secured debt in contemplation of bankruptcy
amounts to advice to engage in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent,
342. Justice O'Connor has stated as much: "Lawyers are officers of the court and, as
such, may legitimately be subject to ethical precepts that keep them from engaging in
what otherwise might be constitutionally protected speech." Gentile v. State Bar of
Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1081-82 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring). State ethical rules gov-
erning attorneys prohibit them from advising clients to engage in conduct that is crimi-
nal or fraudulent. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
343. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found a First Amendment violation in a
federal policy calling for revocation of a physician's registration to prescribe controlled
substances if the physician recommended to a patient the medical, although unlawful,
use of marijuana. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 540 U.S.
946 (2003). The court held that the physician's recommendation alone, without the req-
uisite elements of conspiracy or aiding and abetting, cannot be the subject of govern-
ment action because it would "strike at core First Amendment interests of doctors and
patients." [d. at 635-36. "An integral component of the practice of medicine is the com-
munication between a doctor and a patient. Physicians must be able to speak frankly
and openly to patients." [d. at 636. Even were the Supreme Court of the United States
to agree, it might distinguish (and decline to extend First Amendment protection to) an
attorney's recommendation to engage in criminal conduct from a physician's recommen-
dation to engage in criminal conduct because an attorney's professionally prescribed
responsibility to zealously represent a client must be exercised within the bounds of the
law whereas the physician's exclusive professionally prescribed responsibility is to the
health of a patient.
In two relatively recent federal district court cases, the United States Justice De-
partment conceded the unconstitutionality of a prohibition in another federal statute
analogous to the Act's prohibition of an attorney's advice to incur debt in contemplation
of bankruptcy. Each case involved a challenge to a provision of the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 that made it a misdemeanor to knowingly and willfully counsel another to
dispose of assets in order to thereafter become eligible for Medicaid. Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4734, 111 Stat. 251, 522-23. In one case the court
presumed but did not discuss the reasons for finding a First Amendment violation. New
York State Bar Ass'n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). In the other the court
did not discuss the First Amendment issue at all. Magee v. United States, 93 F. Supp.
2d 161 (D.R.I. 2000). The Justice Department's concession in each case was based at
least in part upon a memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service that
stated the following: "To the extent that the provision would prohibit counseling about
legal activities, a court would seem likely to declare it unconstitutional." Congressional
Research Service Memorandum, Proposed Amendment of Section 217 of P.L. 104-193;
Criminalizing Certain Transfers of Assets to Become Eligible for Medicaid, at 2, July
11, 1997 (copy on file with author). The memorandum did not cite any cases analyzing
the precise First Amendment issue. The memorandum concluded "a prohibition of
counseling about legal activities would be a content-based restriction on speech, and, as
such, would be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, which means that
it would be upheld only if it is necessary 'to promote a compelling state interest,' and is
'the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.'" [d. The memorandum
also concluded that the prohibition would not be subject to the lower degree of First
Amendment protection afforded to commercial speech because the attorney's advice,
while given for a fee, does not propose a commercial transaction and is therefore not
commercial speech. [d. The memorandum also distinguished "speech ... used as an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute." [d. Neither the memo-
randum nor the cases considered whether disposition of assets in order to qualify for
Medicaid would be fraudulent and whether the First Amendment might tolerate prohi-
bition of an attorney's advice to engage in fraudulent conduct.
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318 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
the Act's prohibition on such advice would be constitutionally permis-
sible. Yet to incur secured debt in contemplation of bankruptcy is not
a crime.344 Nor is it common law fraud, which requires some misrep-
resentation, concealment, or non-disclosure.345 The debtor cannot
misrepresent, conceal, or fail to disclose secured debt incurred prior to
bankruptcy (unless entirely paid before bankruptcy and thus irrele-
vant) because the debtor must truthfully describe it in Schedule D
filed with the petition.346 It might be a fraudulent conveyance, how-
ever, on the theory that the debtor would be incurring a secured obli-
gation with actual intent to hinder unsecured creditors of the debtor
by seeking to avoid the presumption of abuse under the means test.347
Yet in many decisions rendered in the seemingly analogous context of
pre-petition exemption planning, bankruptcy courts have declined to
find intent to defraud unsecured creditors simply from the fact that
the debtor deliberately converted non-exempt property to exempt
property pre-petition for the purpose of reducing or eliminating credi-
tor recovery in bankruptcy.348 Were courts to reach the same conclu-
sion with respect to a debtor's assumption of secured debt in
contemplation of bankruptcy, an attorney's advice to incur such debt
would not be advice to engage in conduct that is fraudulent and our
postulated exception to First Amendment protection of an attorney's
advice would not apply.
The Act's prohibition of an attorney's advice to incur debt in con-
templation of bankruptcy could survive First Amendment scrutiny
then only were we to hypothesize some as yet unarticulated exception
to the First Amendment, such as one permitting the prohibition of le-
gal advice given to assist a client's evasion of consequences implicit in,
or perhaps clearly stated in, legislation (e.g. advice given to avoid the
means-test presumption of abuse). Yet such an exception to First
Amendment protection of an attorney's legal advice would sanction
344. Bankruptcy fraud is a federal crime. 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). Bankruptcy fraud
requires that the "debtor devise or intend to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud" and,
inter alia, files a petition under title 11 "for the purpose of executing or concealing such
a scheme or artifice or attempting to do so." [d. Whether the attorney's advice to incur
debt in contemplation of bankruptcy is advice to commit bankruptcy fraud depends,
therefore, upon whether incurring debt in contemplation of bankruptcy is part of a
scheme or artifice to defraud, a question to which the text now turns. If the behavior is
not part of a scheme or artifice to defraud, it can't be criminal. If it is part of a scheme
or artifice to defraud, under the analysis suggested in the text, the fact that it is also
criminal would be moot because the attorney's advice could constitutionally be banned if
the behavior of the client is either criminal or fraudulent.
345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159-62 (1981).
346. RULES AND FORMS OF PRACTICE AND P. IN BANKR., Rule 1007(b)(l), Official Form
6; 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2000).
347. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §4(a)(1) (1984).
348. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 319
prohibitions striking at core functions of attorneys, tax planning ad-
vice for example, long accorded legitimacy by the Court.349
Moreover, unless narrowly construed to apply only to advice given
with that motive, the prohibition would be subject to attack under the
First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine.35o Surely there will be in-
stances involving neither fraud nor intent to evade a presumption of
abuse in which advice to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy
will be appropriate. Consider two examples. A client struggling with
hefty mortgage payments on a fifteen-year mortgage might wish to
employ Chapter 13 to address her overall financial difficulties. To fa-
cilitate a feasible plan and to respond to the client's desire to pay a
significant sum to unsecured creditors, the attorney might suggest
that the client generate additional disposable income by refinancing
the mortgage (which will incur new debt) with a longer-term mortgage
(at the same time discussing disadvantages of that option with the
client). Another client, safe from the means-test presumption of abuse
in part by virtue of large monthly payments on an expensive late-
model automobile, might be exposed on account of those payments to
possible dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition under the court's reserved
power to dismiss for abuse based on the totality of the debtor's finan-
cial circumstances.351 Searching for an appropriate strategy to lessen
that risk, the attorney might wish to advise the sale of the expensive
late-model automobile and the credit purchase of a less expensive au-
tomobile (assuming either that the client would still be safe from the
means-test presumption of abuse with lower monthly automobile pay-
ments or that the client might be able to overcome the means-test pre-
sumption of abuse resulting from lower automobile payments and
greater putative disposable income). The Act's prohibition, literally
read, applies to the advice in both instances, but without any justifica-
tion that would save it under the First Amendment.
Even if constitutional, the prohibition on advising a client to incur
debt in contemplation of bankruptcy nevertheless may be ineffectual.
The statutory language does not prohibit the attorney from truthfully
responding to a question from the debtor about the impact of new debt
(e.g. "What if I buy a new car on credit?"), and a court probably would
349. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi
ex rei. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930); United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496,
506 (1873).
350. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine permits a litigant to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute on its face, not just as applied, for an unnecessarily broad
reach into the area of protected expression. The litigant challenging the statute need
not be harmed by the speech infringement, and if the litigant prevails, the court invali-
dates the entire statute even if the law as applied in some contexts would be constitu-
tional. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 336, at 1334-47.
351. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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320 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
not infer such a prohibition given the prevailing ethical rule that an
attorney may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client even though the attorney may not suggest that
the client engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct.352 Nor would the
statutory language seem to prevent the attorney from volunteering an
explanation of how the means test works. In fact, another part of the
legislation requires that the attorney furnish the client with "reasona-
bly sufficient information (which shall be provided in a clear and con-
spicuous manner) . . . on how to provide all the information . . .
required ... pursuant to section 521, including-the amounts speci-
fied in section 707(b)(2)."353 (Recall that the amounts specified in sec-
tion 707(b)(2) include the amount of secured debt and the amount of
imputed disposable income.) As a consequence, debtors whose income
triggers the means test but who are sufficiently astute or tactical, that
is, some of the very debtors at whom much of the consumer bank-
ruptcy reform was targeted, may be among the most successful in
evading the presumption of abuse. Debtors who read and rely on self-
help publications, either in preparation for seeing an attorney or in
connection with self-representation, also may be more successful than
others in evading the presumption of abuse by incurring additional
secured debt because, in what would seem to be deference to First
Amendment concerns, the Act excludes authors, publishers, distribu-
tors, or sellers of works subject to copyright protection, when acting in
that capacity, from the definition of debt relief agency.354 The Act
therefore does not prohibit such entities from giving advice to incur
debt in contemplation of bankruptcy, elevating the sanctity of speech
that gives general advice above the value of professional speech di-
rected to the specific circumstances of a particular client.
An attorney's violation of the prohibition on advice to incur debt
in contemplation of bankruptcy also will be difficult to detect. If the
debtor disregards the advice, nothing in the debtor's schedules will
suggest to other actors in the system that they should inquire about
the attorney's advice. Ifthe debtor follows the advice, the reflection of
recently incurred debt on the debtor's schedules would alert other ac-
tors in the system, but inquiry about the attorney's advice likely
would be stymied by the attorney-client privilege, unless the debtor
waives the privilege.355 Waiver of the privilege would be against the
352. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
353. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 228 (adding § 527(c) to the Bankruptcy Code).
354. [d. § 226(a) (adding § 101(12A)(E) to the Bankruptcy Code).
355. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to bankruptcy cases. FED. R. BANKR. P.
9017; FED. R. EVID. 1l01(b). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the attorney-client
privilege is a creature of federal common law. FED. R. EVID. 501. The privilege protects
both "confidential disclosures made by a client to an attorney in order to obtain legal
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 321
debtor's interest, and thus unlikely, because testimony about the rea-
son for incurring debt might support a motion to dismiss either under
the means test (the court deciding to ignore the newly incurred debt in
determining imputed disposable income) or on the ground that the pe-
tition was filed in bad faith.356
As previously noted, the Act also prohibits the attorney from ad-
vising an assisted or prospective assisted person "to incur more
debt ... to pay an attorney ... for services performed as part of pre-
paring for or representing a debtor in a case under ... [the Bank-
ruptcy Code] ."357 Thus, in addition to making Chapter 7 more
complex and thus more difficult for consumer debtors to use without
legal representation, this provision of the Act also makes it more diffi-
cult for cash-strapped consumer debtors to timely obtain legal repre-
sentation. This prohibition also raises First Amendment concerns.
An unknown number of consumer debtors considering bankruptcy re-
lief lack funds sufficient to pay the full amount of an attorney's fee
prior to the filing of a petition. Consumer bankruptcy attorneys have
pursued different approaches to this problem in consumer Chapter 7
advice as well as an attorney's advice in response to the disclosures." E.g., United
States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1997). The privilege is unavailable if the
client seeks or obtains the services of the attorney for the purpose of enabling fraud.
E.g., CAL. EVID. Code § 956 (West 1995). Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Wein-
traub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985), held "the trustee of a corporation in bankruptcy has the
power to waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to pre-bankruptcy communica-
tions" between corporate management (on behalf of the corporation) and the corpora-
tion's attorney. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 358. The Court reserved the question of
whether an individual's trustee in bankruptcy has the same power in the following
language:
[R]espondents maintain that the result we reach today would also apply to in-
dividuals in bankruptcy, a result that respondents find "unpalatable." . . . But
our holding today has no bearing on the problem of individual bankruptcy,
which we have no reason to address in this case. A£, we have stated, a corpora-
tion, as an inanimate entity, must act through agents .... When the corpora-
tion is solvent, the agent that controls the corporate attorney-client privilege is
the corporation's management. Under our holding today, this power passes to
the trustee because the trustee's functions are more closely analogous to those
of management outside of bankruptcy than are the functions of the debtor's
directors. An individual, in contrast, can act for himself; there is no "manage-
ment" that controls a solvent individual's attorney-client privilege. If control
over that privilege passes to a trustee, it must be under some theory different
from the one that we embrace in this case.
[d. at 356-57.
356. Whether incurring additional debt solely for the purpose of passing the means
test would justify dismissal of the case under either of these theories is a nice question.
The Bankruptcy Code does not prohibit the debtor from incurring debt pre-petition, al-
though debt incurred in contemplation of bankruptcy with no intent to repay would be
non-dischargeable.
357. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 227(a) (adding § 526(a)(4) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
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322 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
cases.358 Some attorneys have extended partial fee credit to the client
with the expectation that the client pay the attorney post-petition.359
Other attorneys, insisting on payment of legal fees in full prior to fil-
ing a petition for the client, have suggested that the client borrow the
necessary funds from a friend or relative or suggested that the client
save and earmark funds that the client might otherwise have paid to
existing unsecured creditors. Perhaps some have suggested that the
client incur a cash advance on a credit card to fund payment of the
attorney's fees.
The prohibition on an attorney's advice to incur debt to fund
bankruptcy legal services can be read to extend to all of these ap-
proaches. It clearly applies to advice that a client seek a cash advance
on a credit card. If limited to that advice, the prohibition might sur-
vive First Amendment scrutiny under our postulated exception for ad-
358. Two student notes survey attorney-fee arrangements in consumer Chapter 7
cases and the judicial responses to those arrangements. Kerry Haydel Ducey, Note,
Bankruptcy, Just For the Rich? An Analysis ofPopular Fee Arrangements for Pre-peti-
tion Legal Fees and a Call to Amend, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (2001); Joshua D. Morse,
Comment, Public Policy is Never a Substitute for Statutory Clarity: Rejecting the Notion
That Pre-Petition Attorney-Fee Debts Are Dischargeable in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 575 (2000).
359. The attorney's extension of fee credit in a Chapter 7 case poses a clear conflict
of interest, permissible only if the attorney advises the client that the debt to the attor-
ney will be discharged in the Chapter 7 and need not be repaid. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals is the most recent of four circuit courts to have held unpaid pre-petition
attorneys' fees dischargeable in bankruptcy. Rittenhouse v. Eisen, 404 F.3d 395 (6th
Cir. 2005). In addition, if the attorney takes any act to collect the unpaid fees post-
petition as a personal liability of the debtor, the attorney violates either the automatic
stay or the discharge injunction. To avoid that problem, the attorney may secure the
debt pre-petition such as with a security interest in a debtor's expected income tax
refund.
Consumer bankruptcy attorneys customarily extend fee credit in Chapter 13 cases
and collect those fees from plan payments. While the prohibition against advice to incur
additional debt to pay for bankruptcy assistance can be read to prohibit attorneys from
advising Chapter 13 clients about this customary practice, Congress could not have in-
tended that result. First, the Act leaves intact provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that
treat compensation to a debtor's Chapter 13 attorney as a priority administrative ex-
pense that a Chapter 13 plan must pay in full. The Bankruptcy Code requires that a
Chapter 13 plan provide for full payment of all claims entitled to priority under § 507.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (2000). Section 507 provides for priority of administrative ex-
penses that are allowed under section 503(b). Id. § 507(a)(1). Under § 503(b)(2), com-
pensation awarded under § 330(a) is an allowed administrative expense. Id. § 503(b)(2).
Such compensation includes compensation to a debtor's Chapter 13 attorney. Id.
§ 330(a)(4)(B). Second, the Act also leaves intact a rule of bankruptcy procedure that
permits a cash-strapped debtor to pay bankruptcy petition filing fees in installments
following the filing of the petition but requires that such fees be fully paid before the
debtor or a Chapter 13 trustee may pay an attorney who renders services to the debtor
in connection with the case. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1006(b). Both the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vision concerning Chapter 13 compensation for attorneys and this rule of bankruptcy
procedure presume that attorneys in Chapter 13 cases may extend fee credit. Surely,
therefore, the attorney would not be prohibited from advising the client about such fee
credit.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 323
vice to engage in conduct that is fraudulent if, as a result ofthe advice,
the client incurs such a debt with no intention of repayment post-peti-
tion.36o Much more dubious, however, is the constitutionality of
prohibiting legal advice to pursue one ofthe other approaches because
any such advice does not suggest fraudulent conduct by the client. If
the attorney extends fee credit, or ifthe client borrows from a friend or
relative, both attorney and client expect that the client will volunta-
rily repay the discharged debt. If the client delays filing of the petition
and in the meantime earmarks for the attorney funds that the client
otherwise might have paid to an unsecured creditor (which incurs new
debt by virtue of interest and late fees), the creditor is no worse off
than had the client filed the petition earlier. Other than the possibil-
ity of fraud in the one case, there doesn't seem to be any other legiti-
mate reason for denying First Amendment protection to speech by an
attorney that suggests how a client can obtain and pay for bankruptcy
legal representation. Accordingly, unless narrowly construed to apply
only to such a case, the entire prohibition might be struck under the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.361
2. Advertising
Under new section 528 of the Bankruptcy Code, consumer bank-
ruptcy attorneys (as debt relief agencies) must include specified lan-
guage in some advertising that is directed to the general public. If an
attorney advertises bankruptcy assistance services, the benefits of
bankruptcy (including Chapter 13, whether or not Chapter 13 is men-
tioned), or assistance with respect to "credit defaults, mortgage fore-
closures, eviction proceedings, excessive debt, debt collection pressure,
or inability to pay any consumer debt," then the advertisement must
clearly and conspicuously disclose "that the assistance may involve
bankruptcy relief' under the Bankruptcy Code.362 The advertising
also must include the following (or substantially similar) statement:
"We are a debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief
under the Bankruptcy Code."363 As a result, some attorneys who re-
360. The credit card issuer can contest the dischargeability of the claim arising from
the cash advance by alleging that the advance was incurred with no intention of repay-
ment. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2000). In doing so, the creditor may draw upon a presump-
tion of non-dischargeability if the cash advance is incurred within seventy days before
the order for relief and exceeds $750. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 310 (amending
§ 523(a)(2)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code). But the cost and problems of proof associated
with that remedy make it imperfect. Congress might have addressed this specific prob-
lem with a much narrower and likely more effective solution: make claims for cash ad-
vances to pay for bankruptcy legal services per se non-dischargeable.
361. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
362. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 229(a) (adding § 528(b)(2) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
363. [d.
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324 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
present individuals filing bankruptcy as well as creditors may feel
compelled to abandon advertising of bankruptcy assistance services or
eliminate their consumer bankruptcy practice for fear of alienating
creditor clients.
Congress may intend this required language in advertising to
curb instances of perceived abusive, or at least opportunistic, market-
ing practices by some consumer bankruptcy attorneys.364 Advertising
that does not mention bankruptcy, for example, may lure some clients
interested in a non-bankruptcy workout to an attorney who then per-
suades or pressures the client to file bankruptcy - - a kind of bait and
switch.365 Ironically, this rationale for the required language in ad-
vertising undercuts the argument that consumer bankruptcy has lost
its shame or stigma.366 Bankruptcy must still retain shame or stigma
for some individuals if consumer bankruptcy attorneys lure them by
avoiding mention of bankruptcy.
The Act's requirement to include specified language in advertis-
ing probably does not abridge free speech rights, but resolution of this
First Amendment issue is not entirely free from doubt. Advertising of
bankruptcy services is commercial speech. If misleading, commercial
speech is not subject to any First Amendment protection.367 Even if
not misleading, commercial speech may be regulated if the regulation
directly advances a substantial governmental interest through means
not more extensive than necessary to serve the interest.36B The Su-
preme Court of the United States has described this formulation as
"intermediate scrutiny," emphasized its application to attorney adver-
tising, and refined it to require that the regulation directly and mate-
rially advance the governmental interest and be narrowly drawn.369
364. Testimony in 1998 congressional hearings claimed such abuse. Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1998 Part I: Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before the House Subcomm. on Commer-
cial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Pt. I at 61, 63
(1998) [hereinafter Hearings Part 1] (prepared statement of John J. Gleason, Vice Presi-
dent of Credit, Bon-Ton Department Stores); Bankruptcy Reform Act of1998; Responsi-
ble Borrower Protection Act; and Consumer Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy
Accountability Act of 1998 Part II: Hearing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and H.R. 3146
Before the House Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong., Pt. II, at 58, 59 (1998) (prepared statement of George J. Wal-
lace, Esq., Eckert Seamons Cherin & Elliott, LLC).
365. As suggested in Gary Neustadter, When Attorney and Client Meet: Observa-
tions ofInterviewing and Counseling in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFF.
L. REV. 177, 187-88,239-40 (1986), a non-bankruptcy workout in a consumer context
using the services of an attorney is inefficient and rare. Thus, what some might charac-
terize as pressure to file bankruptcy might also or instead be a dose of realism.
366. This argument is identified supra note 8 and accompanying text.
367. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
368. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
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Judicial scrutiny of a mandate to disclose commercial information
(as distinguished from a prohibition or restriction upon commercial
speech) is yet further relaxed. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,37o the Supreme Court upheld
against a First Amendment challenge an Ohio State Bar Disciplinary
Rule requiring that an attorney advertising his or her availability on a
contingent fee basis disclose that clients would have to pay costs even
if their lawsuits were unsuccessful (assuming clients would be so lia-
ble).371 "Because the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of
the information such speech provides, appellant's constitutionally pro-
tected interest in not providing any particular factual information in
his advertising is minimal."372 Accordingly, "an advertiser's [First
Amendment] rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure re-
quirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in prevent-
ing deception of consumers."373 The Disciplinary Rule in question
passed muster under that standard, the court concluded, because the
State could reasonably conclude that potential contingent fee clients
could be misled by advertising that failed to include the required lan-
guage,374 and because the record did not provide any factual basis for
concluding that the disclosure requirement was unduly
burdensome.375
Nine years later, in Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business & Profes-
sional Regulation, Board ofAccountancy,376 the Supreme Court again
spoke to the First Amendment implications of required language in
advertising. The Florida Board ofAccountancy had disciplined a Flor-
ida certified public accountant who was also a Florida attorney for
identifying herself under the attorneys' listings in the telephone direc-
tory as "IBANEZ SILVIA S CPA CFP." Among other things, the
Board contended that use of "CFP" (meaning Certified Financial Plan-
ner) was misleading or potentially misleading because it incorrectly
suggested state approval and recognition. The Court concluded that
the Board had failed to demonstrate that the use of "CFP" was mis-
leading377 and therefore failed to meet the constitutional burden for a
total ban on use of "CFP." The Court also concluded that the Board
370. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
371. Zaunderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626 (1985).
372. Zaunderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
373. [d. at 651.
374. [d. at 652-53.
375. [d. at 653 n.15.
376. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
377. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Profl Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512
U.S. 136, 144-45 (1994).
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326 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
had failed to demonstrate that the use of "CFP" was potentially mis-
leading.378 Accordingly, the Board could not justify any measure to
prevent deception or confusion. The Court intimated in dictum, how-
ever, that on a different record demonstrating a potential to mislead
(and thus justifying some regulation of commercial speech) it still
might not countenance another Board regulation that required a dis-
claimer in any advertising by a CPA that uses language suggesting
specialization. The regulation required that such a disclaimer '''state
that the recognizing agency is not affiliated with or sanctioned by the
state or federal government,' and . . . must set out the recognizing
agency's 'requirements for recognition, including, but not limited to,
education, experience[,] and testing."'379 Mter reiterating the admo-
nition expressed in Zauderer that unduly burdensome disclosure re-
quirements would offend the First Amendment, the Court noted that
such a detailed disclaimer would effectively preclude use of the word
"specialist" on letterhead, "on a business card, or in a yellow pages
listing."380
Thereafter, in Borgner v. Brooks,381 the Eleventh Circuit upheld
against a First Amendment challenge a Florida statute requiring that
Florida-licensed dentists advertising a specialty practice or credential
accredited by a bona fide credentialing organization other than the
American Dental Association or the Florida Board of Dentistry dis-
close in the advertisement that the indicated specialty or credential-
ing organization was not state-approved. The Court credited a survey
demonstrating that consumers might be misled to their detriment ab-
sent the disclosure382 and found the disclosure requirement "not ...
especially long or burdensome, but simply an effective manner to con-
vey necessary information to the public."383 The court distinguished
the lengthier and more complex disclaimer discussed in Ibanez; this
disclaimer did not require dentists to identify the requirements, such
as a dentist's education, experience, and testing, imposed by a creden-
tialing organization as a condition to issuing a credential.384
Required language in advertising by consumer bankruptcy attor-
neys will be constitutional, then, if the government could reasonably
conclude that advertising without the disclosure is potentially mis-
leading, that the required language is reasonably directed toward les-
378. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146.
379. Id. at 146.
380. Id. at 146-47.
381. 284 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002).
382. Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1211-13 (11th Cir. 2002).
383. Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1215.
384. Id. at 1215.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 327
sening the potential for deception, and that the required language
does not unduly burden consumer bankruptcy attorneys.
Courts have alternatively relied on logic or surveys in concluding
that a governmental authority could reasonably have found advertis-
ing to be potentially misleading. In Zauderer, the Supreme Court
found one of the State's claims of potential deception "self-evident"
and therefore reasonable even without supporting survey data.385 In
that case, the attorney's advertisement of contingent fee representa-
tion for women injured by use of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine De-
vice stated that "'if there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our
clients."'386 It did not mention the distinction between the attorney's
fees and litigation costs and did not mention that a client might have
to pay litigation costs ifthe client were unsuccessful in pursuing his or
her claim. The Court found to be obvious that some members of the
public could be misled into thinking that retaining the attorney would
be a no-lose proposition.387 In contrast, in Ibanez, the Court did not
find self-evident the assertion by the Florida Board of Accountancy
that an attorney's use of the designation "CFP"was potentially mis-
leading. It therefore was unwilling in that case to accept the Board's
bare assertion as sufficient to meet the government's burden of dem-
onstrating that the advertising was potentially misleading.388 A
claim that advertising by consumer bankruptcy attorneys is poten-
tially misleading if it omits mention of bankruptcy appears analogous
to the claim that Zauderer's advertising of contingent fee representa-
tion was potentially misleading in its omission of the client's potential
exposure for litigation costs. Both involve a suggestion of a legal solu-
tion to a client's problem without mention of information about the
solution that would be important to a reasonable person. The Su-
preme Court might therefore find self-evident the claim that advertis-
ing by consumer bankruptcy attorneys is potentially misleading if it
fails to mention bankruptcy.
385. Zaunderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53.
386. Id. at 652.
387. Id.
388. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146. The Court's earlier opinion in Peel v. Attorney Regis-
tration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91 (1990), did not quite reach
the issue. An attorney had challenged a decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois that
had censured him for letterhead that identified his certification by the National Board
ofTrial Advocacy as a civil trial specialist. The Supreme Court reversed the decision on
First Amendment grounds. It first found a complete absence of any evidence of actual
deception. Peel, 456 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). It then turned to the question of potential de-
ception. Without addressing whether or how the state's attorney registration and disci-
plinary commission might have demonstrated potential deception, it concluded that the
rule restricting the attorney's advertising was "broader than reasonably necessary to





 r  ­
 . e e ,
i




s. '3   
   
  t c  
r    
   
 387 t  , rt 
fi i   ou t
  "  ­
.   
ffi i r  ­





 . t    ­
 i







, . . . rn i ­
 f . .   
 An rn   ur   
   fi   
   .   r   
t  fi     
.  . . ).  rn   ­
t t t    rn ­
ry nstr  l
  rn  b     
 i t rn   e ). .
HeinOnline -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 328 2005-2006
    
  
          
           
         
          
       
 
  
             
         
         
          
 
 
        
           
     
 
          
        
          
        
        
 
   
          
          
         
    
        
          
        
      
        
               
              
 
                 
            
            
             
           
               
              
             
        
            
            
              
               
               
              
            
          
              
                 
                  
328 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
The government must adduce evidence to shoulder its burden if
the claim is not self-evident. In Borgner, the Eleventh Circuit credited
two surveys conducted by the Florida Board of Dentistry demonstrat-
ing that consumers seeing advertising of a dental specialty practice
might incorrectly believe that the practice was state-certified.389 I am
unaware of any survey data on which the United States could rely in
claiming that advertising by consumer bankruptcy attorneys that fails
to mention bankruptcy relief is potentially misleading. But the gov-
ernment could adduce assertions to that effect made in testimony
before Congress390 and likely also could adduce anecdotal evidence to
the same effect.391 In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court
has suggested that anecdotes might suffice.392
If the government can sustain its burden of demonstrating that
consumer bankruptcy advertising that omits reference to bankruptcy
is potentially misleading, it must also demonstrate that the required
language is reasonably directed toward lessening the potential decep-
tion. Surely it can do so. The required language393 clearly and simply
identifies the potential for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Reading
the required language, no one could reasonably think otherwise. Ipso
facto the required language is reasonably directed toward lessening
the potential for deception.
Finally, the government must demonstrate that the required lan-
guage in advertising, which must be clear and conspicuous,394 does
not unduly burden consumer bankruptcy attorneys. The required lan-
389. Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1211-13.
390. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
391. Cf Hearings Part I, supra note 364, at 95 (statement of Nicholl J. Russell)
(stating that attorney did not advise him of Chapter 13 or consumer credit counseling
alternatives).
392. In Florida Bar u. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), the court considered a
First Amendment challenge to a Florida Bar rule prohibiting personal injury attorneys
from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for thirty
days following an accident or disaster. The Court concluded that the Bar had ade-
quately demonstrated that the rule served a substantial governmental interest. In re-
jecting concerns voiced by the dissent about survey data on which the Bar had relied,
the Court referred to prior cases in which it "permitted litigants to justify speech restric-
tions by reference to studies and anecdotes . ..."(emphasis added). Id. at 628.
393. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
394. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Act provides a definition of "conspicu-
ous," although the Act requires that the Federal Reserve Board promulgate regulations
offering guidance on the meaning of "clear and conspicuous" when used in certain provi·
sions of the federal Truth in Lending Act. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 1309(a). Ab-
sent a definition, courts are likely to refer to the definition of "conspicuous" in the
Uniform Commercial Code. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Bassett, 285 F.3d 882, 884-85 (9th
Cir. 2002) (applying Uniform Commercial Code definition for purposes of provisions in
the Bankruptcy Code governing the enforceability of reaffirmation agreements). That
definition provides that a term or clause is conspicuous when so written "that a reasona-
ble person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it" and gives as examples
printed headings in capitals and language in a body of a form that is in larger or other
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 329
guage in advertising could impose a burden in two ways. Holding
other advertising content and appearance constant, the additional
language could increase the cost of the advertising. Alternatively,
holding the cost of advertising constant, the additional language could
reduce the prominence of or displace other content, thus reducing the
competitive benefit of the advertisement to the advertiser. The Su-
preme Court's cryptic dictum in Ibanez implies that both cost and con-
tent are relevant.395 Reducing the prominence of or displacing
content would also reduce the amount of information available to con-
sumers. In Ibanez, the Court did not consider the impact on consum-
ers of less prominent or reduced information, but surely that also
should be relevant to a First Amendment analysis.
Attorneys advertise through a variety of media: on television, on
radio, in print, and on the Internet. The nature and degree of burden
on the attorney for each kind of media will differ. On television, the
required language could be supplied by a graphic displayed at the bot-
tom of the screen contemporaneously with the projection of images
and voice. It could thus be accomplished without lengthening the ad-
vertising spot or accelerating the presentation of images or voice. The
only additional cost, therefore, would be the cost of supplying the
graphic, relatively trivial in comparison to the cost of the advertising
spot. On radio, in contrast, the required language necessarily must be
spoken. The advertising spot must therefore be lengthened unless at
least some of the remaining message is either deleted or spoken more
quickly.
Adding the required language to print or Internet advertising
may consume more space and may be more costly unless the adver-
tisement either deletes other information or displays some other infor-
mation less conspicuously (such as by using smaller font or reducing
letters from upper to lower case). Consider advertising by a bank-
ruptcy attorney in the yellow pages of a telephone directory, perhaps
the most common form of bankruptcy attorney advertising. SBC's
Smart Yellow Pages, for example, offers four relevant types of adver-
tising, grouped by kind of business (e.g. "Attorneys - Bankruptcy
contrasting type or color. U.C.C. § 1-201(10). Whether a term or clause is conspicuous
is for decision by the court.
395. See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text. The Court's concern in that
case about the impact of a required disclosure on the use of a letterhead or business card
is probably not relevant to the disclosure required by the Act because the Act imposes
the disclosure requirement only on advertising directed to the general public. BAPCP
Act, supra note 320, § 229(a) (adding § 528 to the Bankruptcy Code). On the other
hand, a business card might be considered advertising directed to the general public if
an attorney routinely encloses a business card with a mailing directed to potential cli-
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330 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
Law"). In order of increasing size or prominence and cost they are
listings, in-column space ads, leader ads (in-column space ads that ap-
pear immediately below the heading for the relevant category of busi-
ness), and display ads.396 Listings typically provide only a name,
address, and telephone number. As such, they are probably not sub-
ject to the Act's disclosure requirement, although this is not entirely
free from doubt.397 The Act's mandate to disclose will apply, however,
to in-column space ads, leader ads, and display ads.39B
SBC prices in-column space ads, leader ads, and display ads
based on size, color, artwork, background, photographs, and other
variables, but not per word.399 Display ads are at least two columns
wide and one-quarter of the page in height.4oo Some consume an en-
tire page.401 There may be enough blank space in a full-page or half-
page display ad to permit the additional language with no change or
only minor changes in the remaining copy. Moreover, because SBC
does not price the ads based on the number of words, the additional
language also would not increase the cost of such an ad. They are
expensive,402 however, and display ads by consumer bankruptcy at-
396. These types of ads are described on the web site of SBC Smart Yellow Pages, at
http://www.sbcsmartyellowpages.com/pagesJproductsiproducts.sellow.htm#InCOL (last
visited Mar. 18, 2005).
397. The Act triggers the mandated disclosure if the advertisement indicates that
the attorney provides assistance with respect to credit defaults, mortgage foreclosures,
eviction proceedings, excessive debt, debt collection pressure, or inability to pay a con-
sumer debt. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 229(a) (adding § 528(b)(2) to the Bankruptcy
Code). Unless the attorney adds language to the listing beyond name, address, and
telephone number, this trigger will not apply. The Act also requires the mandated dis-
closure in any advertisement of "bankruptcy assistance services." [d. (adding
§ 528(b)(1)(A) to the Bankruptcy Code). "Bankruptcy assistance services" include "de-
scriptions of services that provide Chapter 13 relief whether or not the advertisement
mentions Chapter 13 statements that could lead a reasonable consumer to believe that
the attorney was offering debt counseling when in fact the attorney is only offering to
provide services under the Bankruptcy Code." [d. Because the definition of "bank-
ruptcy assistance services" uses the word "include," the simple listing of an attorney's
name, address, and telephone number in the yellow pages under a heading entitled
"Attorneys - Bankruptcy Law" could amount to advertising of bankruptcy assistance
services. In the Bankruptcy Code, the use of the word "includes" is not limiting. 11
U.S.C. § 102(3) (2000). If the disclosure requirement applies to listings, attorneys will
either have to choose the more expensive in-column space ad or eliminate the listing
entirely.
398. See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
399. Telephone Interview with SBC advertising sales representative (Mar. 17,
2005).
400. SBC Smart Yellow Pages for Santa Clara and San Jose, California, 132-134
(June 2004).
401. [d. at 128, 129.
402. Depending upon style, artwork, and other variables, SBC may charge in the
neighborhood of $4,000/month for a full page ad (discounted if bundled with Internet
advertising). Telephone Interview with SBC advertising sales representative (Mar. 17,
2005).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 331
torneys are therefore rare.403 A few consumer bankruptcy attorneys
may run large display ads as loss leaders, primarily to generate more
lucrative (e.g. Chapter 11) bankruptcy work,404 and a few large vol-
ume consumer bankruptcy law offices may use them to generate vol-
ume sufficient to justify the expense.
To accommodate the required language, conspicuously, in display
ads smaller than half a page, or in leader ads or in-column space ads,
the attorney almost invariably must either increase the size of the ad,
at increased cost,405 or omit other potentially valuable information,
such as the attorney's educational background, certification, experi-
ence, other practice areas, initial consultation fees, email address, web
site URL, languages spoken, availability of weekend or evening ap-
pointments, or the kinds of problems for which bankruptcy may offer
relief (e.g. foreclosure, repossession, garnishment, tax levies).406
Some attorneys using these smaller ads may not wish to pay the same
amount to convey less information and may not wish to pay more to
convey the same information together with the required language. If
so, they may stop advertising entirely. Ironically, therefore, the re-
quired disclosure may provide large volume law offices (already using
large display ads) an unintended, and for many lawmakers likely an
undesirable, competitive advantage.
With the barest of guidance from the Supreme Court, it is impos-
sible to predict whether the increased costs associated with advertis-
ing in particular media or the less measurable costs attributable to a
competitive disadvantage from shrunken or less informative advertis-
ing amounts to an "undue burden."407 In the meantime, a bankruptcy
403. Of seven display ads in the June 2004 edition of the SBC Smart Yellow Pages
for Santa Clara and San Jose, California, none are half or full page, two measure two
columns in width by half a page in height, one measures three columns in width by a
quarter page in height, and the remaining five measure two columns in width by a
quarter page in height. SBC Smart Yellow Pages for Santa Clara and San Jose, Califor-
nia, 132-34 (June 2004).
404. Interview with Santa Clara County bankruptcy attorney who runs a display ad
as a loss leader (Mar. 12, 2005).
405. Depending upon style, format, and other variables, SBC may charge $79-$148/
month for a one inch in-column space ad, $154-$3611month for a two inch in-column
space ad, and $339-$800/month for a four inch in-column space ad. Telephone Inter-
view with SBC advertising sales representative (Mar. 17, 2005).
406. One finds all of these kinds of information among the 25 display ads, leader
ads, and in-column space ads in the June 2004 SBC Smart Yellow Pages for Santa Clara
and San Jose, California. SBC Smart Yellow Pages for Santa Clara and San Jose, Cali-
fornia, 132-34 (June 2004).
407. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine (see supra note 350 and accompa-
nying text) does not apply in commercial speech cases. E.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 433 U.S. 350, 379-80 (1977). Thus, only an attorney who advertises or
contemplates advertising may bring the constitutional challenge, and if an attorney ad-
vertises or contemplates advertising only in specific media, a court might limit its hold-
ing only to the types of media and other particular circumstances involved.
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332 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
attorney defying the mandate risks civil liability (including for costs
and attorneys' fees) to assisted persons, avoidance of contracts with
assisted persons, and civil liability (including for costs and attorneys'
fees) in an action brought by the State on behalf of its residents.4oB
3. Disclosures and written contract
New section 527 of the Bankruptcy Code imposes new disclosure
requirements upon consumer bankruptcy attorneys and requires a
written contract between the attorney and an assisted person. The
disclosures are required of any debt relief agency "providing bank-
ruptcy assistance to an assisted person."409 "Bankruptcy assistance"
includes information, advice, or counsel, whether sold or otherwise
provided.410 Thus, an attorney must provide the disclosures to an as-
sisted person even if the assisted person, after getting the informa-
tion, advice, or counsel, decides not to retain the attorney to file a
petition or otherwise represent the client in a case under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
The attorney must provide to an assisted person the written no-
tice required from the clerk of the bankruptcy court under section
342(b)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code.411 That section requires the clerk
to give to individuals whose debts are primarily consumer debts a
written notice that contains a brief description of Chapters 7, 11, 12,
and 13, and the general purpose, benefits, and costs of proceeding
under each of those chapters, a brief description of the types of ser-
vices available from credit counseling agencies, and statements alert-
ing the individual of the consequences of knowing and fraudulent
concealment of assets or false oaths or statements under penalty of
peIjury in connection with a bankruptcy case and that information
supplied by an individual in connection with a case is subject to exam-
ination by the Attorney Genera1.412 The Bankruptcy Code previously
required the clerk to give a simpler notice that simply indicated each
chapter under which the individual debtor could proceed. That sim-
pler notice from the clerk was futile, and, except perhaps for the new
warnings, the elaborated notice from the clerk will be equally futile.
The only effective way for the clerk to comply is to give the notice to
the debtor (or more often to the debtor's agent who is about to file a
petition and schedules with the clerk) at the time of filing, a time obvi-
ously too late to educate the debtor or influence a decision about
408. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 227(a) (adding § 526(c) to the Bankruptcy Code).
409. [d. § 228(a) (adding § 527 to the Bankruptcy Code).
410. [d. § 226(a) (adding § 101(4A) to the Bankruptcy Code).
411. [d. § 228(a) (adding § 527(a)(1) to the Bankruptcy Code).
412. [d. § 104 (amending § 342(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code).
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whether or not to file a case or the chapter under which to file. 413 The
additional requirement that an attorney also give such notice might
mitigate the problem. The statute does not specify a time at which the
attorney must give the notice, which means that the attorney could
give the notice to the client at a time too late to influence a client's
decision. On the other hand, the attorney may (but need not) combine
this notice with other disclosures that are required within three busi-
ness days after the first date on which the attorney first offers to pro-
vide any bankruptcy assistance services to an assisted person.414
Giving this notice at the same time as those other required disclosures
will be more efficient and hence more likely. Even if given that early
in the counseling process, however, the notice may" carry little or no
impact. Many consumer debtors decide before visiting a consumer
bankruptcy attorney that they want bankruptcy relief and, of those,
many know what form of bankruptcy relief they want. Moreover,
some consumer bankruptcy attorneys will steer the undecided debtor
either to Chapter 7 or to Chapter 13 based upon the attorney's own
attitudes and the attorney's knowledge of prevailing practices of local
judges and trustees.415 The efficacy of written notice in the face of
personal interaction with an attorney is dubious.
In the same notice, or in a separate clear and conspicuous written
notice, the attorney must advise assisted persons that information to
be provided with a petition or thereafter in a case must be complete,
accurate, and truthful, that all assets and liabilities must be com-
pletely and accurately disclosed in documents filed to commence the
case, that certain asset values and information relevant to application
of the means test must be stated after reasonable inquiry, that cases
may be audited, and that failure to provide the required information
may result in dismissal or other sanction, including a criminal sanc-
413. The futility may long ago have been recognized, or the requirement forgotten,
by some bankruptcy clerks. On August 23, 2001, I called the clerk's office of bankruptcy
courts in San Francisco and San Jose. From my conversation with employees of both
offices, it appeared that neither office provided the required written notice at that time.
One employee told me that there were pamphlets available if someone asked. Another
referred me to the web site of the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia, but the web site did not contain the required notice and would in any event not
likely be visited by a consumer debtor. United States Bankruptcy Court for the North-
ern District of California, at http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/ (last visited June 30, 2005).
414. See infra text accompanying notes 416-17.
415. In part, these conclusions rest upon my observation of the interviewing and
counseling behavior of six consumer bankruptcy attorneys, and of the predisposition of
their clients, described in Neustadter, 35 BUFF. L. REV. at 199-228. Professor Braucher
reached the same conclusion about the behavior ofconsumer bankruptcy attorneys after
her study of the influence of local legal culture (attorney attitudes and local practices)
on consumer bankruptcy filing choices in Cincinnati and Dayton, Ohio, and in Austin
and San Antonio, Texas. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One
Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 580-81 (1993).
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334 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
tion.416 The attorney must provide this notice not later than three
business days after the first date on which a debt relief agency first
offers to provide any bankruptcy assistance services to an assisted
person.417 The first offer of bankruptcy assistance services surely
cannot be when a prospective assisted person first reads an advertise-
ment because the person advertising cannot know at that time to
whom the notice should be sent. The first offer is certainly no later
than when the attorney or the attorney's paralegal meets with a pro-
spective assisted person and then offers to provide services. The first
offer might well occur earlier, however, such as during a telephone
conversation in which the attorney or attorney's agent describes the
attorney's services and either sets up or offers to set up an appoint-
ment to meet with a prospective assisted person, thereby making an
offer to provide bankruptcy assistance at least in the form of informa-
tion. Thus, the attorney or attorney's agent must get an address for
immediate mailing of the disclosures because the attorney cannot rest
assured, even with an imminent appointment, that he or she will see
the prospective client within three business days of the telephone
conversation.
At the same time that the attorney furnishes the client the notice
required under section 342(b)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code, the attorney
also must provide an assisted person with another set of clear and
conspicuous disclosures in a single document separate from other doc-
uments or notices provided to an assisted person. These disclosures,
either taken verbatim from quoted language in the Act or adapted
from that language, advise assisted persons of the basic events and
procedures in a routine bankruptcy, advise them that they may re-
present themselves, hire an attorney, or obtain help from a bank-
ruptcy petition preparer, and advise them that they should ask to see
a contract before hiring anyone.418 The disclosures forewarn assisted
persons about the possibility of reaffirmation, suggest that they may
want help in preparing a Chapter 13 plan and in getting it confirmed,
suggest that they may want help from a specialist if they are going to
select bankruptcy relief other than under Chapter 7 or 13, and fore-
warn them about the possibility of litigation in bankruptcy court.419
Finally, and once again at the same time that the attorney fur-
nishes the client the notice required under section 342(b)(I) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the attorney must provide an assisted person with
disclosures that explain how to provide information required by sec-
416. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 228(a) (adding § 527(a)(2)(D) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
417. Id. (adding § 527(a)(2) to the Bankruptcy Code).
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tion 521 of the Bankruptcy Code, unless the attorney provides the in-
formation after reasonably diligent inquiry.42o The disclosures must
explain how to value assets at replacement value, how to determine
amounts required by the means test, how to complete the list of credi-
tors, and how to determine what property is exempt and how to value
exempt property at replacement value as defined in section 506 of the
Bankruptcy Code.421
The efficient attorney will provide all of the foregoing disclosures
at once, in two separate documents. One document will contain the
disclosures required to be in a single document separate from other
documents and notices, for which the attorney may simply duplicate
language of disclosure quoted in the statute. The second document
will contain the remaining disclosures, including the notice required
under section 342(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. The cautious attor-
ney should mail these disclosures to a prospective client immediately
after the prospective client's first contact with the attorney's office
(usually a telephone contact), whether or not the prospective client
schedules an appointment, or provide them during the initial consul-
tation of an unannounced walk-in client.
The attorney also must execute a written contract with an as-
sisted person that clearly and conspicuously explains the services to
be provided and the cost and terms of payment.422 The attorney and
assisted person must execute this written contract not later than five
business days after the first date on which the attorney provides bank-
ruptcy assistance services to the assisted person but prior to the filing
of a petition by the assisted person, and the attorney must furnish the
assisted person with a copy of the fully executed and completed con-
tract.423 To assure compliance, the attorney must avoid providing any
information, advice, or counseling about bankruptcy in telephone con-
versations with prospective clients prior to an initial consultation be-
cause the prospective client may not meet with the attorney, if at all,
until more than five days after such a conversation. This will severely
restrict the early and convenient flow of information from attorney to
prospective client, frustrate prospective clients, and waste the time of
both the attorney and prospective client for whom the telephone con-
versation might otherwise have been sufficient.
420. [d. (adding § 527(c) to the Bankruptcy Code). Unlike section 527(b), this sec-
tion does not specifically require the information be provided in a document separate
from other documents, but the requirement that the information be clear and conspicu-
ous suggests that it would be good practice to use a separate document.
421. [d.
422. [d. § 229(a) (adding § 528(a) to the Bankruptcy Code).
423. [d.
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336 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
The attorney must then require execution of the contract at the
time of the initial consultation because the client thereafter may not
return, if at all, within the five-day period. If, as is most likely, the
attorney uses a standard form of contract for all clients, the client's
promise in the contract must be conditional upon the client's subse-
quent choice to use the attorney's services because some clients will
not have made that choice by the conclusion of the initial appoint-
ment. The statutory language may even be read to require a contract
with a person who only takes advantage of a free initial consultation,
in which case the attorney again must require execution of the con-
tract at the time of the consultation, even if the client may never re-
turn, because the client might return for additional services after
expiration of the five-day period. It would of course not be surprising
if some prospective clients who are undecided at the end of an initial
appointment, whether free or otherwise, decline to sign a contract
even if the attorney explains the conditional nature of the prospective
client's promise.
The disclosure requirements and the written contract, each a
form of compelled speech, probably do not violate an attorney's First
Amendment rights.424 Moreover, they are not likely to add significant
cost to the process of representation. Consumer bankruptcy attorneys
can quickly and easily create the relevant forms, or obtain them from
customary sources, and they will integrate use of the documents into a
standard, repetitive routine for counseling a client.425
In theory, most of the disclosures will provide useful information
to a prospective client, and the written contract will help avoid unnec-
essary misunderstanding, especially because state law may not re-
quire execution of a written contract.426 Yet the timing, content, and
dynamic of the personal interaction between attorney and client often
will overshadow the disclosures.427 Moreover, like truth-in-lending
disclosures, real estate closing disclosures, and a host of other disclo-
sures mandated by consumer protection legislation, this additional
disclosure may overwhelm or confuse many consumer debtors with in-
424. Commenting on other regulatory schemes that require disclosure, Professors
Gunther and Sullivan comment, "Most of these regulatory requirements have never
been the subject of any serious First Amendment challenge." SULLIVAN & GUNTHER,
supra note 336, at 1386.
425. For a discussion of routines adopted by consumer bankruptcy attorneys in their
service to clients, see Neustadter, supra note 365, at 199-228.
426. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6148 (West 2003) (requiring written con-
tracts between attorney and client only if expenses, including attorney fees, will exceed
$1,000).
427. See supra note 415 and accompanying text.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 337
formation that they have an insufficient capacity to understand or
absorb.428
4. Sanctions of debt relief agencies
The Act affords a menu of sanctions for violation of the rules gov-
erning the behavior of debt relief agencies. Some of the sanctions
raise additional concerns.
Any contract between an attorney and an assisted person that
does not comply with the "material requirements" of sections 526, 527,
or 528 is void and unenforceable except by the assisted person.429 It
m:ust have been a late night for the drafter of that sanction. An attor-
ney's contract with the client cannot fail to comply with section 527
because that section doesn't state any requirements for such a con-
tract. More important, the Act gives no clue to determining which of
the requirements in sections 526 and 528 applicable to such contracts
are or are not material. Of less importance, but amusing, is the mis-
use of conventional vocabulary: a contract enforceable by one party
but not the other is voidable, not void.
The attorney's intentional or negligent violation of any provision
of sections 526, 527, or 528 also exposes the attorney to liability to the
assisted person in the form of disgorgement of fees and charges, actual
damages, and costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in seeking
those remedies.430 Although partly redundant to common law claims
for breach of contract or misrepresentation, the liability extends also
to failure of the attorney to make the new required disclosures or ad-
vertise properly and changes the American common law rule on recov-
ery of attorneys' fees. It also arises if a case is dismissed or converted
to another chapter as a result of the attorney's intentional or negligent
failure to file any required document,431 or if the attorney intention-
ally or negligently disregards the "material requirements of [the
Bankruptcy Code] or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ap-
plicable to such [debt relief] agency."432 Once again, the Act offers no
guidance about which of those requirements are or are not material
428. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN.
L. & POL'y REV. 233, 242, 260-61 (2002).
429. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 227(a) (adding § 526(c)(1) to the Bankruptcy
Code).
430. [d. § 526(c)(2).
431. [d. § 526(c)(2)(B).
432. [d. § 526(c)(2)(C). The language imposing this liability refers to "debt relief
agencies," a phrase that includes bankruptcy petition preparers. In its application to
bankruptcy petition preparers the language is superfluous because the Bankruptcy
Code already had imposed a stiffer sanction upon bankruptcy petition preparers for in-
tentional or negligent disregard of even non-material requirements of the Bankruptcy
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338 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
and hence no guidance on when the attorney will or will not be liable
for disregarding a material requirement.
For violations of section 526(a), the Act also authorizes a State to
sue on behalf of its residents to recover actual damages incurred by
assisted persons, together with the costs of suit and its own attorney's
fees.433 A State's allocation of limited law enforcement resources to
this purpose likely will be rare, but the rare case likely would involve
a law firm that represents a large number of consumer debtors annu-
ally and is thereby seriously exposed.
Federal district courts may enjoin violations of section 526(a) in
an action by the State,434 but a bankruptcy court may enjoin such vio-
lations, or impose "an appropriate civil penalty," on its own motion, or
on the motion of the United States trustee or the debtor, only ifit finds
that the attorney intentionally violated section 526(a) or engaged in a
clear and consistent pattern or practice of such violations.435 Drafters
of the Act probably intended to require the greater showing in bank-
ruptcy court only because of the authority conferred on the bank-
ruptcy court to impose a civil penalty and in so doing, probably
inadvertently, also required the greater showing for an injunction.
Injunctive relief poses a constitutional problem in one case. Re-
call that an attorney violates section 526(a) ifhe or she gives specified
kinds of advice.436 Injunctive relief against such advice may be an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech even if the speech prohibi-
tion itself does not violate the First Amendment. While not per se un-
constitutional, a content-based injunction against speech bears a
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.437 It will be constitutional
only if the attorney's advice would invariably be unprotected speech
and if the injunction is narrowly tailored.438
B. ATI'ORNEY DUE DILIGENCE OBLIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS FOR
ATI'ORNEY VIOLATIONS OF RULE 9011
The Act amends section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to impose
due diligence obligations on attorneys representing individual debtors
in Chapter 7 beyond those stated in Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of
433. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 227(a) (adding § 526(c) to the Bankruptcy Code).
In the action, the State may also recover "any liability under paragraph (2)," which
seems to be a reference to the liability imposed under section 526(c)(2) for disgorgement
of attorneys' fees and charges. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. See supra pp. 314-23.
437. E.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Near v.
Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 339
Bankruptcy Procedure ("Rule 9011"). Fqr delinquency in meeting
those obligations or in complying with Rule 9011, the amendments au-
thorize the bankruptcy court to impose specified sanctions.439 The Act
also expresses the sense of Congress that Rule 9011 be modified to
impose additional obligations upon bankruptcy attorneys (and upon
pro se debtors).44o These amendments articulate and attempt to in-
sure a heightened gate-keeping function for consumer bankruptcy at-
torneys. Combined with required pre-petition credit counseling,
means testing, and regulation of debt collection agencies, they appear
designed to further discourage or prevent "unwarranted" Chapter 7
filings by individual debtors.
To understand the meaning and evaluate the impact of these
amendments, it is useful to begin with a review of some history ofboth
Rule 9011 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule
11"). Rule 9011 derives from and in substantial measure replicates
Rule 11,441 and Rule 11 jurisprudence therefore informs interpreta-
tion of Rule 9011.442 Both rules require the attorney's signature on
certain documents filed with a federal court on behalf of a client, and
both rules attribute to the attorney's signature specified certifications
by the attorney to the court.443 Both rules authorize the court to sanc-
tion an attorney for inaccurate certifications.444 The original version
of Rule 11, adopted as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, attributed to an attorney's signature on a pleading a certifica-
tion that the pleading was not interposed for delay and that, to the
best of the attorney's knowledge, information, and belief, there was
439. Because the new obligations and sanctions are part of a bundle of amendments
to section 707, they presumably apply only in Chapter 7 cases, and because they are
part of a bundle of amendments to section 707(b), a section dealing with dismissal for
abuse of cases filed by individual debtors whose debts are primarily consumer debts,
they would appear to apply only to attorneys representing such debtors in connection
with a motion to dismiss for abuse. This is clearly true for sanctions identified in new
section 707(b)(4)(A), which refers explicitly and exclusively to sanctions against an at-
torney for a debtor in connection with a successful motion to dismiss for abuse under
section 707(b). BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(4) to the
Bankruptcy Code). It is also reasonably clear for the Rule 9011 sanction identified in
new section 707(b)(4)(B), which uses the same language ("attorney for the debtor") as
section 707(b)(4)(A) and appears to refer to the violation of Rule 9011 identified in sec-
tion 707(b)(4)(A). [d. The same conclusion is not as clear from the language of new
sections 707(b)(4)(C) and 707(b)(4)(D), which refer instead to "attorney" (not "attorney
for the debtor") and refer to certifications about pleadings, written motions, and sched-
ules without limitation to the context of a motion to dismiss for abuse. [d.
440. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 319. I discuss this invitation further infra pp.
344-45.
441. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 advisory committee's note (1997 Amendment).
442. See, e.g., Klein v. Wilson, 279 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2002).
443. FED. R. ClY. P. 11; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
444. FED. R. ClY. P. 11; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
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340 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
good ground to support the pleading.445 It authorized but did not re-
quire "appropriate disciplinary action" for willful violation of the
rule.446 Courts rarely imposed discipline, however, in part because of
uncertainty about the nature of appropriate discipline and in part be-
cause they read Rule 11 to require only an attorney's subjective deter-
mination that good grounds supported a pleading.447
In response to perception that Rule 11 was not effective in deter-
ring abuses, amendments to Rule 11 in 1983 sharpened its bite.448
Among the changes, an attorney's signature thereafter represented
"that to the best of the [signer's] knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it [a pleading, motion, or other paper]
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law ...."449 The italicized language made clear that an attorney's
honesty in presenting a document was not sufficient.45o Nonetheless,
the Advisory Committee notes to the 1983 amendments, and subse-
quent case law, suggested that the reasonableness of an inquiry might
depend upon the amount of time available for investigation, the need
to rely on the client for information, the complexity of the factual is-
sues, or the need for additional discovery.451 The 1983 amendments
to Rule 11 also replaced a court's discretion to impose "disciplinary
action" with a mandate to impose an "appropriate sanction" for viola-
tion of the rule, including an order to reimburse the opposing party for
reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by virtue of
the violation.452 Rule 9011, which first became effective at the same
time as the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, carried identical
language.453
Further amendment to Rule 11 in 1993, which has since remained
unchanged, retracted the mandate to impose sanctions for violation of
the rule and limited the nature of sanctions to those sufficient to deter
improper conduct: directives of a non-monetary nature, payment of a
penalty into court, or, only if warranted for effective deterrence, reim-
445. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO.
CEDURE § 1331, at 9, 11 (Civil 2d ed. 1990).
446. [d. § 1331, at 9; id. § 1336, at 99.
447. [d. § 1331, at 10-12; id. § 1335, at 58-59.
448. [d. § 1331, at 21-22.
449. 97 F.RD. 165, 167 (Apr. 25, 1983) (emphasis added).
450. Fed. R Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983 Amendment); WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 445, § 1335, at 58-64.
451. Fed. R Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983 Amendment); Thomas v.
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1988).
452. 97 F.RD. 165, 167 (Apr. 25, 1983); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 445, § 1336,
at 99-100.
453. 97 F.RD. 57, 149 (Apr. 25, 1983) (Rule 9011 effective Aug. 1, 1983); 97 F.RD.
165, 167 (Apr. 25, 1983) (Rule 11, effective Aug. 1, 1983).
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bursement to the movant of reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
fees, incurred as a direct result of the violation.454 The 1993 amend-
ments left unchanged the attorney's duty to conduct a reasonable in-
quiry,455 but modified the substance of an attorney's certifications to
the court. The attorney no longer certifies that a pleading, motion, or
other paper is "well grounded in fact." Instead, among other things,
the attorney certifies that allegations or other factual contentions in a
pleading, motion, or other paper "have evidentiary support or, if spe-
cifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery ...."456
Rule 9011 was amended in 1997 to conform to the 1993 changes to
Rule 11.457
Two developments in 1995 enhance our understanding of the
evolution of Rules 11 and 9011. In 1995, House Bill 988 would have
restored mandatory sanctions for Rule 11 violations and would have
provided that sanctions suffice to compensate the parties injured by
the violation as well as deter future violations.458 The bill passed the
House459 but died in the Senate. However, in response to a perceived
"proliferation of frivolous private securities fraud suits,"460 Congress
in the same session altered application of Rule 11 in private securities
litigation as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.461 That Act requires court findings on compliance with Rule
l1(b) (the subsection in which an attorney's certifications are listed)
upon final adjudication in any private action arising under either the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.462 It
then mandates Rule 11 sanctions upon any attorney found to have
violated Rule 11 and establishes a rebuttable presumption that the
appropriate sanction for failure of any responsive pleading or disposi-
tive motion to comply with Rule l1(b) is an award of attorneys' fees
and expenses incurred by the opposing party as a direct result of the
violation and, for substantial failure of any complaint to comply with
Rule l1(b), an award of all attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in
the action by the opposing party.463
454. 146 F.R.D. 401, 421-23; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993
Amendment).
455. 146 F.R.D. 401, 420; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993
Amendment).
456. 146 F.R.D. 401, 421.
457. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 advisory committee's note (1997 Amendment).
458. H.R. 988, 104th Congo § 4 (1995).
459. 141 CONGo REC. H2749 (1995).
460. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 445, § 1338.5, at 157 (Supp. 2004).
461. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000)).
462. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l{c) (2000).
463. [d.
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342 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
Action by a conference committee in the 107th Congress com-
pletes the picture drawn by this abbreviated historical foray. In that
Congress, both H.R. 333 and S. 420 (versions of bankruptcy reform
preceding the Act) had required a bankruptcy court to sanction a
debtor's attorney with a civil penalty, payable to the trustee or United
States trustee, in the event of a Rule 9011 violation.464 Those bills
also had required the court to order a debtor's attorney to reimburse a
panel trustee for all reasonable costs incurred by such trustee in pros-
ecuting a motion filed under section 707(b) (dismissal for abuse, in-
cluding abuse presumed by virtue of means testing) if the court both
granted the motion and found that the attorney's action in filing a
Chapter 7 petition violated Rule 9011.465 The Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995 provided ample precedent for these man-
dates. But in the face of significant opposition, including from the
American Bar Association,466 the Conference Report on H.R. 333 re-
ceded from mandated sanctions in favor of discretionary sanctions,467
a change preserved in the Act.468
With that historical background as context, we now may explore
new section 707(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, which encompasses
four subsections articulating the new attorney obligations and attend-
ant sanctions, and section 319 of the Act, which invites modification of
Rule 9011 but does not amend the Bankruptcy Code. I first discuss
the new sanctions for violation of Rule 9011, then discuss the invita-
tion to amend Rule 9011, and close by discussing the new attorney
obligations.
1. Civil penalty and reimbursement of attorneys' fees
New section 707(b)(4)(B) authorizes the court to assess a civil pen-
alty against the debtor's attorney for a violation of Rule 9011, payable
to a panel trustee or to the United States trustee.469 New section
464. H.R. 333, 107th Congo § 102(a) (2001); S. 420, 107th Congo § 102(a) (2001).
465. H.R. 333, 107th Congo § 102(a) (2001); S. 420, 107th Congo § 102(a) (2001).
466. Letter from Harold S. Barron, Chair-Elect, ABA Section of Business Law, to
House and Senate Conferees on H.R. 333 (Apr. 22, 2002), available at http://www.
abanet.org/poladvnettersl107thlbankruptcy042202.html, and letter from Robert D. Ev-
ans, Director, ABA Governmental Affairs Office, to Honorable Patrick Leahy (Aug. 30,
2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladvnettersl107thlbankruptcy083001.html.
467. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-617, at 8, 186 (2002) (replacing "the court ... shall"
with "the court ... may" in those portions of § 102(a) of the bill adding § 707(b)(4)(A)
and § 707(b)(4)(B) to the Bankruptcy Code).
468. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(4) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code). In contrast, note a renewed congressional effort to mandate sanctions for
violation of Rule 11 (but not Rule 9011). Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R.
420, 109th Congo §§ 2, 3 (2005).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 343
707(b)(4)(A) authorizes the court to order the debtor's attorney to re-
imburse a panel trustee for all reasonable costs, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, in prosecuting a motion for dismissal or conversion
under section 707(b) (for abuse) if, in addition to finding a Rule 9011
violation, the court grants the motion.47o
Rule 9011 already authorizes the court to order an attorney to pay
a penalty into court for violation of Rule 9011.471 In authorizing a
penalty payable to the United States trustee or panel trustee, the Act
does not amend Rule 9011 per se. Rather than leaving amendment of
Rule 9011 to the typical process,472 it legislates what appears to be an
additional sanction. Accordingly, a court could conceivably order pay-
ment of a penalty into court for violation of Rule 9011 and payment of
a separate penalty to a United States trustee or panel trustee. It
seems more reasonable, however, to construe this new civil penalty
provision as, in effect, an amendment to Rule 9011, such that the
court may order a penalty payable only to a United States trustee or
panel trustee when an attorney has violated Rule 9011. So construed,
this amendment to section 707 would only slightly alter existing law
by changing the identity of the payee of the penalty. That change
alone, therefore, should not deter attorneys from practicing consumer
bankruptcy law or increase the cost of consumer bankruptcy
representation.
Rule 9011 also already authorizes a court to order an attorney
violating the rule to reimburse some or all of a moving party's reason-
able attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of a
Rule 9011 violation, but only if warranted for effective deterrence.473
Authorization in the Act for an order to reimburse a panel trustee is
470. [d.
471. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (emphasis added).
472. Under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000), and an act estab-
lishing the Judicial Conference of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000), changes to
rules of procedure in federal courts normally emanate from an Advisory Committee of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, are reviewed, after public comment, by the
Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and by the Judicial
Conference, and are then transmitted to the Supreme Court ofthe United States. If the
Court decides to prescribe the rules, it must transmit them to Congress not later than
May 1 of the year in which they are to take effect. Absent congressional action, the
rules become effective on December 1 of the same year. The process is more fully de-
scribed on the web site of the Administrative Office of United States Courts, at http://
www.uscourts.gov/ruleslproceduresum.htm (last visited July 5, 2005). However, as we
have seen, Congress has acted more directly by altering application ofRule 11 in private
securities litigation, see supra p. 341, and it also continues to consider legislation that
would restore mandatory sanctions for Rule 11 violations in all actions. See supra note
468. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the congressional power to pre-
scribe federal court rules of practice and procedure in Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S.
131, 136-37 (1992).
473. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
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344 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
not so constrained if the court also grants the trustee's motion to dis-
miss under section 707(b). But this change also may little affect the
practice of consumer bankruptcy law. At most it would affect a con-
sumer bankruptcy attorney's calculus of risk only in the small number
of consumer bankruptcy cases for which the trustee has standing to
bring and is likely to bring a motion to dismiss under section
707(b).474 Even in those cases, the calculus of risk cannot be complete
until consumer bankruptcy attorneys learn the predilection of particu-
lar judges for granting section 707(b) motions under the new stan-
dards of the Act, their predilection to find an accompanying Rule 9011
violation, and their predilection to exercise their discretion to issue
reimbursement orders unconstrained by the existing Rule 9011 re-
quirement that such orders be warranted for effective deterrence. In
practice, therefore, even this change may do little either to deter attor-
neys from consumer bankruptcy practice or to increase the cost of con-
sumer bankruptcy representation.
2. Invitation to amend Rule 9011
The Act also invites the Judicial Conference of the United States
to propose modifications to Rule 9011.475 Under Rule 9011, an attor-
ney of record need not sign bankruptcy schedules or a "statement."476
As a consequence, under Rule 9011(b), the attorney makes no certifi-
cations concerning the schedules or Statement of Affairs filed on be-
half of a debtor and cannot be sanctioned if they are inaccurate. The
Act invites modification of Rule 9011 to require that an attorney of
record conduct "a reasonable inquiry to verify" that the information in
the schedules and the Statement of Affairs (even though still signed
only by a debtor) is "well grounded in fact" before the debtor submits
those documents to the court or to a trustee.477 With respect to the
schedules, that inquiry might involve, for example, the review of pay
stubs and other evidence of income, discussion of monthly expenses
and review of related documents, and some effort to establish or verifY
values ascribed by debtors to assets, including having someone view
and appraise the debtor's real and personal property. With respect to
the Statement of Affairs, that inquiry might involve, for example, re-
view of evidence of payments to creditors, gifts, and other transfers,
review oflegal proceedings against the debtor, and review of the value
of property subject to foreclosure or repossession. An attorney's legal
assistant could perform much of this inquiry, and an appraiser could
474. See supra notes 197, 269 and accompanying text.
475. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 319.
476. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 advisory committee's note.
477. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 319.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 345
value assets, but the additional time and expense required would in-
crease an attorney's costs of doing business. Because profit margins
are small in the highly competitive practice of consumer bankruptcy,
the cost of hiring an expert and some or all of the other additional
costs would likely be reflected in an increased price of bankruptcy le-
gal services.
3. Attorney certification of inquiry about schedules
Unless the Judicial Conference of the United States proposes and
the Supreme Court ofthe United States prescribes the congressionally
requested modification to Rule 9011, however, the Act leaves us with
the following stripped-down version, in new section 707(b)(4)(D) of the
Bankruptcy Code:
The signature of an attorney on the petition shall constitute a
certification that the attorney has no knowledge after an in-
quiry that the information in the schedules filed with such
petition is incorrect.478
Like the civil penalty provision of the Act previously discussed,
this provision does not purport to amend Rule 9011 per se. Clearly,
however, it should be read together with Rule 9011 because Rule 9011
requires an attorney of record to sign the petition, attributes other
certifications to such a signature, and sanctions an incorrect
certification.479
Section 707(b)(4)(D) is unlikely to increase the attorney's cost of
doing business or risk of sanction. It does not require an attorney to
investigate the accuracy of information contained in the schedules,
does not require a "reasonable" inquiry about the accuracy of the infor-
mation, and does not state that the attorney's signature on the peti-
tion certifies the accuracy of that information. Instead, the section
requires only that the attorney inquire about the accuracy of the infor-
mation, something the attorney can do simply by asking the client if
the information is accurate. Unless the client states or implies that
some of the information is inaccurate, the attorney does not know af-
ter inquiry that the information is inaccurate. The attorney's signa-
ture on the petition cannot therefore lead to a sanction if any of the
information in the schedules proves inaccurate. Attorneys routinely
make this inquiry already, and the additional cost of documenting the
inquiry and the client's response will be de minimus. If the section is
so read, its effect on consumer bankruptcy practice is likely to be
negligible.
478. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(4) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code).


























fi i . ,
­
i , t   











 . ANKR . .
HeinOnline -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 346 2005-2006
    
  
            
          
          
         
       
 
     
            
         
          
 
          
           
         
            
              
         
          
          
          
           
            
  
 
        
         
         
 
 
           
 
       
            
           
          
           
         
           
 
 
            
            
             
          
           
  
        
              
 
             
         
          
         
346 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
There is good reason to read the section this narrowly. This new
duty to "inquire" about the correctness of information in schedules
stands in marked contrast to more far-reaching language in Rule
9011(b) that requires "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" as
to other matters, but not as to schedules.48o It also stands in contrast
to the invited modification of Rule 9011 that would, if adopted, require
"reasonable inquiry to verify" that information contained in the
debtor's schedules and Statement of Affairs is well grounded in
fact.481
The legislative history of the evolution of amendments to section
707(b) also supports this narrow reading. Bills in the 105th Congress
introduced new attorney duties and sanctions. H.R. 3150 provided,
among other things, that the signature of an attorney on any petition,
pleading, motion, or other paper filed with the court in the case of a
debtor would constitute a certification that the attorney had per-
formed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances giving rise to
the petition, schedules, and statement of financial affairs or the plead-
ing, as applicable, and had determined that the petition, schedules,
and statement of financial affairs, including the choice of Chapter 7,
were well grounded in fact and did not constitute an inappropriate use
of Chapter 7.482 S. 1301 would have applied the certification of rea-
sonable investigation and certification of determination only to the pe-
tition, not to the schedules or statement of financial affairs.483 The
Conference Report reconciling the two bills adopted the language of S.
1301.484 Bankruptcy reform legislation in the 106th Congress fol-
lowed a similar path on these issues. H.R. 833 provided, among other
things, that the signature of an attorney on the petition would consti-
tute a certification that the attorney has performed a reasonable in-
vestigation into the circumstances giving rise to the petition and has
determined that the petition and supporting lists, schedules, and docu-
ments are well grounded in fact and do not constitute an abuse.485 S.
625 mimicked the more limited language of S. 1301 from the 105th
Congress, but introduced the language that we now see in section 319
of the Act inviting an amendment of Rule 9011 that would require a
reasonable inquiry to verify that the schedules and Statement of M-
fairs are well grounded in fact.486 The Conference Report on the com-
480. Id.
481. See supra note 477 and accompanying text.
482. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Congo § 103 (1998) (emphasis
added).
483. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, S. 1301, 105th Congo § 102(a) (1998).
484. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794 § 102(a) (1998).
485. H.R. 833, 106th Congo § 102(a) (1999) (emphasis added).
486. S. 625, 106th Congo §§ 102(a), 319 (1999).
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 347
peting bills provided that the attorney's signature on a petition,
pleading, or written motion constituted a certification of a reasonable
investigation into the circumstances giving rise to the petition, plead-
ing, or written motion and a determination that the pleading, petition,
or written motion (but not the schedules) is well grounded in fact and
do not constitute an abuse.487 It also added a new and separate provi-
sion (which we now see in section 707(b)(4)(D) of the Act) stating that
the attorney's signature on a petition constitutes a certification that
the attorney has no knowledge after inquiry that the information in
the schedules is incorrect.488 It also included language from the Sen-
ate bill inviting modification of Rule 9011.489
Thus, the Conference Reports in both the 105th and the 106th
Congresses receded from house bills carrying broader attorney certifi-
cations about the accuracy of information in the schedules. In their
place, the Conference Report in the 106th Congress substituted a cer-
tification of lack of knowledge after inquiry that the schedules are in-
correct and invited, but did not adopt, an amendment of Rule 9011 to
impose the more rigorous duty of reasonable inquiry to verify that the
schedules and Statement ofAffairs are well grounded in fact. The Act
replicates the language of that Conference Report on these issues,
thus strongly suggesting the more narrow duty that I have described.
The invited modification to Rule 9011, not section 707(b)(4)(D), is the
bogeyman.
4. Attorney certification of reasonable investigation and
determination
I have suggested that provisions in new section 707(b)(4)(A), (B),
and (D) do not significantly enhance the extent or risk of attorney
sanctions and therefore may not significantly impact consumer bank-
ruptcy law practice. It is more difficult to predict the impact of new
section 707(b)(4)(C), which reads in full as follows:
The signature of an attorney on a petition, pleading, or writ-
ten motion shall constitute a certification that the attorney
has-
(i) performed a reasonable investigation into the circum-
stances that gave rise to the petition, pleading, or written mo-
tion; and
(ii) determined that the petition, pleading, or written mo-
tion-
487. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-970 § 102(a) (2000).
488. [d. I leave for another day discussion of the problem that this section and sec-
tion 707(b)(4)(C) pose for emergency petitions filed without accompanying schedules
pursuant to the authority of FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c).
489. [d. § 319.
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348 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
(I) is well grounded in fact; and
(II) is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and
does not constitute an abuse under [amended section 707(b)]
paragraph (1).490
Like amendments earlier discussed, this amendment does not modify
Rule 9011 per se and does not articulate sanctions for inaccurate certi-
fications. However, it clearly rides the back of Rule 9011, which re-
quires an attorney of record to sign a petition, attributes other
certifications to the filing of a signed petition, and sanctions inaccu-
rate certifications. Accordingly, Rule 9011 almost certainly will be
read as authorizing a court to impose sanctions in cases in which the
additional certifications specified in this amendment prove to be
inaccurate.
The amendment speaks to an attorney's obligations concerning a
petition, pleading, or written motion. In this Article, however, I focus
only on that portion of the amendment addressing certifications con-
cerning the petition.491 Consider first the attorney's certification that
he or she has determined that the petition "is well grounded in fact," a
certification that seems to go beyond the existing Rule 901l(b) certifi-
cation that allegations and factual contentions in a petition have evi-
dentiary support or are likely to have such support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.492 A voluntary pe-
tition filed by an individual whose debts are primarily consumer debts
states only a few facts: the debtor's name(s) and street and mailing
address, digits from the debtor's social security number or EIN or
other tax identification number, information relevant to determina-
tion of venue, the debtor's status as an individual, and the consumer
nature of the debtor's debts.493 It also must identify any prior bank-
ruptcy filed by the debtor within the preceding eight years, any pend-
490. BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 102(a)(2)(C) (adding § 707(b)(4) to the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
491. When an attorney signs a pleading or written motion, new section 707(b)(4)(C)
heightens the attorney's obligations beyond the obligations imposed by Rule 9011: rea-
sonable investigation rather than inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, allega-
tions and contentions well-grounded in fact rather than having evidentiary support, and
claims and legal contentions warranted by a good faith argument rather than a nonfriv-
olous argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Compare
BAPCP Act, supra note 320, § 102(a)(2)(C), with FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. Some con-
sumer bankruptcy attorneys might therefore be more reluctant to handle matters re-
quiring a pleading or written motion (e.g. dischargeability of a debt or avoidance of a
lien), or charge more for representation in such matters. Those matters do not arise in
the run-of-the-mill consumer bankruptcy case, however, and thus the heightened obli-
gations with respect to pleadings and written motions should not similarly affect repre-
sentation in most consumer bankruptcy cases.
492. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
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2006] 2005: A CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ODYSSEY 349
ing bankruptcy case filed by the debtor's spouse, partner, or affiliate,
and any property that the debtor owns or possesses that poses or is
alleged to pose a threat of imminent and identifiable harm to public
health or safety.494 Under Rule 9011(b)(3), the attorney may truth-
fully certify that these facts asserted in the petition have "evidentiary
support" if the debtor tells the attorney that the facts are true and it is
reasonable under the circumstances for the attorney to rely on the
debtor's assertion.495 Section 707(b)(4)(C), requiring that the petition
be "well grounded in fact," appears to require in addition that the at-
torney seek reasonable additional verification of at least some of the
facts, such as by looking at bills to verify name and address of the
debtor and the consumer nature of debts, looking at a social security
card or other document bearing the debtor's social security number,
and undertaking a PACER search to determine whether the debtor
has filed a bankruptcy case within the preceding eight years.
A petition also estimates the number of creditors, the value of as-
sets, the amount of debts, and whether funds will be available for dis-
tribution to unsecured creditors. These estimates are based on facts
stated in the schedules. As I have argued, the attorney's certification
of the accuracy of facts stated in the schedules can be read narrowly to
require only an inquiry of the client, not something more, such as the
verification of the value of assets identified in the schedules. It would
be inconsistent with that argument to expect a certification about esti-
mates in the petition, based on facts stated in the schedules, to rest on
anything more. Thus, to certify that a petition is well grounded in fact
adds little burden of consequence beyond existing attorney
obligations.
Consider next the attorney's certification that he or she has deter-
mined that the petition "does not constitute an abuse [under section
707(b)(1)]." This required certification is perplexing because ulti-
mately only a judge can make that determination. At best, an attor-
ney only can be expected to reach an honest and reasonable legal
494. Id.
495. See O'Brien v. Alexander, 101 F.3d 1479,1488-89 (2d Cir. 1996) (sanctions may
not be imposed unless a particular allegation is utterly lacking in support). As to some
facts stated in the petition, reliance exclusively on the debtor's statements might be per
se unreasonable. See In re Oliver, 323 B.R. 769 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2005) (sanctioning
debtor's attorney for violation of Rule 9011(b)(1) by relying exclusively on debtor's fail-
ure to disclose prior Chapter 13 filings when simple and inexpensive check of bank-
ruptcy court records, such as through PACER, would have revealed debtor's serial
Chapter 13 filings, an injunction against yet another bankruptcy filing, and hence an
improper purpose for the filing). The same also may be true as to some facts asserted in
other contexts. See In re Melendez, 235 B.R. 173 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (striking attor-
neys' declarations in support of reaffirmation agreements for lack of sufficient inquiry
concerning facts supporting attorneys' conclusions that reaffirmation would not impose
undue hardship upon debtor).
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judgment that a court likely would not presume abuse if the debtor's
putative annual income triggers the means test, or that, based on spe-
cial circumstances, a court would decline to find abuse notwithstand-
ing a presumption of abuse, and that, irrespective of the means test, a
court would not find abuse based on either on a finding of a debtor's
bad faith or the totality of circumstances of the debtor's financial situ-
ation.496 So interpreted, this certification requirement essentially
would be identical to the subjective good faith standard applied to the
pre-1983 Rule 11 certification that to the best of the attorney's knowl-
edge, information, and belief there was good ground to support a
pleading. The risk of sanctions for an inaccurate certification that a
petition does not constitute an abuse, like the prospect of sanctions
under the pre-1983 version of Rule 11, would be remote.497
It is unclear, however, whether the attorney's determination that
a petition is well grounded in fact and does not constitute an abuse is
independent of or linked to the additional requirement in section
707(b)(4)(C) that an attorney perform a reasonable investigation into
the circumstances giving rise to the petition. Resolution of the ambi-
guity in the section on that question is critical to assessment of its
impact upon consumer bankruptcy practice.
The first clause of the section requires reasonable investigation
into the circumstances giving rise to the petition. The second clause
requires the attorney's determination that the petition is well
grounded in fact and does not constitute an abuse. The two duties
might be separate and unrelated, for a couple of reasons. First, one
may read "circumstances that gave rise to the petition" as meaning job
loss or interruption, uninsured medical expense, death or divorce in
the family, excessive use of credit cards, or other events or behaviors
generating the debtor's financial distress. Those circumstances would
indicate why the debtor is filing a petition; they do not relate in any
way to the attorney's determination under the second clause. The at-
torney's burden to reasonably investigate such circumstances might
be satisfied by a review of a few documents that confirm a client's
story. Second, the syntax of section 707(b)(4)C) contrasts with that of
Rule 9011(b). Rule 9011(b) explicitly links all of an attorney's certifi-
cations under that rule to knowledge, information, and belief formed
after "an inquiry reasonable in the circumstances."498 It does this by
identifying all of the certifications in a numbered list that follows the
language concerning reasonable inquiry.499 In contrast, the language
496. See supra Part II.
497. See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
498. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
499. [d.
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of section 707(b)(4)(C) lists two certifications, separated by a semi-co-
lon, only the first of which expressly requires that the certification be
based upon "reasonable investigation." Finally, the Act's invitation to
modify Rule 9011 such that an attorney be required to conduct a rea-
sonable inquiry to verify that the information in the schedules and the
Statement of Affairs is well grounded in fact suggests that section
707(b)(4)(C) requires a lesser inquiry. If Rule 9011 were modified in
the manner that Congress invites, then and perhaps only then would
an attorney's determination that a petition is well grounded in fact
and does not constitute an abuse have to rest in part upon the attor-
ney's reasonable inquiry concerning the accuracy of critical facts in
the schedules - - the debtor's income, expenses, and debt - - from which
claims of abuse could be defeated.
On the other hand, this suggested reading of section 707(b)(4)(C)
is in one sense strained. Were we to read "circumstances that gave
rise to the petition" as referring to reasons that explain the debtor's
financial distress and decision to file a Chapter 7 petition, the lan-
guage of the section would require an inquiry serving no relevant
function because the Bankruptcy Code requires neither a reason for
filing a Chapter 7 petition nor an explanation of a reason for the filing.
If not so construed, and if not linked to the second clause, the first
clause would require that an attorney reasonably investigate circum-
stances giving rise to the petition for some other unidentified reason.
Accordingly, the language of the section could be construed to require
that the attorney's determination that a petition is well grounded in
fact and does not constitute an abuse be based upon a reasonable in-
vestigation of the circumstances giving rise to the petition, in which
case "circumstances" would refer to the debtor's income, expenses, and
debt rather than to the underlying cause or causes of the debtor's fi-
nancial distress. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the
linkage expressed differently and more precisely in Rule 9011 between
reasonable inquiry and the attorney's resulting certifications. If we
read the section as linking the two clauses, the new duty imposed by
the section may significantly increase an attorney's costs of preparing
a case,500 especially because a reasonable "investigation" suggests a
responsibility beyond the reasonable "inquiry" that is a predicate for
500. Based on information provided by the American Bar Association, the Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated an increase in attorney costs of between $150 and $500
per consumer Chapter 7 case on account of a reasonable investigation of a debtor's fi-
nancial affairs and computing debtor eligibility for Chapter 7. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, S. 256 BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION ACT OF 2005, 14 (2005), available at http://www.cbo_gov/ftpdocs/62xx1doc6266/
s256hjud.pdf. The American Bar Association appears to have furnished much more
conservative figures to the Congressional Budget Office than it claimed in its fact sheet
for public dissemination. See supra note 319.
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existing Rule 9011 certifications, as well as increase the burden on the
debtor to obtain and produce for the attorney copies of relevant
documents.
Reasonable investigation leading to a determination that a peti-
tion does not constitute an abuse might require, for example, that the
client provide and the attorney review copies of all paychecks and
other evidence of income for the six-month period preceding the filing
of a petition to determine whether the debtor's putative annual in-
come will trigger the means test.50! If the debtor's putative annual
income triggers the means test, reasonable investigation might fur-
ther require that the client provide and the attorney review documen-
tary evidence of all of the debtor's monthly expenses, secured debt,
and priority unsecured debt to determine the debtor's putative dispos-
able income,502 and that the attorney review documentary evidence of
all of the debtor's unsecured debt to determine the percentage of un-
secured debt that could be retired over a five-year period from the
debtor's putative disposable income.503 If application of the means
test triggers the presumption of abuse, reasonable investigation would
then require review of documents and possibly other investigation
that would demonstrate special circumstances rebutting the presump-
tion of abuse.504
In most cases, the debtor's putative annual income will not trigger
the means test.505 Accordingly, if we assume for such cases the inter-
pretation of a debtor's reporting requirements advanced in proposed
interim bankruptcy rules,506 reasonable investigation need not extend
beyond an investigation of income unless the attorney is concerned
about other circumstances that might trigger a motion to dismiss for
abuse based on the debtor's bad faith or the totality of circumstances
of the debtor's financial situation. As a result, we may see tiered at-
torney fees, with a significantly higher fee charged only to clients
whose putative annual income triggers, or comes close to triggering,
the means test and to clients whose financial situation or other cir-
cumstances suggest the possibility of abuse apart from the means test.
501. See supra pp. 276-83.
502. See supra pp. 284-300.
503. See supra pp. 284-85. The attorney might satisfy the duty of reasonable inves-
tigation of the debtor's debt by ordering and downloading into bankruptcy petition
software a report from services that merge data from the three major credit reporting
agencies (Equifax, TransUnion, and Experian), even though data reported by those
agencies may be incomplete, inaccurate, or out of date. One such service, Online Credit
Reporting, charges $34.95 for a report combining data from all three credit reporting
agencies. http://www.onlinecreditreporting.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
504. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
505. See supra note 269.
506. See supra pp. 302-03.
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An attorney might charge an even higher fee in cases when applica-
tion of the means test generates a presumption of abuse and the attor-
ney must demonstrate special circumstances to rebut the
presumption. Alternatively, some attorneys may decline to represent
clients facing a presumption of abuse, unwilling even for a higher fee
to face the risk of sanctions. The possibility of significantly increased
fees, or more limited access to legal representation, is thus greatest for
debtors whose financial circumstances will generate a presumption of
abuse, and this consequence is most unsavory for those among them
whose circumstances might overcome the presumption of abuse.
To briefly review, new section 707(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code
exposes the debtor's attorney to the possibility of a civil penalty for a
Rule 9011 violation and to the possibility of an order to reimburse
costs and attorneys' fees if the attorney's Rule 9011 violation accompa-
nies a trustee's successful motion to dismiss for abuse, but the in-
creased exposure beyond current Rule 9011 exposure is minimal. The
section attributes to an attorney's signature on a petition a certifica-
tion that the attorney has no knowledge after inquiry that information
in the schedules filed with the petition is incorrect, but the required
inquiry falls short of a requirement to make a reasonable inquiry that
the information in the schedules is well grounded in fact, a require-
ment that hovers menacingly in a congressional invitation to amend
Rule 9011. Finally, the section attributes to an attorney's signature
on a petition a certification that the attorney has conducted a reasona-
ble investigation into the circumstances giving rise to the petition and
has determined that the petition is well grounded in fact and does not
constitute an abuse. One reading of that section imposes little addi-
tional burden on an attorney, requiring an investigation only of the
reasons why a debtor is filing a petition, a verification only of the lim-
ited number offactual assertions contained in the petition itself, and a
good faith legal judgment predicting a court's ruling on a motion to
dismiss for abuse. An alternative reading of that section imposes
greater burdens, but they may be significant only in the relatively
small number of cases in which a debtor's putative annual income
triggers the means test or the debtor's financial situation or other cir-
cumstances suggests the possibility of abuse outside the means test.
Additional attorney obligations under new section 707(b)(4) may con-
tribute to some increase in attorney fees for Chapter 7 consumer
debtor representation and somewhat reduce pro bono representation,
and it may unfairly increase fees or limit access to representation for
some debtors whose circumstances would rebut a presumption of
abuse, but dire predictions that it will lead to a mass exodus of attor-
neys from the consumer bankruptcy bar, or cause massive increases in




i . l i
  ,  
 .  fi a
, i ,








 .  
i      fi ­
rn kn ft
fi




   fi   ­
stit  . ­
   
fi fi ­




   
fi t ­






    ­
fr  r   
HeinOnline -- 39 Creighton L. Rev. 354 2005-2006
    
  
          
  
 
            
            
    
           
   
 
          
            
        
        
         
       
           
       
           
          
          
            
           
        
          
     
           
           
           
           
           
           
          
             
          
           
           
         
       
          
          
        
       
  
354 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
fees that leave most debtors unable to afford legal representation,507
seem hyperbolic.
CONCLUSION
"Look Dave, I can see you're really upset about this. I honestly
think you ought to sit down calmly, take a stress pill, and
think things over." HAL508
The closing scenes of 2001: A Space Odyssey offer a mystifYing
view of the future.509 We can begin to map much of the new landscape
of Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy more clearly. We are likely to see
efficient, if generally unnecessary or unproductive, delivery of pre-pe-
tition credit counseling and pre-discharge instruction in personal fi-
nancial management. The United States trustee will spend several
million dollars annually approving and continuously reviewing provid-
ers of both. Self-help publications, postings on the Web, and petition
preparers will describe the requirements, consumer bankruptcy attor-
neys will fold the counseling and instruction into the service routine,
debtors with broadband access to the Internet and facile with com-
puters will find the requirements relatively easy to satisfy, and debt-
ors able to pay for the counseling and instruction will subsidize those
unable to do so. Some pro se debtors, debtors with exigent circum-
stances, debtors with limited English-speaking ability, and debtors
without computer savvy or access to the Internet may experience
greater difficulty with the requirements.
Means testing for abuse will apply to only a relatively small num-
ber of Chapter 7 debtors or potential Chapter 7 debtors. Politicians,
credit card issuers, and others will declare victory over abusers of
Chapter 7, and the means test at least certainly symbolizes victory.
At the same time, amended section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
preserves much of the judicial discretion that the means test was de-
signed to eliminate and will generate creative forms of evasive plan-
ning. The possibly shallow victory will leave in its wake a bonanza of
litigation parsing the statute, the IRS Standards, and the Internal
Revenue Manual. To screen for abuse, actors in the system must gen-
erate and process more paperwork, much of it superfluous. The direct
and indirect costs of doing so are not inconsequential.
Consumer bankruptcy attorneys, who must identify themselves
as debt relief agencies, will integrate additional disclosures and a
written contract into their service routine, but the disclosures are un-
507. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
508. 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (MGM 1968).
509. [d.
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likely to trump the client's or the attorney's predispositions. Pending
resolution of a likely First Amendment challenge to mandated disclo-
sures in advertising, large volume consumer bankruptcy firms may
continue to advertise at little if any additional cost whereas a firm
with a smaller advertising budget may have to eliminate useful infor-
mation from its advertising or eliminate some forms of advertising
altogether.
In other respects the future terrain of consumer bankruptcy prac-
tice is less clear. Attorneys will increase their fees, at least to cover
the cost of more paperwork and, perhaps, to defray costs of additional
due diligence, at least until judges clarifY the nature and scope of the
Act's attorney due diligence obligations and signal the likelihood of
sanctions for non-compliance. Cautious attorneys will avoid advising
clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy pending resolu-
tion of a First Amendment challenge to restrictions on that advice.
Less likely, I suspect, is a mass exodus of attorneys from consumer
bankruptcy practice or attorney fee increases so substantial as to de-
prive most debtors of legal representation. No modern-day Com-
mander Dave will soon disable the consumer bankruptcy reform of
2005, but most consumer bankruptcy attorneys, including those who
vigorously opposed the reform, will turn their skills, passion, and ad-
vocacy to restricting its reach and adapting to its demands.
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